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Abstract
Similarly to how the Industrial Revolution was accompanied by rapid developments of
markets for natural resources (such as oil and coal), the development of new markets
for information goods is crucial to fully realize the benefits of the Digital Revolution. In
particular, technological innovations of the last few decades resulted in the production of
huge volumes of data by numerous businesses and individuals. Making such distributed
data available and easily exchangeable between different parties leads to significant
benefits for our society.
In this thesis, I consider the problem of designing a market for distributed data. I
focus on the following specific features of this domain: (1) data providers have high
costs for producing their databases and low costs for maintaining these databases; (2)
users submitting their queries have combinatorial preferences over which databases are
produced and get allocated; (3) the market exhibits a complex two-level production
structure; (4) data providers and users can arrive to the market stochastically over time.
These factors outline the design space for the market for distributed data that I consider
in this thesis. I start with designing a number of mathematical models that tackle
some particular aspects of this design space in isolation: from modeling combinatorial
preferences of buyers to studying uncertainty regarding availability of goods. I proceed
with a formal market design in a static setting (i.e., assuming that buyers and sellers
arrive to the market at the same time). I argue for the need of regulation for such
a market and propose an economic mechanism that can perform this regulation. I
further study the most general domain with all four aforementioned features present, i.e,
including the stochastic arrival of buyers and sellers to the market. To make the market
design challenge tractable in this domain, I restrict the class of possible mechanisms to
simple posted price mechanisms. The main challenge in this domain is to guarantee
dynamic incentive compatibility (i.e., to prevent buyers and sellers from misreporting
their costs and values as well as their arrival times in equilibrium). I further suggest a
posted price mechanism that efficiently copes with this challenge, while guaranteeing
zero expected average budget deficit.
v

Zusammenfassung
A¨hnlich wie die industrielle Revolution von einer raschen Entwicklung der Ma¨rkte
fu¨r natu¨rliche Ressourcen (wie O¨l und Kohle) begleitet wurde, ist die Entwicklung
neuer Ma¨rkte fu¨r Informationsgu¨ter von entscheidender Bedeutung, um die Vorteile der
digitalen Revolution voll auszuscho¨pfen. Insbesondere die technologischen Innovationen
der letzten Jahrzehnte fu¨hrten dazu, dass zahlreiche Unternehmen und Einzelpersonen
riesige Datenmengen produzierten. Die Bereitstellung solcher verteilten Daten und der
einfache Austausch zwischen verschiedenen Parteien fu¨hren zu erheblichen Vorteilen fu¨r
unsere Gesellschaft.
In dieser Arbeit bescha¨ftige ich mich mit dem Problem der Gestaltung eines Marktes fu¨r
verteilte Daten. Ich konzentriere mich auf die folgenden spezifischen Merkmale dieser
Doma¨ne: (1) Datenanbieter haben hohe Kosten fu¨r die Erstellung ihrer Datenbanken
und niedrige Kosten fu¨r die Pflege dieser Datenbanken; (2) Benutzer, die ihre Abfra-
gen einreichen, haben kombinatorische Pra¨ferenzen u¨ber die Datenbanken erstellt und
zugewiesen werden. (3) Der Markt weist eine komplexe zweistufige Produktionsstruktur
auf. (4) Datenanbieter und -nutzer ko¨nnen im Laufe der Zeit stochastisch dem Markt
beitreten. Diese Faktoren definieren den Entwurfsraum fu¨r den Markt fu¨r verteilte
Daten, den ich in dieser Arbeit betrachte. Ich beginne mit der Entwicklung einer Reihe
mathematischer Modelle, die sich isoliert mit bestimmten Aspekten dieses Entwurfs-
raumes befassen: von der Modellierung kombinatorischer Pra¨ferenzen von Ka¨ufern bis
zur Untersuchung der Unsicherheit in Bezug auf die Verfu¨gbarkeit von Waren. Ich
fahre mit einem formalen Market Design in einem statischen Umfeld fort (d. h. unter
der Annahme, dass Ka¨ufer und Verka¨ufer gleichzeitig auf dem Markt eintreffen). Ich
pla¨diere fu¨r die Notwendigkeit einer Regulierung fu¨r einen solchen Markt und schlage
einen wirtschaftlichen Mechanismus vor, der diese Regulierung durchfu¨hren kann. Ich
untersuche weiterhin den allgemeinsten Bereich mit allen vier oben genannten Merk-
malen, d. h. einschliesslich der stochastischen Ankunft von Ka¨ufern und Verku¨ufern auf
dem Markt. Um die Herausforderung des Marktdesigns in diesem Bereich umsetzbar zu
machen, beschra¨nke ich die Klasse der mo¨glichen Mechanismen auf einfache Mechanismen
fu¨r vero¨ffentlichte Preise. Die Hauptherausforderung in diesem Bereich besteht darin,
eine dynamische Anreizkompatibilita¨t zu gewa¨hrleisten (d. h. zu verhindern, dass Ka¨ufer
und Verka¨ufer ihre Kosten und Werte sowie ihre Ankunftszeiten im Equilibrium falsch
angeben). Ich schlage ferner einen Mechanismus fu¨r vero¨ffentlichte Preise vor, der diese
Herausforderung effizient bewa¨ltigt und gleichzeitig ein erwartetes durchschnittliches
Haushaltsdefizit von Null garantiert.
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1 Introduction and Overview of Results
1.1 Motivation1
1.1.1 Economics Meets Technology
The adoption of new ways of representing information has always gone hand in hand with
an evolution in both technology and society. The invention of the printing press around
1440 A.C. by the German blacksmith Johannes Gutenberg turned the publication of
books into an enterprise: It became much cheaper to produce multiple copies of a book,
but at the same time, it required significant initial capital to build the printing press.
These high fixed costs of production, as well as higher risks regarding future utilization,
gave rise to a number of new market models for selling books from monopoly pricing,
to the emergence of cooperative associations and syndicates, to subscription publishing,
(Tucker et al., 2017). This symbiosis between technology and new economic markets
stimulated a significant growth in the number of published books and periodical literature.
It enabled European society to fully enjoy the numerous intellectual movements that
would flourish in the upcoming Age of Enlightenment.
The synergies between technology and markets are not restricted solely to the example
above. In fact, there are numerous cases in which these synergies benefited society by
creating new ways of representing data. Consider, for example, the film, photography or
sound recording industries. Rapid development of the underlying technologies became
possible due to the highly profitable movie and entertainment markets that emerged in
the second half of the last century.
1.1.2 Call for Data Markets
The technological progress of the second half of the last century led to the emergence
of new markets for selling digital data. ‘‘Data is the new oil.” This topic has been
repeatedly discussed by The Economist (2017b,a), The New York Times (2018) and a
1Parts of this section borrow from my previous papers Moor et al. (2019), Moor (2019), Moor et al.
(2016).
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number of other reputable publishers. It is not without reason that, in recent years,
this message has been conveyed so persistently to the general public. Indeed, in the last
decade, we have seen a spectacular growth in both the demand and the supply of digital
data. The primary reason for this growth originates in the fast computerization that
happens simultaneously in almost every aspect of our daily lives.
Indeed, the strong demand for digital data in recent years follows the explosive growth
in scientific and industrial research in the area of machine learning. The vast majority of
applications in this field heavily rely on enormous volumes of data. Data is typically used
to train and validate machine learning models and to make certain inferences according
to these models. However, it is not a purely theoretical interest that drives the active
development in these areas. In fact, the last decade is marked by the spark of real-world
applications that rely on machine learning techniques. The development of modern
advertisement auctions that lie at the heart of Google’s business model, as well as the
invention of recommender systems heavily used by Amazon, are just the two well-known
applications in this field.
The supply of digital data has exhibited a similarly explosive trend. According to a
recent McKinsey report (2016), there are large amounts of data generated by industries
adopting the Internet of Things (IoT) technologies. The IoT technologies inherently rely
on hundreds to thousands of sensors that generate enormous flows of data. This data
can be used to optimize business processes or perform predictive maintenance, among
other tasks. The report states that while this data can be of high value for a number of
different stakeholders, it is not currently used efficiently. This inefficiency arises from
the fact that companies cannot easily buy or sell their data. This leads the authors to
conclude that there is a strong need for markets for this kind of data.
Structured Data. The evidence coming from academia confirms the intuition above by
promising great benefits to society if we publish more data in a structured way (i.e., as a
database). This can allow machines to understand relationships between different pieces
of data (see, for example, Bernstein et al. (2016)). Delegating this task to automatic
query processing algorithms would significantly reduce the human effort required to
analyze unstructured datasets. In the life sciences, for example, researchers submit
queries that join data from databases provided by different companies. Each of these
databases contains information on chemical compounds, disease data, biological function
and biomarkers. Automatic aggregation and processing of this data leads to faster and
more efficient drug discovery (see, for example, HCLS (2001)). Another illustrative
example is IBM Watson, a large-scale question answering system that defeated human
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champions on the popular TV show Jeopardy. This system heavily relies on querying
structured data from distributed databases (Ferrucci et al., 2010).
Fortunately, many technologies that enable automatic aggregation and processing of
structured data already exist. For example, the Web of Data (WoD), sometimes referred
to as Semantic Web (W3C, 2014), is a stack of technologies that allows data providers to
represent their data as a graph of abstract concepts connected by relationships. A user
who submits a query to the WoD relies on a query engine to join several of those graphs
produced by different data providers. In this case, the query engine does all the work of
joining and processing the data and returns a direct answer to the user’s query. Despite
the apparent power of the WoD approach, the technology has not yet seen widespread
adoption. One reason for this underutilization is economic in nature: most of the data
produced for the WoD so far has either been subsidized by governments or produced at
a loss (Buil-Aranda et al., 2013). This suggests that one of the most important factors
preventing the widespread adoption of such technologies is the lack of financial incentives
for data providers to publish their data in a structured way. Indeed, data providers
may incur high costs for producing their databases, and they naturally hope to recoup
these costs. However, advertising - the main source of income for many data publishers,
as well as traditional search engines - does not work in this domain. This is because
such structured and distributed data is processed by machines rather than by humans,
and the machine can simply ignore any ad. Therefore, new sources of revenue for data
providers are needed. This can be achieved by a market in which providers sell data to
users and the trade is mediated by a market platform. In this thesis, I conduct research
into how to find the best design for such a marketplace.
1.2 Challenges Designing Data Marketplaces
Despite the existence of numerous companies that sell their proprietary databases, there
is still no clear understanding of what is the best design of a marketplace for distributed
databases. Indeed, data published as a database can be easily linked against databases
of other data providers. This potentially increases the value of this database for users as
now they can submit complex queries against complementary databases. Therefore, to
achieve additional gains from the trade, data providers should be interested in linking
their databases among each other. However, we do not see this happening on large
scale. To understand how to capture the welfare gains arising from complementarities of
different databases, I study a number of economic and technical aspects of this domain
that are the most relevant for designing a practical marketplace for distributed data. In
3
this thesis, I focus on the following aspects of the design space.
High fixed costs, low marginal costs. Similarly to other markets for digital goods,
data providers in markets for distributed data typically have high fixed costs for producing
the first instance of their databases and very low marginal costs for maintaining their
databases. In this case, the fixed costs correspond to the costs of structuring the data,
linking it against databases of other data providers, setting up the database, etc. The
marginal costs include the electricity costs of running the database, answering queries,
etc. As the willingness of users to pay for answers for their queries is typically much
lower than the fixed costs of production of databases, these costs can be recouped only
by collecting enough money from some (potentially large) number of users.
Combinatorial preferences of users. One peculiarity of the domain of data markets
is that the databases produced by different data providers can be complementary for
buyers. Consider the following example. There is a buyer who wishes to drive to New
York to have a dinner.2 Assume that there are two databases available to the buyer. The
first database contains the list of addresses of different restaurants in New York, while
the second contains the number of available parking slots next to each restaurant. The
buyer who can query only the first database may be willing to pay some positive amount
of money for it. Indeed, having received the list with addresses of all the restaurants
in New York, the buyer can simply check each of the restaurants until he finds one
with an available parking slot. However, if the buyer can join both databases, he gets a
precise answer for his original question of where to drive to have dinner. Thus, his value
for accessing the two complementary databases must be higher. Designing a market
that allows to achieve additional gains by exploiting this combinatorial aspect of buyers’
preferences is, therefore, a crucial design decision for the domain of distributed data.
Complex production structure. In the domain of distributed databases, it makes sense
to consider the market as a production economy rather than as an exchange economy.
Interestingly, production in these markets happens on two distinct levels.
On the first level, it is data providers that produce their databases. The second level of
production in data markets corresponds to the production of answers for buyers’ queries
out of the databases of potentially different data providers. It follows that the goods
produced by data providers (i.e., databases) differ from the goods consumed by buyers
(i.e., answers to their queries). This differentiates the domain of data markets from many
2To simplify the language, we use ‘‘he” for the buyer (user) and ‘‘she” for the seller (data provider).
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other domains in which using a simple auction format for redistribution of the goods
may be sufficient.
Dynamic arrival of buyers and sellers. While in many combinatorial markets the
dynamics may not play a critical role, data markets are inherently dynamic.3 This means
that both buyers and sellers in these markets arrive regularly and can strategically delay
their arrivals if they expect to be better off by doing so. Due to the combinatorial nature
of preferences of buyers such delays can have a dramatic effect on the operation of the
market. Indeed, the late arrivals of sellers may result in a very low surplus reached by
the buyers who arrive earlier and thus, can access only very few databases.
Each of the aforementioned aspects is accompanied by a number of computational and
economic market design challenges. In this thesis, I suggest a number of market models
that efficiently cope with those challenges.
1.3 Goal and Research Questions of the Thesis
This thesis focuses on the development of mathematical (game-theoretical) models that
describe the basic economics of markets for distributed data. The ultimate goal is to
design the economic mechanisms that govern trade in such markets. These mechanisms
should build the foundation for more practical market design solutions in this domain
in the future. While the overall challenge of practical market design for distributed
data may sound ambitious, the underlying economic mechanisms must provide a good
enough approximation for these practical marketplaces. Thus, they must have provable
theoretical guarantees on their optimality or be supported by extensive computational
analysis if a full theoretical examination is infeasible. From the computer science
perspective, the proposed mechanisms should be either efficiently computable or provide
appropriate approximations. Apart of that, the field of computer science and particularly
of distributed databases provides us with the most important technological constraints
for the market design challenge.
As is common in economic mechanism and market design, I adopt the perspective of a
market designer who aims at building highly efficient markets (i.e., markets with high
levels of surplus reached by the participants) whenever this is possible. To ensure that
the proposed market is practical and to be able to formally reason about its economic
3For example, combinatorial spectrum auctions typically happen once in several years (Cramton,
2013). Within this time frame the technology can change dramatically making it impractical for the
bidders to misreport their bids based on the expected outcome of one of the future auctions.
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properties, this must be subject to a number of additional constraints - namely, one
should maintain incentive compatibility, which ensures robustness of the market to
strategic manipulations by both users and data providers. A second property, individual
rationality, guarantees that the market participants do not end up with negative utilities
if they participate in the market. In particular, it means that the data providers can
recoup the fixed costs they incurred when producing their databases, and it also ensures
that users obtain a non-negative surplus when participating in the market. Finally, budget
balance is the property that allows the market to operate without external subsidies.
Unfortunately, there does not exist a mechanism for satisfying all these desiderata in an
arbitrary domain. This follows, from the seminal paper by Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983). Instead, the design of the market must be tailored to the particular nature of
distributed data. This raises the following three research questions:
Question 1. What are the technological constraints of the domain of distributed data
and what are the economic features of such a market?
Question 2. How can we formally design a static mechanism that can cope with the
constraints arising from Question 1?
Question 3. How can we model the dynamic arrival of buyers and sellers to the market
and design an appropriate mechanism for mediating the trade in a dynamic setting?
1.4 Publications Contained in this Thesis
This thesis consists of four papers that answer the three research questions presented in
Section 1.3. In this section, I restate the research questions and provide a list of papers
that address the respective research questions.
Question 1. What are the technological constraints of the domain of distributed data
and what are the economic features of such a market?
Publications:
 D. Moor, T. Grubenmann, S. Seuken, A. Bernstein (2015). A Double Auction for
Querying the Web of Data. In Proceedings of the Third Conference on Auctions,
Market Mechanisms and Their Applications, AMMA, Chicago, IL, USA.
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 D. Moor, S. Seuken, T. Grubenmann, A. Bernstein (2016). Core-Selecting Pay-
ment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions with Uncertain Availability of Goods. In
Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
IJCAI, New York, NY, USA.
Question 2. How can we formally design a static mechanism that can cope with the
constraints arising from Question 1?
Publications:
 D. Moor, S. Seuken, T. Grubenmann, A. Bernstein (2019). The Design of a
Combinatorial Data Market. Working paper.
Question 3. How can we model the dynamic arrival of buyers and sellers to the market
and how to design an appropriate mechanism for mediating the trade in the dynamic
setting?
 D. Moor (2019). Data Markets with Dynamic Arrival of Buyers and Sellers.
In Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and
Computation, NetEcon, Phoenix, AZ, USA.
Additional work. The following papers I co-authored shed some more light on the
technical aspects of the domain of distributed data (Question 1). However, I do not
provide the full content of these papers in my thesis as I am not the first author of those.
 T. Grubenmann, A. Bernstein, D. Moor and S. Seuken (2017). Challenges of
source selection in the WoD. In Proceedings of the 16th International Semantic
Web Conference, ISWC, Vienna, Austria.
 T. Grubenmann, A. Bernstein, D. Moor, S. Seuken (2018). Financing the Web
of Data with Delayed-Answer Auctions. In The Web Conference, WWW, Lyon,
France.
 T. Grubenmann, A. Bernstein, D. Moor, S. Seuken. FedMark: A Marketplace for
Federated Data on the Web. Working paper.
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1.5 Related Work
1.5.1 Existing Business Models
I here mention a number of companies that operate marketplaces for data in certain
business areas. I then briefly summarize their respective business models, the kind of
data that they provide and the typical data providers and consumers of this data.
Bloomberg. Bloomberg L.P. is a privately held company that makes most of its profits
operating as an aggregator of financial data and analytics. The company sells access to
the Bloomberg Terminal to banks, hedge funds, brokers and other financial institutions.
This terminal allows easy access to and display of financial data and news, and it provides
a number of analytical tools. The platform bundles together numerous databases from
both free and proprietary sources. Free databases typically contain data that is common
knowledge, such as simple stock prices. A typical provider of the proprietary data is the
New York Stock Exchange (NYS) and Comscore. Bloomberg terminals are typically
leased for one or two years. The subscription costs between 20,000 USD and 25,000 USD
per year (Greg, 2011). According to Quartz (2013), the company suggests discounts
depending on the number of terminals acquired.
Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters is widely considered to be Bloomberg’s main
competitor in the market for trading financial data. In addition to financial data, the
company also provides software and numerous databases with legal data used by lawyers,
accountants and journalists. According to the annual report of Thomson-Reuters (2015),
the largest share of its operating revenue is derived from subscription leases. The company
also suggests discounts depending on the total contract price: the higher the price, the
larger the discount.
LexisNexis. LexisNexis provides access to a number of legal databases. Typical buyers
include law firms, banking and financial services companies and state and local govern-
ments. Data providers for LexisNexis include other companies - for example, Thomson
Reuters. A number of databases offered by LexisNexis are also produced by the company
itself. In contrast to Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters, LexisNexis suggests transactional
pricing in addition to flat rate pricing. With transactional pricing, customers can pay
either per search or per hour. Similarly to Blomberg and Thomson Reuters, LexisNexis
offers discounts to certain customers (e.g., governments). Under the flat rate pricing,
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Lexis Nexis suggests two subscription tariffs with some degree of content restriction
(LexisNexis, 2019).
Microsoft Azure Data Marketplace. A practical data marketplace was attempted by
Microsoft with its Microsoft Azure Data Marketplace platform, but it ceased operations
in 2016 due to ‘‘lack of sustained customer interest” (Ramel, 2016). This lack of interest,
however, does not necessarily suggest a lack of demand; an inadequate business model
could be to blame. Evidence for this is the fact that companies like Thomson Reuters,
LexisNexis and Bloomberg still make large profits by selling access to their proprietary
databases. Still, Microsoft Azure Data Marketplace was a remarkable example of a data
market, as it allows any data provider to deliver its database to the platform (i.e., the
data is not restricted to a particular domain).
Other. There are a number of smaller companies that compete with Bloomberg and
Thomson Reuters in the market for financial data. FactSet is just one example. Similarly,
in the domain of legal data, Wolters Kluwer is a competitor of LexisNexis. There are also
a number of other domains apart from those discussed above, with numerous companies
selling their data. For example, Elsevier is a well known publisher of scientific and
technical databases. A good overview of different existing data vendors and data market
places can be found in Schomm et al. (2013).
1.5.2 Related Literature
There are numerous papers focusing on designing markets for digital goods as opposed
to non-digital goods. Varian (1995, 1997) discusses the problem of competition between
producers of digital goods in an environment with high sunk and low marginal costs.
In Varian (2000), the problem of buying and sharing of information goods is analyzed.
Goldberg et al. (2001), Goldberg and Hartline (2001, 2003) propose an auction for
selling goods in unlimited supply (such as music or video). Bakos and Brynjolfsson
(1999) showed that in domains with high uncertainty about the valuations of users for
information goods, bundling allows the seller to better predict the value of buyers for
the bundle and, thus, to extract more revenue. All aforementioned approaches discuss a
general digital good such as music or video files. Unfortunately, none of these approaches
allow to model the combinatorial structure of users’ preferences that is specific for the
domain of distributed databases (see Section 1.2).
Generally speaking, it is not straightforward that buyers’ preferences in markets for
distributed data can be described by a utility function. However, there are a number of
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cases in which deriving the utility of a buyer is possible. For example, a recent paper
by Bergemann et al. (2018) presents a model in which heterogeneous buyers need to
take an action in an uncertain world. The buyers do not know in which state the world
is, but they have private prior beliefs about this state. As the payoff of the buyers’
decisions depend on the state of the world, they can acquire some supplementary data
to update their beliefs. Thus, the value of a buyer for the data can be defined as the
gain in utility that the buyer expects to get from the refined signal about the state of
the world. Consequently, the utility can be described as the value of the buyer for this
information, net the payment that the buyer has to make to acquire the data.
A different model for the value of information was proposed by Admati and Pfleiderer
(1986). In their model, a number of homogeneous traders acquire information regarding
an asset that is traded in a speculative market. The information received by traders
is reflected in the price of the asset and, thus, the value of the information decreases
as more participants in the market gain access to the information. This value model is
conceptually different from the one proposed by Bergemann et al. (2018) in how the value
of information depends on the number of buyers to whom the information is revealed.
While this thesis does not contribute directly to this line of research, it is build upon the
idea that the buyers in data markets are able to estimate their values for data.
There are numerous papers discussing how to sell structured data (such as a single
database). For example, Mehta et al. (2019) propose a utility model and an optimal
mechanism for selling a single dataset that consists of multiple rows and columns. The
authors have shown that despite the heterogeneity of the buyers, the optimal mechanism
is a fairly simple ‘‘price-quantity” schedule. In Koutris et al. (2015), Balazinska et al.
(2013), Deep and Koutris (2016) the authors design a query-based pricing. As different
queries can lead to potentially different result sets, the number of different goods, in this
case, coincides with the number of different queries that the user can submit. Obviously,
this number can be large which opens a possibility of arbitrage in this domain (i.e., the
possibility to produce a similar view of a database for a smaller payment), which these
authors pay special attention. Consequently, designing a query-based pricing rule for
such domains needs some special care. None of these works, however, models the fact
that the data can be produced by different data providers. In the domain of distributed
databases, this is a crucial feature and my thesis takes this into account.
This idea of combinatorial preferences in markets for distributed data is further empha-
sized by Agarwal et al. (2019) who suggested a possible solution for a marketplace that
sells data for machine learning tasks. In their paper, the authors proposed a design of a
marketplace for a setting when data providers have already incurred high sunk costs for
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producing their data and would naturally like to minimize their regret. In contrast to
that, in my work, I aim at designing a marketplace that would incentivize sellers who
have not yet produced their data to do so. In particularly, I want to guarantee that
these sellers always get fully compensated for producing their databases.4
1.6 Summary of Contributions
In this section, I briefly summarize the four papers mentioned in Section 1.4, which
together constitute the main contribution of this thesis.
1.6.1 A Double Auction for Querying the Web of Data
The paper presents a possible market design solution for the domain of the Web of Data
(WoD) in a setting in which sellers have considerable marginal costs for answering queries.
The solution is based on using a combinatorial double auction to allocate different sets
of sellers to answer queries submitted by buyers. In this setting, each buyer submits
his bid to the market platform. The bid consists of the query and a willingness to pay
for the query. Naturally, the buyer can misreport his willingness to pay. However, I
assume that the buyer cannot misreport his query. Similarly, data providers submit their
cost estimates for answering the queries, as well as statistics regarding the data at their
disposal. Data providers can lie about their costs (i.e., to submit lower or higher costs
than the true costs). However, the market platform can validate the statistics and, thus,
the data providers cannot manipulate it.
The main challenge discussed in the paper arises from the uncertainty of the actual
(realized) results of query execution. Indeed, when the buyer submits his query, he is
not aware of the actual result set that he will ultimately receive. Thus, upon receiving
the result set of a lower value than expected, the individual rationality constraint for
the buyer may be violated. To eliminate this, we must correct the payments computed
by the market platform ex-post. In this paper, I present a number of possible payment
correction rules.
Important here is that the double auction discussed in the paper aims at maximizing
social welfare in the two-sided market. To achieve this goal however, we must sacri-
fice strategyproofness (this is due to the result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)).
Therefore, to compare the different payment correction rules I perform a computational
4These two different market design objectives result in different amounts of information that the
market designer needs to know to compute allocation and payments. In particular, the design of Agarwal
et al. (2019) does not rely on prior knowledge of distributions of sellers’ costs while my design does.
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Bayes-Nash equilibrium analysis of the proposed market. The analysis showed that the
proposed payment correction rules perform relatively well (with respect to the efficiency
reached in the market) comparing to the Threshold rule that is commonly used in a
double auction setting without uncertainty (Parkes et al., 2001). This suggests that
implementing an auction-based market for the WoD may be a viable solution. The main
limitation of the model, however, is that it assumes high marginal costs of answering
queries and ignores the fixed costs that the data providers incur for producing their
databases.
1.6.2 Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
with Uncertain Availability of Goods
In this paper, I present the design of a combinatorial auction for a domain in which
goods can become unavailable. While this problem may seem to be unrelated to the
problem of designing the market for distributed data, it has numerous similarities. First,
in both domains, buyers’ preferences are combinatorial. Second, in the two domains the
goods that the buyer expects to receive may differ from the goods he actually receives
(i.e., similarly to Moor et al. (2015), the buyer can receive a different result set than he
expects).
In this case, I follow the general approach of Porter et al. (2008) and assume that each
good can become unavailable with a certain probability. I further suggest the design
of a core-selecting combinatorial auction that maximizes the expected social welfare
(with respect to the reported bids) and computes the payments ex-post. This means that
the payments computed by such an auction are contingent on the actual realization of
availabilities of different goods. One of the main results of this paper is that generally,
there does not exist a mechanism that is ex-post core-selecting and budget balanced.
This follows from the fact that the ex-post core can be empty. However, in practice we
can circumvent this issue by computing the payments from the ex-post core whenever
the core is non-empty and using some reference payments (such as VCG) in all other
cases.
As core-selecting auctions are generally not strategyproof, I analyze the performance
of the proposed mechanism via a computational Bayes-Nash equilibrium analysis. The
analysis suggests that the proposed payment rules perform much better than a naive
application of a standard combinatorial auction to the domain with uncertainty. In
addition to that, the rate of violations of the individual rationality constraint gets smaller
for the ex-post computation of payments comparing to the ex-ante computation. The
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suggested approach, however, has a number of practical limitations. The main limitation
is the high computational complexity in large settings. Observe also that this setting
corresponds to a one-sided market and, thus, assumes a single auctioneer (seller).
1.6.3 The Design of a Combinatorial Data Market
This paper suggests a practical market design solution for a static case in which buyers
and sellers arrive to the market at the same time. In this setting, I assume that each
seller can produce at most one database and has a high fixed cost for producing it. A
buyer can submit his query to the query engine that resides on the market platform’s side.
An answer for the buyer’s query constitutes the result set which typically consists of
multiple rows. In this case, the value of a buyer for the result set depends on how many
rows does the result set contain as well as on the databases that are used to produce the
result set.
The design exploits the idea of the market platform playing the role of a regulator
that aims at achieving high levels of surplus reached by buyers while guaranteeing that
the fixed costs of allocated sellers are recouped. In this setting, the market platform
computes the allocation of sellers as well as the payments that should be paid to the
sellers. This is done using a Buyer Optimal Reverse Auction (BORA) that is designed
to optimize the surplus of buyers. The market platform also determines the posted price
(per row of the result set) that is exposed to buyers. The main challenge in this setting
is keeping both parts of the market balanced (i.e., to ensure that the total amount of
money collected from the buyers is sufficient to compensate the allocated sellers). This is
done by designing an appropriate fixed point iteration procedure that gradually updates
the posted price and recomputes the outcome of the BORA auction as long as the budget
deficit is not equal to zero.
To validate the model I provide an extensive simulation study of the proposed mechanism
in small- and medium-sized domains. The results of this study confirm the high efficiency
achieved by the proposed model. I also demonstrate that in such a market the sellers have
a strong incentive to ‘‘innovate”, i.e., to produce unique databases rather than to compete
with each other for producing databases out of common knowledge data. Development of
large-scale simulations and testing the market under real-world conditions is one possible
future extension of this work.
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1.6.4 Data Markets with Dynamic Arrival of Buyers and Sellers
The focus of this paper is on modeling the dynamic arrival of buyers and sellers to the
data market. Similarly to Moor et al. (2019), the market platform in this model plays
the role of a regulator that aims to optimize the surplus of buyers while guaranteeing
that the fixed costs of the allocated sellers are recouped. The operation of the market
platform is modeled by a Markov process, with states corresponding to different numbers
of allocated databases. The transition probabilities are defined by posted prices that the
market platform exposes to data providers as well as by the arrival rate of the new data
providers.
This paper introduces the notion of dynamic incentive compatibility that prevents late
arrivals of agents. To guarantee dynamic incentive compatibility, the posted prices
exposed to buyers must differ from those computed for sellers. In the paper, I argue that
optimal posted prices computed by the market platform and exposed to sellers can only
decrease, which guarantees dynamic incentive compatibility for sellers. I also demonstrate
that the posted prices exposed to buyers constitute a martingale process. This suggests
that the expected price faced by the buyer tomorrow is equal to the posted price observed
by the buyer today. This allows to achieve dynamic incentive compatibility for buyers.
This paper also shows that dynamic incentive compatibility is generally not compatible
with budget balancedness. Fortunately, as I show, the average expected budget deficit
goes towards zero as the number of sellers in the market increases.
1.7 Conclusion and Future Work
Today, a thorough analysis of the data at hand is essential for any efficient policy
and decision making. Ensuring that the data is readily available to decision makers is,
therefore, a challenge with enormous potential gain. The goal of this thesis is to build the
foundation for a practical market design that would incentivize data providers to publish
and link their databases against the databases of other data providers while making it
attractive for users of the data to participate in the market. Such a design must enable
achieving additional welfare gains by allowing buyers to join databases across different
domains. In this domain, budget balancedness is an important feature that makes such
a market sustainable.
I performed an extensive exploration of the design space and proposed several economic
mechanisms that cope with a number of market design challenges arising in the domain
of distributed data. I have proposed the design of an optimal static mechanism for such
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a market. This mechanism aims to maximize buyers’ surplus while guaranteeing that
allocated sellers are compensated for the fixed costs they incurred. It also guarantees
budget balancedness and individual rationality.
Further, I studied the dynamics of such markets. In this realm, I identified the main
challenges arising from the dynamic arrival of buyers and sellers on the market (e.g.,
dynamic incentive compatibility) and suggested a mechanism that efficiently copes with
those challenges. These findings suggest that markets for distributed data, while extremely
complicated, are still viable and can function highly efficiently under appropriately
designed regulations.
1.7.1 Limitations
There are a number of market design challenges that have not been addressed in this
thesis. For example, none of our current models allow for the measurement of the impact
of privacy on the operation of the market. Some aspects of the privacy issues inherent
to data markets have been studied by Jones and Tonetti (2018). In their work, the
authors suggested a model in which multiple firms can trade personal data of their
users. However, there has not been significant progress in understanding what this would
suggest for practical market design on the level of data marketplaces.
This thesis also does not examine how different terms of use or qualities of data influence
the efficiency of the proposed markets. While I also do not consider expiring data, this can
be modeled within my Moor (2019) paper by adding backwards transition probabilities
into the Markov chain of the market platform. However, I leave this direction for future
work.
1.7.2 Future Work
Designing a centralized market for distributed data is a challenge. Once we have built
the basic static and dynamic models of such a market, a natural next step would be to
relax certain assumptions and to study the robustness of our models with respect to
these relaxations. In particular, one could think of modeling more complex preferences
of buyers by making these preferences dependent on the total number of buyers who
can access a certain dataset (similarly to Admati and Pfleiderer (1986)). Modeling the
implications of privacy and different qualities of data on the efficiency of the proposed
market mechanisms would be another future direction. Notice also, that in practice,
different databases can have different terms of use. Modeling this aspect of data markets
may lead to further combinatorial challenges in query execution and potentially in pricing.
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Thus, it constitutes another possible line of the future research.
An alternative direction for the future work would be to study the existing decentralized
markets for data. Indeed, in our daily lives, we see a number of companies selling their
data in a decentralized manner (see Section 1.5.1). This decentralized market evolved via
a number of merges or acquisitions of smaller companies by companies like Bloomberg
and Thomson Reuters. As a result, the current decentralized market for data exhibits a
number of data aggregators in specific business areas. Understanding how such a market
structure evolved, what is the optimal number and size of such aggregators and what
prevents these aggregators from further merging may shed some light on the most critical
obstacles preventing data markets to achieve full efficiency.
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2 A Double Auction for Querying the
Web of Data
A VERY common form of motion of
mechanical systems is what are called
small oscillations of a system about a
position of stable equilibrium. We
shall consider first of all the simplest
case, that of a system with only one
degree of freedom.
L.D. Landay and E.M. Lifshitz,
Volume 1 of Course of Theoretical
Physics
The content of this chapter has previously appeared in:1
Moor, D. and Grubenmann, T. and Seuken, S. and Bernstein A. (2015).
A Double Auction for Querying the Web of Data. In Proceedings of the
Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications,
AMMA, Chicago, IL, USA.
1This excludes the addendum added in the Section 2.1 of the current thesis.
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Abstract
Currently, the Web of Data (WoD) suffers from a lack of financial incentives for data providers.
In this paper, we address this issue, by proposing a double auction to efficiently allocate
answers (from data providers) to queries in the WoD. However, our domain exhibits a number
of complicating features. Most importantly, before executing a particular query, the market
mechanism only has estimates regarding what result can be expected. Thus, in contrast to other
domains, the allocation rule as well as the pricing rule of the auction must operate based on
value and cost estimates. New challenges arise from this setting; in particular the auction’s
participation constraint can no longer be guaranteed to be satisfied. We propose three payment
correction rules to address this issue, and compare the efficiency of the resulting payment rules
via a computational Bayes-Nash equilibrium analysis.
1 Introduction
The Web of Data (WoD) is to computers what the traditional Web is to humans. The goal is
to expose data in a semantic format such that machines can easily find the information they
are looking for. This semantic format allows for easy data integration and hence content from
different sources can be queried in a federated fashion without the need to agree on a common
scheme – something that is neither possible in the traditional Web nor in a traditional database
setting. If implemented properly, a semantic search would lead to the desired results much faster
than using a traditional search engine. However, a big practical challenge is the adoption of WoD
technologies (Antoniou and van Harmelen, 2004). In particular, the majority of data that exists
somewhere in some form is simply not made available in a WoD format.
The primary reason for this is a lack of incentives for the data providers: on the WoD, datasets
are usually queried by algorithms rather than viewed by people. Thus, advertising, the main source
of income for search engines on the traditional web, does not work in this environment where
machines process the data and automatically filter out unwanted information or advertisement.
It is of course possible to directly charge users to access (and search through) high-quality
data. For example, Bloomberg, LexisNexis, and Thomson Reuters charge customers high fees for
accessing their data using a subscription-based model. More recently, marketplaces like the Azure
DataMarketplace1 has enabled different publishers to sell their data with different subscriptions
based on the number of transactions per month. However, none of these companies provide their
data in a way such that they can be queried in a federated fashion. They do not provide the
means to join multiple data sets, thereby forgoing the complementarities the WoD would enable.
1https://datamarket.azure.com/home
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This is a serious drawback, because customers are often interested in a specific combination of
data from different providers that are joined in a certain way.
1.1 Market Incentives for Supplying Data
To create new incentives for providing data in a semantic format, we propose to use a market
for querying the WoD. Specifically, we suggest using a double auction to elicit buyers’ values for
getting an answer to their queries as well as sellers’ costs for supplying their data. Our goal in
designing the auction is to elicit the (true) values and costs of the market participants such that
we can make (approximately) efficient allocations, while satisfying the participants’ participation
constraints and keeping the market budget-balanced. Interestingly, in our domain, satisfying these
design goals is highly non-trivial.
One argument against the marketplace’s viability is that caching/duplication of data and
Bertrand competition will drive prices down to zero, making it uninteresting for sellers to even
enter the market. In practice, however, many data providers can sell information due to 1) frequent
content changes (e.g., airplane schedules, today’s movies, stock prices), 2) ever-increasing content
(e.g., court cases, patent information or pharma information), or 3) licensing restrictions (e.g.,
restricting re-sale and sometimes even re-use of movies, music, or financial exchange information).
Thus, there are many data sources for which our proposed market would be viable.
1.2 Market Design Challenges
The first complicating feature of our domain is that the sellers are selling their data instead of
just computational resources. This means that a buyer who submits a query to the market does
not know a priori what he will get in return; i.e., he is effectively “buying something of uncertain
value.” Concretely, the goods for sale in the auction are not fully specified upfront. This requires
the buyer to specify his value function, which is a function that defines his value for different
outcomes of the auction, for all possible result sets that the market could return.
A second, and even more central challenge in our domain, is the fact that the sellers can only
provide statistics about the data they are selling (i.e., the goods in the auction); but based
on these statistics, the market mechanism can only compute rough estimates regarding what
result a specific allocation will produce. In particular, the exact value of an allocation will only
be known after the sellers have produced the result. In consequence, the allocation rule and
the pricing rule of the market mechanism must operate based on value and cost estimates – a
distinguishing feature of our domain. We will demonstrate that this feature implies that for
a two-sided market mechanism which is otherwise guaranteed to satisfy budget-balance and
participation (Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso, 2001), the participation constraint may now become
infeasible to be satisfied, and the budget-balance constraint may simply fail. Thus, one of our
main research questions is how we can design a market mechanism with good properties in the
presence of these domain-specific challenges.
Based on the query, the buyer’s value function, the sellers’ cost functions, and the statistics,
the market computes the estimated value for the different result sets. The buyer does not specify
a value for the different result sets itself as the estimation of this value is a computationally
challenging task.
1.3 Overview of Contributions
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
1. We propose the “Query Market,” a double auction mechanism for querying the WoD.
2. We show that the Threshold rule does not work in our domain due to the uncertainty about
the sellers’ data.
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3. We introduce three payment correction rules to design payment rules that always satisfy
the participation constraint despite the uncertainty in our domain.
4. We evaluate the efficiency of the three payment rules via a computational Bayes-Nash
equilibrium analysis (Lubin, Bu¨nz and Seuken (2015)) for multiple market scenarios.
1.4 Related Work
1.4.1 Market-based Approaches towards Resource Allocation in Computational
Systems
The idea to use markets to allocate computational resources is almost as old as computers
themselves. Already in the 1960s, researchers at Harvard University used an auction-like method
to determine who gets access to the PDP-1, the world’s first interactive, commercial computer
(Sutherland (1968)). Since then, many market-based approaches for computational systems have
been proposed.
Early research on market-based scheduling focused on the efficiency of computational resource
allocation. Malone, Fikes and Howard (1983) present Enterprise, and show how to achieve
an efficient allocation of tasks between multiple LAN-connected nodes, where task processors
broadcast requests for bids and bid on tasks. Bids reflecting task completion times. Likewise,
Spawn by Waldspurger et al. (1992) utilizes a market mechanism to optimize the use of idle
resources in a network of workstations. Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick (1995) investigated
the impact of soft factors such as ownership for incentive-provisioning in database systems.
More recently, Lai et al. (2005) proposed Tycoon, a distributed computation cluster, featuring
a proportional-share market resource allocation model. The authors claim that an economic
mechanism is vital for large scale resource allocation a common problem on the Web. Furthermore,
market-based optimizations have proved to be as good or better than traditional allocation methods
in grid-computing schedulers. Similarly, Auyoung et al. (2006) demonstrate how profit-aware
algorithms outperform non-profit aware schedulers across a broad range of scenarios.
Labrinidis, Qu and Xu (2007) applied market-based optimizations to real-time query answering
systems. Stonebraker et al. (1996) proposed a WAN-scale Relational Database Management
System with a market-based optimizer instead of a traditional cost-based one. Dash, Kantere
and Ailamaki (2009) proposed a market-based approach for cloud cache optimization taking into
account a user’s value for getting an answer to a query. However, their approach focuses on the
cost-side of cloud computing. Koutris et al. (2013) proposed a Market for SQL queries which
sells data instead of computational resources for answering queries. They use an arbitrage-free
pricing scheme instead of a double auction to calculate payments and do not consider competition
between sellers in their analysis. Furthermore, buyers in their market do not specify a value for
different results nor do sellers specify estimated statistics about their data, hence, they do not
face the problem of value and cost estimation, one of the main issues in our market.
Only recently, a new research field called electronic market design has emerged (Anandalingam,
Day and Raghavan (2005)). This field provides computer scientists with the necessary tools
from auction theory, mechanism design, and market design, to analyze and design markets for
computational resources with the same precision as economists have done with great success, for
example, in the multi-billion dollar spectrum auction domain (Cramton (2013)). Our goal in
this project is to develop a market-based approach for the WoD that is equally grounded in the
mathematical foundations of mechanism design and market design.
1.4.2 Querying the Web of Data
Research on distributed query processing has a long history in the database field. Its traditional
concepts were used to provide integrated access to RDF sources distributed on the WoD (Harth
et al. (2007), Quilitz and Leser (2008), Erling and Mikhailov (2009)). The drawback of these
3
ID_1
Order_1
Product_A
Order_2
Product_B
“Alice”Name
Ordered Ordered
Product Product
3 7
Amount Amount
“211B 
Baker 
Street”
Address
Figure 1: An example dataset, represented as an RDF graph, about a customer “Alice” who ordered
3 items of product A and 7 items of product B.
solutions is that they assume total control over the data distributions, an unrealistic assumption in
the open Web. Addressing this drawback, some proposed systems that do not assume fine-grained
control but perfect knowledge over the rdf:type predicate distribution (Langegger, Wo¨ßand
Blo¨chl (2008) ) while others proposed to extend SPARQL with explicit instructions controlling
where to execute sub-queries (Zema´nek, Schenk and Svatek (2007)). Unfortunately, this assumes
an ex-ante knowledge of the data distribution on part of the query writer.
More recently, SPLENDID (Go¨rlitz and Staab (2011)) relies on service descriptions and VoID
statistics for each endpoint, to perform source selection and query optimisation. In contrast, FedX
(Schwarte et al. (2011)) uses no knowledge about mappings or statistics about concepts/predicates
but consults all endpoints to determine if a predicate can be answered (caching this information
for the future). Finally, Hartig, Bizer and Freytag (2009) describe an approach for executing
SPARQL queries over Linked Open Data (LoD) based on graph search. LoD rules, however, require
them to place the data on the URI-referenced servers a limiting assumption for example when
caching/copying data. Other flexible techniques have been proposed, such as the evolutionary
query answering system eRDF (Oren, Gueret and Schlobach (2008)), where genetic algorithms
are used to learn how to best execute a SPARQL query. However, none of these approaches
investigates the economic viability of their proposed solutions.
2 Web of Data (WoD)
One of the main concepts of the WoD is the Resource Description Framework (RDF) (Cyganiak,
Wood and Lanthaler (2014)) which models data as statements about resources (subject and object)
which are linked via a predicate that defines the relation between the two resources. A resource
denotes something in the universe of discourse (e.g. a physical thing, a website, or an image).
Figure 1 shows how data in RDF can be modelled as a graph. Each arrow in the figure represents
a predicate pointing from a subject to an object. For example the resource ID 1 in Figure 1,
representing the ID of a customer, is the subject of both, the Address and Name predicates. The
objects of these relations are the literals ”221B Baker Street” and ”Alice”, respectively.
The SQL-like query language SPARQL (Harris and Seaborne (2013)) was proposed as a
language to query the Web of Data. Listing 1 shows an example of how such a query can look
like. The query asks for name and address of customers, the products ordered by them and the
amount. If this query is executed against the dataset in Figure 1 the result from Table 1 will
be returned. Each line ending with a ”.” in the WHERE-clause indicates a triple pattern. The
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leading ”?” in the query indicates variables. During query processing the query engine searches
for binding for these variables such that the result matches the corresponding RDF graph. Each
valid match for the variables will produce one row in the result. In a given row, all variables with
the same name must be matched to the same resource. For example if the variable ”?order” is
matched with the resource Order 1 in the second line of the query in Listing 1 then the variable
”?order” in the third line must also be matched with the resource Order 1. Hence, in this case
the only valid binding for the variable ”?amount” is 3 which gives us the first row in Table 1.
SELECT ?name ? address ? product ?amount WHERE {
? order Product ? product .
? order Amount ?amount .
? id Ordered ? order .
? id Name ?name .
? id Address ? address . }
Listing 1: A query which asks for name, address, product and amount.
?name ?address ?product ?amount
”Alice” ”221B Baker Street” Product A 3
”Alice” ”221B Baker Street” Product B 7
Table 1: Result of the query in listing 1.
2.1 Distributed SPARQL processing
If the required data for a query is not located in a single place but distributed over different
datasets queries must be processed in a distributed fashion. One of the problems in distributed
SPARQL processing is the estimation of the size of a join of triples from different datasets. Figure
2 shows how data could be partitioned over two datasets, A and B. If the same query from Listing
1 is performed over A and B the result will be again as in Table 1. The size of the join is in
this case 2 even though there are 4 orders in dataset A and 3 customer names in dataset B. The
problem of join estimation is that given some statistics from both individual datasets (in this
case the count of triples) it is hard to guess the size of the join of these two datasets. It could be
that every one of the four orders matches a customer in B which has 3 different addresses. In
this case the result size would be 12, 3 times the same name with 3 different addresses for every
order. But it could also be that the data from A and B don’t match and hence the result size
would be 0. In the field of distributed query processing there are several different approaches to
estimate the size of the join without executing the query itself. Each approach has a different
trade-off between accuracy and cost (consumption of computational resources).
3 The Query Market
The market mechanism we propose is a double auction that allows a buyer to submit a query
and get an answer to his query using datasets provided by different sellers.2
2To simplify the language, we will use “he” for buyers and “she” for sellers.
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Figure 2: RDF graphs distributed over two datasets, A and B
3.1 Modeling Assumptions
We assume that sellers are only constrained by what kind of data they can provide, but that they
are not resource-bounded, i.e. that they can potentially answer all the queries for which they
have data to provide. This assumption is motivated by the fact that computational resources
can nowadays be bought dynamically when needed, for example from cloud services like Amazon
EC2. Hence, the cost of the sellers is the marginal cost that occurs answering an additional query
which is the cost of the additional resources that need invested to answer the query.
As this implies that buyers are not competing for the same resources, we can hold an independent
auction for each buyer’s query. Hence, the remaining of the paper will only consider one buyer
per auction. In practice multiple auctions run in parallel, one for each query.
Furthermore, we assume that there is no incentive for the sellers to strategize on the statistics
they provide for their data. This assumption can be motivated in two ways: (1) the market
operator may have the right to audit the statistics of sellers at any point in time, such that
incorrect statistics can be detected and penalized; (2) the market operator may directly run a
process on the sellers’ machines to fetch the statistics in regular time intervals. However, even
though the sellers are non-strategic about reporting the statistics, they are only rough (and often
incorrect) estimates of what the sellers can deliver, because “precise” estimates might be to
expensive to produce. Hence, the statistics delivered by the sellers might be flawed. Additionally,
the result of a join between data from different sellers is again an estimate based on their statistics,
and thus, imprecise estimates may compound when computing join estimates.
Finally, we assume that the buyer is only strategic about reporting his value function, but
submits his true query to the market. The goal of the buyer is to maximize his utility given his
query. This means maximizing his value minus the cost he needs to pay for the answer.
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Figure 3: Schematic view of the Query Market.
3.2 Formal Model
Figure 3 shows a schematic of our market with three different sellers. We let b denote the buyer
and S  ts1, . . . , snu denote the set of sellers in the market. The buyer must submit the query
q and the value function v. The pair pq, vq of query and value function is the bid of the buyer.
Each seller i needs to provide some statistics σi about the data she can provide for the query as
well as her cost function ci. The pair pσi, ciq of statistics and cost function is the bid of seller i.
Example 1. Consider the query from Listing 1. An example of a value function v would be the
number of rows in the result times some constant value, e.g. $5. In this case the value function
would look like:
v  valuePerRowprq : r  $5
where r is the number of rows in the result.
For an allocation that produces the result from Table 1 the value would be $10.
Analogously, a seller can for example specify her cost with respect to the number of triples
provided, e.g. $2. In this case the cost-function ci would look like:
v  costPerTripleptiq : ti  $2,
n where ti is the number of triples provided by seller i.
If seller i would provide for a certain allocation 10 triples, her cost would be $20.
A plan pi describes how the query should be answered by the Query Execution Engine. This
includes the set of sellers that participate in answering the query as well as the concrete instructions
for the Query Execution Engine how to produce the result for the query.
The Query Planer constructs all possible, valid plans that can answer the query q. For each
plan pi the Query Planer calculates the return set summary resti which is an estimate of what
seller i will return if plan pi is executed (e.g. the cardinality of the data the seller returns) and
combines all the required information to calculate the cost for seller i. Formally, resti is the result
of ri which denotes the estimation process and is a function of the plan pi and the statistics
σ1, . . . , σn provided by the sellers:
resti : rippi, σ1, . . . , σnq.
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The Query Planer also calculates the result set summary xest which is an estimate of what the
buyer will get if plan pi is executed (e.g. the cardinality of result of the query) and combines all
the required information to calculate the value for the buyer. Note that xest does not denote the
actual result of the query as it is not needed for the pricing rule. Formally, xest is the result of x
which denotes the estimation process and is a function of the plan pi and the statistics σ1, . . . , σn
provided by the sellers:
xest : xppi, σ1, . . . , σnq.
Using xest and resti , the estimated value v
est : vpxestq for the buyer and the estimated cost
cesti : cipr
est
i q for seller i can be calculated. These estimates, together with the actual plan pi
form the vector of plan values piv:
piv : ppi, vest, cest1 , . . . , c
est
n q.
Example 2. Consider a plan pi that consists of a join between two sellers, s1 and s2. Based
on the statistics σ1 and σ2, the market estimates x
est, rest1 , and r
est
2 . Given the value and cost
functions from example 1, assume that for the join in pi seller s1 needs to provide 10 triples,
seller s2 5 triples, and the cardinality of the result is 8 rows. In this case we have:
rest1 : r1ppi, σ1, σ2q  10,
rest2 : r2ppi, σ1, σ2q  5,
xest : xppi, σ1, σ2q  8.
With these estimates, the vector of plan values piv can be formed:
piv : ppi, vest  $40, cest1  $20, c
est
2  $10q.
The set of all plan values will be sent to the Pricing Rule, and it contains all the information
that is required by the Pricing Rule to calculate the prices.
At the same time, the Query Planer determines the plan pi that maximizes the estimated
social welfare
pi  argmax
pi
pSW ppi, σ1, . . . , σnqq  argmax
pi

vpxppi, σ1, . . . , σnqqloooooooooomoooooooooon
vest

¸
i
ciprippi, σ1, . . . , σnqqlooooooooooomooooooooooon
cesti
	
and sends the allocated plan to the Query Execution Engine3.
The execution of the query produces the result which is sent to the buyer. Using the result
of the query execution both, the estimate of the result set summary xest and the estimate of
the return set summaries resti of the allocated plan, can be replaced by the actual summaries
xalc and ralci , where ”alc” stands for ”allocated”. The actual value v
alc : vpxalcq and costs
calci : cipr
alc
i q for the result can now be computed and the vector of the allocated plan values
pivalc : ppi, valc, calc1 , . . . , c
alc
n q is sent to the Pricing Rule.
Example 3. Assume that the plan from example 2 is the allocated plan. During query execution
it might turn out that seller s1 needs to provide 10 triples for the join but seller s2 only 4. At the
same time, the result set consists only of 5 rows instead of 8. Hence, the vector of the allocated
plan values is:
pivalc : ppi, valc  $25, calc1  $20, c
alc
2  $8q.
The Pricing Rule (further described in Section 4.2) computes the price for the buyer, pb, and
the prices for the sellers, p1, . . . , pn. We assume that both, the buyer and the sellers, have a
quasi-linear utility function. For the buyer, the utility function is given as follows:
ubpxq  vpxq  pb for x P tx
est, xalcu
3The execution is done in a distributed fashion against the set of sellers from the winning plan using the Federated
Query Extension of SPARQL 1.1. See http://www.w3.org/TR/sparql11-federated-query/
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and for the sellers as follows:
uiprq  cprq  pi for r P tr
est, ralcu
Remark 1. Even though the buyer himself does not explicitly specify different bids for different
plans, the auction implicitly translates his value function v into a specific bid vppi, σ1, . . . , σnq
which is the value for a given plan pi and statistics σ1, . . . , σn. Since each plan generally consists
of multiple sellers, the buyer’s value function eventually translates into combinatorial bids for
different bundles of sellers. Thus, our auction is a combinatorial double auction.
4 The Double Auction
When we are designing a double auction, we strive for the following four properties:
1. Efficiency (EFF)
2. Budget-balance (BB)
3. Participation (P)
4. Strategyproofness (SP)
It is well-known, that in an exchange domain, we cannot satisfy all four properties simultaneously.
In our domain, we relax strategyproofness and aim for a double-auction that maximizes efficiency,
subject to satisfying budget-balance and participation.
4.1 Allocation Rule
The allocation is part of the Query Planner (as described in Section 3) which chooses a plan pi
that maximizes the estimated social welfare SW  vest 
°
i c
est
i .
4.2 Pricing Rule
For this section, we generalize and unify the notation for buyers and sellers and denote the set of
all agents as I  SYtbu. We use index 0 for the buyer and 1...|S| for sellers. We let a denote an
efficient allocation (which corresponds to the plan pi) and ai an efficient allocation when agent
i is excluded. Now, let wjpaq denote an agent’s value for an allocation a, j P 0, 1, ..., |S|, where
w0paq  vpaq for the buyer, and wjpaq  cjpaq for a seller j  t1, ..., |S|u. The social welfare for
the efficient allocation including all agents is denoted V  :
°
j wjpa
q, and the social welfare
for the efficient allocation excluding agent i is denoted V i :
°
ji wjpa

iq. VCG payments can
be computed as follows:
pvcgi : wipa
q  pV   V iq.
We let ∆vcgi : V
  V i denote the VCG discount of agent i. Furthermore, we let ∆
vcg :
t∆vcg0 , ...,∆
vcg
|S| u. Now, we can equivalently write VCG payments as follows:
pvcgi : wipa
q ∆vcgi .
At first sight, VCG payments may seem attractive, because they make truthful reporting of
values, a dominant strategy for all agents. However, it is well known that in two-sided market
setting like ours, VCG generally leads to a budget-deficit, i.e., the payments made to the sellers
can be larger than the payments collected from the buyers (Milgrom, 2007). Formally, the
budget-balance constraint is violated.
To address this problem, Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso (2001) have proposed a family of pricing
rules that only approximate VCG payments, while ensuring budget-balance. Their idea is to
compute payments as pi : wipaq ∆i, where ∆i is a discount assigned to an agent for allocation
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a and wipaq is a reported value of the agent. Discounts ∆  t∆0, ...,∆|S|u are computed to
minimize the distance to VCG discounts while satisfying the budget-balance and participation
constraints. The Threshold pricing rule (Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso, 2001) can be formulated
as the following optimization problem, where the target point is ∆trg  ∆vcg:
min
∆
L2p∆,∆
trgq
s.t.
¸
iPtbuYS
∆i  V
 pbudget balanceq
0 ¤ ∆i ¤ ∆
trg
i @i P I pparticipationq
(1)
4.3 Failure of the Participation Constraint
The Threshold pricing rule provides budget-balance in a two-sided market domain with no
uncertainty about the goods to be sold. However, in our domain, because of inefficiencies which
can occur due to uncertainty in statistics provided by the sellers about their data, all of the pricing
rules proposed by Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso (2001) may lead to an infeasible participation
constraint in the payment computation problem.
We now provide an example which illustrates how imprecise estimates provided by the sellers
can cause problems with the participation constraint. In particular, the following example shows
that even VCG can end up violating the participation constraint in a domain with uncertainty.
Example 4. Let b be the buyer and S  ts1, s2, s3u three different sellers. Assume two possible
plan values are generated by the Query Planer for b’s query. The first plan value piv1 
tpi1, v
estppi1q  3, c
est
1 ppi1q  0.5, c
est
2 ppi1q  2u, the second one piv2  tpi2, v
estppi2q  6, c
est
2 ppi2q 
1, cest3 ppi2q  4u. If there was no uncertainty in the domain, an efficient allocation would choose
piv2 resulting in VCG payments p
vcg
b  5, p
vcg
s1  0, p
vcg
s2  2, p
vcg
s3  4.5. While not being
budget-balanced, these payments provide participation.
Now assume that there is an uncertainty and after piv2 is allocated we have: piv1  tpi1, v
estppi1q 
3, cest1 ppi1q  0.5, c
est
2 ppi1q  2u, piv
alc
2  tpi2, v
alc  3, calc2  1, c
alc
3  2u. VCG payments com-
puted for this actual allocation are pvcgb  3, p
vcg
s1  0, p
vcg
s2  1, p
vcg
s3  1.5. It’s clear now
that the participation constraint for s3 is not satisfied anymore because |p
vcg
s3 |   c
alc
3 .
If VCG violates the participation constraint, then payment rule (1) becomes infeasible in our
domain. Thus, we need to design payment correction rules to tackle this problem.
4.4 Payment Correction Rules
We now propose three different payment correction rules and study which one leads to higher
efficiency (in equilibrium). As mentioned before, because of uncertainty, our mechanism might
sometimes make an inefficient allocation (even given truthful value reports). In this case,
one cannot rely on VCG because of negative VCG discounts which lead to infeasibilities in the
participation constraints (as explained in Section 4.3). A similar problem was faced by Goetzendorf
et al. (2015), where the authors just trimmed such infeasibilities. We could try to apply this
idea to our domain and use the trimmed VCG discounts as a target point ∆trg in (1). While
this new target guarantees satisfaction of the participation constraint, it is not clear whether it
provides good incentives (and thus good efficiency). For this reason, we also define two alternative
methods for constructing a target point ∆trg. For this we let pi denote the plan for the allocation
chosen by the Query Planer. We the define V est : vpxppi
, σ1, . . . , σnqq
°
i ciprppi
, σ1, . . . , σnqq
as the total value of all agents in this allocation (before query execution), and V est,i :
vpxppii, σ1, . . . , σnqq 
°
i ciprppi

i, σ1, . . . , σnqq as the total value of all agents in the allocation
where agent i is excluded. Our three payment correction rules are:
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1. PC-TRIM: Compute VCG discounts using xalc and ralc for the allocated plan, given a possibly
non-efficient allocation (similarly to Goetzendorf et al. (2015)). Then trim infeasibilities in
the participation constraints by increasing all negative ∆i to be zero and use the resulting
discounts as a new target point ∆trg.
2. PC-PENALTY: We let V alc,i denote the social welfare for the allocated plan pi
, where we use
actual summaries (based on the result from the executed query) for seller i, but use the
reported statistics for all other sellers. Then we compute VCG discounts based only on the
statistic reported by sellers. Next we reduce those discounts which correspond to sellers
who have provided wrong estimates by a penalty factor αi 
V estV

alc,i
V est
, for all i involved in
pi. The penalty factor reflects the harm caused by agent i to the efficiency by providing
her imprecise estimates.
3. PC-VCG: Compute VCG discounts using the (possibly wrong) estimates xest and rest from
the Query Planner, instead of xalc and ralc, even though the query has already been
executed, and use those estimate-based VCG discounts as a target point ∆trg.
The resulting payment rules for our market are derived from the Threshold payment rule
by applying the aforementioned payment correction procedures. However, it is not strictly
necessary to use Threshold as an underlying payment computation rule. Instead many other VCG
approximation techniques can be utilized in combination with the proposed payment correction
rules, for example, Small, Large, Fractional (Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso (2001)) etc.
To check which payment rule provides better efficiency, we compare all three of them in a
double auction setup when all agents play according to the Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the
mechanism.
5 Quantitative Evaluation
To study the efficiency of the three proposed payment rules, we need to make an assumption
regarding the agents’ behavior in the market. Assuming agents to be rational, we allow them to
strategize and act as if they would try to maximize their expected utilities. This allows us to
naturally restrict our analysis to only setups when all agents play according to their equilibrium
strategies. In other words, we are interested in finding a strategy profile for all agents which would
maximize the expected utility of every agent assuming that all other agents also play according to
the strategies in this strategy profile. This approach allows us to capture the strategic behavior
of the agents (due to non-strategyproof payment rules) and evaluate efficiency loss caused by the
agents’ strategic behavior. Given that a full information assumption seems highly unrealistic in
this domain, we adopt a Bayes-Nash equilibrium analysis approach.
However, theoretical evaluation of the BNE can be an extremely difficult task. Goeree and
Lien (2014) derived a BNE for a simple combinatorial auction setup with only three agents
and two items. Ausubel and Baranov (2010) derived a BNE for a similar setup but taking into
account correlated values of agents. However, there are no any further results for neither more
complicated combinatorial auctions nor for double auctions. In addition to that, our market
usually involves much more than just 3 agents which makes the theoretical analysis even harder.
Thus, instead of deriving the equilibrium analytically we try to approximate it computationally.
Section 5.1 describes more precisely how a BNE can be approximated. Section 5.2 introduces
the simulated WoD domain and describes the quantitative evaluation framework in detail. In
conclusion Section 5.3 provides a detailed explanation of the results of our evaluations.
5.1 Approximate BNE Computation
To perform the quantitative evaluation of our market we compute p, δq-BNEs using a method
described by Lubin, Bu¨nz and Seuken (2015). This method is based on an iterative best-response
search procedure.
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The general approach for BNE approximation implements an idea of a Fictitious Play and
can be described as a two stage procedure. First, agents are grouped into one of nb bins. We
use only nb  2 bins: one for buyers and one for sellers. Agents within same bin are assumed
to play the same strategy. We also assume that the strategy space for a buyer with value v
can be represented as v  s, s P r0, 1s implying that the buyer can only underbid but not overbid.
Similarly, the strategy space for a seller with a cost c is c  1s , s P r0, 1s which means that the seller
only overreport his costs.
The second stage is an iterative process during which for every bin a best response strategy is
computed, i.e., a strategy which is when being played by every agent within the bin maximizes
the total utility of all agents in the bin (assuming the strategies of other agents are fixed). At
this stage on every iteration nSamples games are sampled using known distributions of types of
all agents. Then, each agent within a particular bin plays different strategies while strategies of
all other agents are fixed. Every such a game contributes into the overall utility of the bin which
is computed as a sum of utilities of all agents from the bin. This reduces the aforementioned
problem of the best response strategy search to a global stochastic optimization problem where
the objective is to maximize the total utility for every bin while varying strategies of agents within
the bin. Clearly, the number of such global optimization problems per iteration is equal to the
number of bins. When optimal strategies for bins are computed, we apply them for every agent
in corresponding bins by allowing them to play a convex combination of their current strategy
and the newly found best response. This leads to an update of the strategy, or shaving factor, for
every bin and followed by the next iteration.
The process terminates when an p, δq-BNE is identified, i.e., when playing the best response
rather than the p, δq-BNE strategy does not improve bins’ overall utilities more than by a factor
of 1  . More formally,
Definition 1. A strategy profile s  ps1 , ..., s

nBinsq is an p, δq-Bayes-Nash equilibrium if for
every bin i P t1, ..., nBinu
Eiruipbri, siqs
Eiruipsi , siqs
¤ 1  ,
and
||si  brips

iq||2 ¤ δ,
where bri denotes a best response of the i-th bin and ui is a total utility of the i-th bin.
We use   1%,   2.5% and   3% for the scenario with three, five and ten sellers
respectively. For all scenarios we assume δ  0.1. We also varied nSamples from 1000000 for a
small setup with only three and five sellers to 500000 for the setup with 10 sellers. To solve the
described global optimization problem of a best response search we utilize multistart method
with 10 starting points generated randomly from U r0, 1s combined with a pattern search local
optimization procedure.
5.2 Domain Description
To evaluate the market we generate three different WoD domains and thus simulate three different
market scenarios. The first scenario includes a single buyer b1 and three sellers sA, sB and
sC . For this scenario we assume that the Query Planner always generates two plans pi1 and
pi2. Each plan involves two different sellers chosen randomly from a uniform distribution. We
denote testX ppiiq the estimated (and possibly imprecise) number of triples which a seller sX reports
she can provide for the plan pii, X P tA,B,Cu, i P t1, 2u. The numbers of triples provided by
different sellers is chosen uniformly from r1, 10s. Even though such a case with only three sellers
is not very likely to happen in a real Query Market where the number of sellers is usually large,
it brings out some interesting properties of the market. More specifically, we use this scenario to
study what happens with the market if it has very influential agents.
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Figure 4: Evaluation framework.
The second scenario includes a single buyer and five sellers. For this scenario we again generate
two different plans each involving two different sellers chosen randomly from a uniform distribution.
By comparing the resulting strategies of this scenario with the corresponding strategies from the
previous one, we study how the factor of the number of sellers alone influences on the efficiency
of our market.
The third scenario is more typical for the Query Market and includes a single buyer and 10
sellers. For this scenario we generate five different plans. Similarly to previous two scenarios each
plan involves two different sellers chosen randomly from a uniform distribution. A high diversity
of sellers and a small number of sellers involved in a single plan reduces the effect of individual
sellers.
For all domains, we assume the agents’ value and cost functions are linear in the cardinality of
data. Thus, we only need a value and cost factors, v and ci, i P S respectively to be reported by
agents. We assume that v and ci are drawn independently from a uniform distribution U r0, 1s,
(i P S).
When a plan is allocated an estimation error can be injected into the plan. To model estimation
errors (or uncertainty), we randomly select a seller X P tA,B,C, ...u from a uniform distribution
over the set of sellers involved in the allocated plan pi. We then generate talcX  N ptestX , σq
truncated at 0 instead of testX . Furthermore, we assume that a seller can only overestimate t
est
X ,
i.e., testX ¥ t
alc
X ; and if t
alc
X ¡ t
est
X , we use t
alc1
X  t
est
X pt
alc
X  t
est
X q instead. Underestimation of the
number of allocated triples should not be a problem as in this case the seller can simply discard
extra triples which are not required by the plan. Additionally, by varying σ we study how the
degree of uncertainty in the domain influences on agents’ incentives and the resulting market
efficiency.
For the three described scenarios, we first approximate the Bayes-Nash equilibrium for every
payment rule. Then we feed the mechanism with all agents playing according to the BNE into a
benchmarking module to measure the following characteristics:
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1 Buyer, 10 Sellers
Type of Payment rule Strategies, % % of VCG profits rate of BB BB Partici-
statistic Buyer Sellers Efficiency Buyer Sellers violations,% deficit pation
w/o uncertainty
VCG 100 100 1.00 100 100 72 0.87 X
THRESHOLD-TRUTH 100 100 1.00 69 76 0 0 X
THRESHOLD 76 147 0.39 48 42 0 0 X
w. uncertainty
VCG-TRUTH 100 100 0.86 89 80 66 0.80 
VCG 98 109 0.77 80 77 64 0.89 
PC-TRIM 78 142 0.37 43 37 1.8 0.005 X
PC-PENALTY 84 135 0.46 46 44 1.6 0.003 X
PC-VCG 80 136 0.41 45 41 1.7 0.004 X
Table 2: Results of a computational BNE analysis for all pricing rules in a uncertainty-free and
uncertain setting for the scenario with one Buyer and 10 Sellers.
• The total efficiency of the market relative to the total efficiency of the market if VCG is
used to compute payments and there is no uncertainty in the domain.
• Profits of buyers and profits of sellers relative to their profits if VCG is used for payment
computation in a domain without uncertainty.
• The rate of budget-balance violations, i.e., how often does it happen that the budget-balance
constraint is violated.
• The amount of budget-balance deficit w.r.t. the total efficiency of the market, i.e., the ratio
of the budget-balance deficit to the total social welfare.
The general workflow of our evaluation framework is presented in Figure 4. First, buyer’s and
sellers’ types are sampled and their value and cost functions are submitted into the auction (1).
Second, a set of plans is generated by the Query Planner (2). Then an allocation happens followed
by an injection of an estimation error into the allocated plan (3). Payments are computed on the
next step. Resulting utilities of agents are used in a best response search procedure to identify
optimal strategies for agents on the current iteration. The process repeats (5) using strategies
computed on the previous iteration until -BNE is found and then these BNE strategies are fed
into the efficiency, profits and budget-balance evaluation module (6). The efficiency module in its
turn generates 100,000 markets with agents acting according to the identified BNE and computes
the total efficiency, profits of agents, number of budget-balance constraint violations and the
budget amount required to cover these violations etc.
5.3 Results
Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 show our evaluation results. We have considered two different
cases (with and without uncertainty): within the uncertainty-free setting, we consider VCG,
THRESHOLD-TRUTH, and the standard THRESHOLD rule. The THRESHOLD-TRUTH rule is simply the
standard Threshold rule where instead of playing their BNE strategies, we force all agents to play
truthfully. While being very artificial, this mechanism gives us an upper bound on the agents’
profits for a budget-balanced mechanism in the uncertainty-free setting.
For the domain with uncertainty, we consider five pricing rules: VCG-TRUTH (a benchmark which
obtains true values, but uncertain reports from sellers and uses VCG as a payment rule), VCG (a
benchmark which computes VCG using uncertain reports), and then the three price correction
(PC) rules PC-TRIM, PC-VCG and PC-PENALTY. Note that VCG for the setup with uncertainty is not
truthful anymore due to inefficient allocations and thus the agents will play their BNE strategies.
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5.3.1 Market Scenario #1: 1 Buyer and 10 Sellers
Consider Table 2, where we present the results for market scenario #1 with 1 buyer and 10 sellers.
This scenario is meant to represent a typical WoD domain with lots of sellers, where no individual
seller is pivotal for trade to happen.
The first observation we make is that THRESHOLD only achieve 39% of the efficiency of VCG.
This result is not surprising, because while VCG is strategyproof, THRESHOLD is not. As we can
see, under THRESHOLD, the agents start manipulating (the buyer under-reports by 24% and the
sellers over-report by 47%), which results in lost trades, and thus explains the lower efficiency of
THRESHOLD.
Next, we compare VCG in the domain without uncertainty to VCG-TRUTH in the uncertain
setting. Here, the 14% smaller efficiency of VCG-TRUTH indicates how much efficiency we lose due
to imprecise estimates and not because of agents’ manipulations. Then we compare VCG with
VCG-TRUTH in the domain with uncertainty. Here we observe that VCG loses an additional 9%
points over and above the efficiency loss that VCG-TRUTH already incurred, which must now partly
be due to the strategy manipulations of the agents. Added together, the uncertainty injection
and the agents’ strategic manipulations lead to a 23% efficiency loss, when compared to VCG in
the uncertainty-free setting.
Finally, we consider our three payment correction rules, PC-TRIM, PC-PENALTY and PC-VCG,
whose efficiency is between 0.37 and 0.46. Let’s first compare the resulting efficiency to that
of VCG-TRUTH, the efficiency upper-bound for the market with uncertain reports. For example,
PC-VCG achieves 48% of the efficiency that VCG-TRUTH achieves. Now let’s consider PC-TRIM, which
actually uses VCG from the setting with uncertainty as its target point in the price computation
algorithm. Thus, the efficiency of PC-TRIM is upper-bounded by the efficiency of VCG in the
setting with uncertainty. Here, we obtain that PC-TRIM achieves 48% of the efficiency of VCG in
the setting with uncertainty. Note that it is not surprising that in some cases (like for PC-TRIM)
our payment correction rules do not achieve the same share of the maximum achievable efficiency
that THRESHOLD is able to achieve in the uncertainty-free setting, because (1) we need to correct
the participation constraint, which may lead to a further efficiency loss, and (2) in the domain
with uncertainty, we are already starting with a target point ∆trg  ∆vcg which already leads
to significant strategy behavior by the agents and an efficiency loss of p1 0.770.86 q  100%  11%.
This suggests that the choice of ∆vcg as a target point in the uncertain environment might be
sub-optimal - in contrast to the uncertainty-free setting, where generally using ∆vcg as the target
point provides good incentives and thus leads to high efficiency. This effect can be seen more
clearly in the scenario with smaller number of agents (see, for example, section 5.3.3).
We now look at the profits of the agents in the market, which in Table 2 are normalized
relative to the profits the agents obtain under VCG in the uncertainty-free setting. We see that
the buyer obtains between 43% and 46% of his VCG profits, while the sellers obtain between
37% and 44% of their VCG profits. Importantly, all three payment correction rules lead to
almost identical profits. Furthermore, we see that under PC-TRIM, the buyer obtains a profit
of 0.430.89  100%  48% of the maximal attainable profit under VCG-TRUTH; and the seller obtains
a profit of 0.370.80  100%  46% of the maximum attainable profit under VCG-TRUTH. Thus, these
results are relatively close to the 48% and 42% which THRESHOLD achieves in the setting without
uncertainty.
5.3.2 Market Scenario #2: 1 Buyer and 5 Sellers
In Table 3 we present the results for market scenario #2 with 1 buyer and 5 sellers. This scenario
represents an intermediate case between the most typical for the semantic web scenario #1 and
an almost extreme scenario #3 with very influential agents.
In this case we obtained strictly worse strategies for the buyer and sellers comparing with
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1 Buyer, 5 Sellers
Type of Payment rule Strategies, % % of VCG profits rate of BB BB Partici-
statistic Buyer Sellers Efficiency Buyer Sellers violations,% deficit pation
w/o uncertainty
VCG 100 100 1.00 100 100 60 1.51 X
THRESHOLD-TRUTH 100 100 1.00 47 73 0 0 X
THRESHOLD 67 172 0.16 28 15 0 0 X
w. uncertainty
VCG-TRUTH 100 100 0.86 86 85 58 1.45 
VCG 97 102 0.79 85 78 56 1.48 
PC-TRIM 72 166 0.18 26 16 1.2 0.01 X
PC-PENALTY 72 161 0.19 28 16 1.3 0.01 X
PC-VCG 71 163 0.18 27 16 1.2 0.01 X
Table 3: Results of a computational BNE analysis for all pricing rules in a uncertainty-free and
uncertain setting for the scenario with one Buyer and 5 Sellers.
those of scenario #1. This shows that the higher number of agents and available plans can
considerably decrease manipulability of the market and raise its efficiency. In our case the low
number of agents results in more than halved efficiency for all proposed payment correction rules.
For example, we have 49%  0.180.37  100% of efficiency drop for PC-TRIM, 41% 
0.19
0.46  100% for
PC-PENALTY, and 44%  0.180.41  100% for PC-VCG. However, such a dramatic drop in efficiency is
not specific only for our payment correction rules: our experiments also provide a similar trend
for the THRESHOLD rule in the setup with no uncertainty. In this case we have 42%  0.160.38  100%
smaller efficiency when decreasing the number of agents and available plans.
Perhaps the most surprising result is the fact that the efficiency of all payment correction
rules in the setting with uncertainty (around 18%) is higher than the efficiency of THRESHOLD
in the uncertainty-free setting (16%). This finding is not easy to explain, because we would
typically expect that the uncertainty in the domain leads to a reduction in the efficiency, as we
have observed it in the previous scenario. Our only explanation is that THRESHOLD, even though
it is using VCG discounts as a target point, is only the optimal payment rule in an ex-post
sense. However, in a Bayesian setting, only little is known about which payment rule is best
(Lubin and Parkes (2009)). Our current conjecture is that our payment correction rules have
coincidentally picked out such an attractive target point that, evaluated in BNE, it leads to even
higher efficiency than THRESHOLD does in the uncertainty-free setting. However, further analysis
is needed to evaluate this conjecture.
5.3.3 Market Scenario #3: 1 Buyer and 3 Sellers
Now consider Table 4, where we present the results for market scenario #3. Remember that this
is an extreme scenario where every seller is very influential; ever seller can potentially be pivotal;
and where one of the three sellers is required for all of the plans (i.e., he is a “monopolist”).
The most important observation from Table 4 is that the efficiency of all three payment
correction rules is now only around 15%, and thus much lower than in the scenario with 10 sellers
(where it was around 40%). This can of course be explained by the fact that in this scenario,
the sellers have become much more pivotal, which has increased their incentives to manipulate.
While previously, the sellers where overbidding by approximately 40%, they are now overbidding
by at least 63% and up to 75% (for PC-PENALTY). Remember that PC-PENALTY only penalizes
sellers, and in particular those sellers that have provided imprecise estimates that have led to
an inefficient allocation. Thus, the buyers can usually expect to receive high VCG discounts
under this rule, and consequently play almost truthfully. The sellers, in contrast, have very large
incentives to manipulate.
16
1 Buyer, 3 Sellers
Type of Payment rule Strategies,% % of VCG profits rate of BB BB Partici-
statistic BuyerSellersEfficiencyBuyer Sellers violations,%deficit pation
w/o uncertainty
VCG 100 100 1.00 100 100 59 1.55 X
THRESHOLD-TRUTH 100 100 1.00 45 73 0 0 X
THRESHOLD 71 178 0.17 26 14 0 0 X
w. uncertainty
VCG-TRUTH 100 100 0.96 95 96 59 1.52 
VCG 98 112 0.80 84 82 59 1.54 
PC-TRIM 67 163 0.15 25 12 1.1 0.013 X
PC-PENALTY 70 175 0.15 22 11 1.1 0.014 X
PC-VCG 69 163 0.16 25 13 1.2 0.012 X
Table 4: Results of a computational BNE analysis for all pricing rules in a uncertainty-free and
uncertain setting for the scenario with one buyer and three sellers.
5.3.4 Budget-balance Violations and Budget Deficits
Remember that our goal was to design a budget-balanced double auction mechanism. As
mentioned before, it is well known that VCG is not budget-balanced in a two-sided market. We
can now put a number on how severe the budget-balance violations of VCG are in our simulated
domains. In Table 2, we see that in the uncertainty-free setting, VCG led to a budget-balance
violation in about 72% of the cases. In Table 4, VCG led to a budget-balance violation in about
59% of the cases.
The THRESHOLD rule is explicitly designed to be budget-balanced, but only works in the
uncertainty-free setting. For this reason, we need our new price correction rules, i.e., the only
rules which are always guaranteed to satisfy the participation constraint in the uncertain setting.
However, even those three rules can sometimes still lead to a budget-balance violation when a
plan is allocated whose total costs are larger than its value, which may happen due to imprecise
estimates. These kinds of budget-balance violations cannot be avoided in our market due to
the nature of the WoD. But fortunately, as we can see in Table 2 and 4, such budget-balance
violations occur very infrequently for our payment correction rules: between 1.6% and 1.8% in
the market with 10 sellers, and between 1.1% and 1.2% in the market with 3 sellers.
Finally, when these budget-balance violations do occur, then the amount of budget deficit that
our payment correction rules exhibit is minimal. For example, in Table 2, we see that the average
budget deficit for our rules is between 0.003 and 0.005, which is almost negligible compared to
a budget deficit of 0.87 of VCG (all of these numbers are relative to total social welfare). In
Table 4 the average budget deficit of our rules is between 0.012 and 0.014, compared to a average
budget deficit of 1.55 of VCG.
Of course, in practice, we would have to find some way to cover these budget deficits. Given
the almost negligible size of the budget deficit, a practical approach is to simply increase the
payments charged to buyers by a correspondingly small amount on all other trades where no
budget-balance violations occur. Developing a practical method for automatically calibrating
these additional “taxes” such that the market operator always has enough budget to cover the
expected budget deficit is subject to future work.
5.3.5 Impact of the Degree of Uncertainty on the Market Efficiency
By analyzing Table 2 and Table 3 we see that the efficiency of the proposed payment rules in the
domain with uncertainty is usually higher than the efficiency of a Threshold rule in a domain
without uncertainty. At the same time agents in an uncertain domain manipulate less than in
the case when all estimates are precise. This can be caused either by a more attractive target
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Figure 5: Efficiency and the rate of budget balance violations for different degrees of uncertainty in
the scenario with a single buyer and three sellers
point ∆trg in the domain with uncertainty or by the fact that in an uncertain domain it is easy
for an agent to lose some of its utility by manipulating because of a more unpredictable market
behavior. To check if a higher uncertainty can really increase the efficiency of the market we
perform a set of experiments with different levels of uncertainty injected into the market.
To manipulate the degree of uncertainty of our market we vary the σ parameter at the error
injection step. Remember, that the error is injected in the following way talcX  N ptestX , σq, where
testX is the estimated number of triples reported by a seller sX , X P tA,B,C, ...u (see Section
5.2). Thus, by increasing σ we increase the uncertainty in the domain. In all our experiments we
parametrize σ 
testX
α , where α P R  is a parameter used to manipulate the uncertainty level. We
perform a number of experiments with α  1.8, α  3, α  5, and αÑ8 (which corresponds to
a domain without uncertainty). Note that in the case with αÑ8 (and, consequently, σ  0) all
the proposed payment rules are essentially equivalent to the standard Threshold rule.
Figures 5-7 illustrate the dependency of the efficiency and the rate of budget balance violations
on the uncertainty level of the domain. For all considered scenarios with different number of
agents we see a positive trend in efficiency when σ increases. In the case with three sellers there
is a small drop in efficiency when increasing σ from 0 to tX3 . We explain this by the fact that
in the domain with very influential (or monopolistic) sellers agents can still manipulate a lot
even despite of a small uncertainty in the domain. However, when σ is large enough it becomes
difficult to manipulate even for influential agents and thus we again have a positive trend in
efficiency when σ ¡ tX3 .
It is misleading, however, to think that we can always increase the efficiency of the market
by injecting more uncertainty in the domain. The problem which arises here is that when we
increase the uncertainty in the domain we also increase the number of budget balance violations
(see the right-side Figures 5-7). This is not surprising as larger differences between test and tals
(due to larger σ) lead to a higher amounts of inefficient allocations with a total cost of a plan
larger than the value of a buyer for the plan. Thus, there is a trade-off between a high efficiency
and a budget balance property. Important also that for the large number of sellers the trend of
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Figure 6: Efficiency and the rate of budget balance violations for different degrees of uncertainty in
the scenario with a single buyer and five sellers
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Figure 7: Efficiency and the rate of budget balance violations for different degrees of uncertainty in
the scenario with a single buyer and 10 sellers
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budget balance violations is almost linear. This means that small perturbations of the uncertainty
in statistics provided by sellers does not lead to a dramatic growth of the budget required to
cover all inefficiencies occurred due to these imprecise estimates.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a double auction for querying the WoD which handles the
fact that the input to both, the allocation and pricing rules, are uncertain due to statistical
estimation errors. We have proposed a general market framework for this domain, and introduced
a formal model for the double auction. It turns out that a particular challenge in our domain
was to design a pricing rule that satisfies the participation constraint despite uncertainty. In
particular, the Treshold rule, which is guaranteed to satisfy participation in standard double
auction environments, can now sometimes lead to an infeasible pricing problem. Towards this
end, we have proposed three payment correction rules which always guarantee the participation
constraint.
We have evaluated the three rules via a computational Bayes-Nash equilibrium analysis.
Interestingly, we have found that incentives, the efficiency, and profits of our new rules are
relatively competitive with the Threshold rule in a uncertainty-free setting, despite the significant
influence of imprecise estimates on the market. We have also evaluated the impact of the number
of sellers (and their influence), and found that, consistent with intuition, a larger number of
sellers leads to higher efficiency, less manipulation, and higher profits. Furthermore, we have
studied the amount of budget required to cover the budget deficit which still occurs, even under
our price correction rules, and found this to be almost negligible. Overall, our evaluation results
look promising toward implementing an auction-based market for the WoD.
In future work, we are planning to investigate how relaxing some of our assumptions (like
those regarding the value and cost functions of the agents) may affect the efficiency, profits and
incentive properties of the market. Furthermore, we are going to investigate the impact of a more
realistic error injection module, by incorporating a real Query Planner as well as real data stores
into our simulation setup.
References
Anandalingam, G., Robert W. Day, and S. Raghavan. 2005. “Landscape of Electronic
Market Design.” Management Science, 51(3): 316–327.
Antoniou, Grigoris, and Frank van Harmelen. 2004. A Semantic Web Primer. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press.
Ausubel, Lawrence M., and Oleg V. Baranov. 2010. “Core-Selecting Auctions with Incom-
plete Information.”
Auyoung, Alvin, Laura Grit, Janet Wiener, and John Wilkes. 2006. “Service Con-
tracts and Aggregate Utility Functions.” In In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on High
Performance Distributed Computing.
Cramton, Peter. 2013. “Spectrum Auction Design.” Review of Industrial Organization,
42(2): 030–190.
Cyganiak, Richard, David Wood, and Markus Lanthaler. 2014. “RDF 1.1 Concepts and
Abstract Syntax.” http: // www. w3. org/ TR/ 2014/ REC-rdf11-concepts-20140225/ .
Dash, Debabrata, Verena Kantere, and Anastasia Ailamaki. 2009. “An Economic Model
for Self-tuned Cloud Caching.” In Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on
Data Engineering.
20
Erling, O, and I Mikhailov. 2009. “RDF Support in the Virtuoso DBMS.” OpenLink Software.
Goeree, Jacob, and Yuanchuan Lien. 2014. “On the Impossibility of Core-Selecting Auctions.”
Theoretical Economics. Forthcoming.
Goetzendorf, Andor, Martin Bichler, Pasha Shabalin, and Robert W. Day. 2015.
“Compact Bid Languages and Core Pricing in Large Multi-item Auctions.” In Management
Science.
Go¨rlitz, Olaf, and Steffen Staab. 2011. “SPLENDID: SPARQL Endpoint Federation Exploit-
ing VOID Descriptions.” In Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Consuming
Linked Data. Bonn, Germany.
Harris, Steve, and Andy Seaborne. 2013. “SPARQL 1.1 Query Language.” http: // www.
w3. org/ TR/ 2013/ REC-sparql11-query-20130321/ .
Harth, A, J Umbrich, A Hogan, and S Decker. 2007. “Yars2: a Federated Repository for
Querying Graph Structured Data from the Web.” 6th International Semantic Web Conference
(ISWC), 211–224.
Hartig, O, C Bizer, and J C Freytag. 2009. “Executing SPARQL Queries over the Web of
Linked Data.” 8th International Semantic Web Conference ISWC2009, 293–309.
Koutris, Paraschos, Prasang Upadhyaya, Magdalena Balazinska, Bill Howe, and Dan
Suciu. 2013. “Toward Practical Query Pricing with QueryMarket.” In Proceedings of the 2013
ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data.
Labrinidis, Alexandros, Huiming Qu, and Jie Xu. 2007. “Quality Contracts for Real-time
Enterprises.” In Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Business intelligence for the
real-time enterprises. Berlin, Heidelberg:Springer-Verlag.
Lai, Kevin, Lars Rasmusson, Eytan Adar, Li Zhang, and Bernardo A. Huberman.
2005. “Tycoon: An Implementation of a Distributed, Market-based Resource Allocation System.”
Multiagent and Grid Systems, 1(3): 169–182.
Langegger, A, W Wo¨ß, and M Blo¨chl. 2008. “A Semantic Web Middleware for Virtual Data
Integration on the Web.” Lecture Notes In Computer Science.
Lubin, Benjamin, and David C. Parkes. 2009. “Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mech-
anisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions.” In Proceedings of the 17th National Conference
on Artificial Intelligence.
Lubin, Benjamin, Benedikt Bu¨nz, and Sven Seuken. 2015. “Fairness Beyond the Core:
New Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions.” Working Paper.
Malone, Thomas W., Richard E. Fikes, and Michael T. Howard. 1983. “Enterprise : a
Market-like Task Scheduler for Distributed Computing Environments.”
Milgrom, Paul. 2007. “Package Auctions and Exchanges.” Econometrica, 75(4): 935–965.
Oren, E, C Gueret, and S Schlobach. 2008. “Anytime Query Answering in RDF through
Evolutionary Algorithms.” The Semantic Web - ISWC 2008, 5318: 98–113.
Parkes, David C., Jayant Kalagnanam, and Marta Eso. 2001. “Achieving Budget-balance
with Vickrey-based Payment Schemes in Exchanges.” In Proceedings of the 17th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. San Francisco, CA.
21
Quilitz, B, and U Leser. 2008. “Querying Distributed RDF Data Sources with SPARQL.”
Proceedings of the 5th European semantic web conference on The semantic web: research and
applications, 524–538.
Schwarte, Andreas, Peter Haase, Katja Hose, Ralf Schenkel, and Michael Schmidt.
2011. “FedX: Optimization Techniques for Federated Query Processing on Linked Data.” In
International Semantic Web Conference (1).
Stonebraker, Michael, Paul M. Aoki, Witold Litwin, Avi Pfeffer, Adam Sah, Jeff
Sidell, Carl Staelin, and Andrew Yu. 1996. “Mariposa: A Wide-Area Distributed Database
System.” VLDB J., 5(1): 48–63.
Sutherland, I. E. 1968. “A Futures Market in Computer Time.” Commun. ACM, 11(6): 449–451.
Van Alstyne, Marshall, Erik Brynjolfsson, and Stuart Madnick. 1995. “Why Not One
Big Database? Principles for Data Ownership.” Decis. Support Syst., 15(4): 267–284.
Waldspurger, C.A., T. Hogg, B.A. Huberman, J.O. Kephart, and W.S. Stornetta.
1992. “Spawn: a Distributed Computational Economy.” IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, 18(2): 103–117.
Zema´nek, J, S Schenk, and V Svatek. 2007. “Optimizing SPARQL Queries Over Dis-
parate RDF Data Sources Through Distributed Semi-joins.” 7th International Semantic Web
Conference (ISWC).
22
2.1 Addendum
Observe, that the setting studied in this paper is not a general double auction setting
but a very restricted one. In particular, it includes only a single buyer and multiple
sellers. Consequently, this makes our domain look similar to the domain of the standard
reverse combinatorial auction. However, in our work, we assume that both the buyer
and the sellers can behave strategically (which is not the case in the standard setting
of combinatorial auctions). This means that the impossibility result of the Myerson-
Satterthwaite theorem applies to our setting, and thus, even the simple VCG mechanism
in the domain without uncertainty may lead to a significant rate of budget balance
violations.
44
3 Core-Selecting Payment Rules for
Combinatorial Auctions with
Uncertain Availability of Goods
People of the same trade seldom meet
together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends
in a conspiracy against the public, or
in some contrivance to raise prices.
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations
The content of this chapter has previously appeared in:
Moor, D. and Seuken, S. and Grubenmann, T. and Bernstein, A. (2016).
Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions with Uncertain
Availability of Goods. In Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Confer-
ence on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI ’16, New York, NY, USA.
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Abstract
In some auction domains, there is uncertainty re-
garding the final availability of the goods being auc-
tioned off. For example, a government may auction
off spectrum from its public safety network, but it
may need this spectrum back in times of emergency.
In such a domain, standard combinatorial auctions
perform poorly because they lead to violations of
individual rationality (IR), even in expectation, and
to very low efficiency. In this paper, we study the
design of core-selecting payment rules for such do-
mains. Surprisingly, we show that in this new do-
main, there does not exist a payment rule with is
guaranteed to be ex-post core-selecting. However,
we show that by designing rules that are “execution-
contingent,” i.e., by charging payments that are con-
ditioned on the realization of the availability of the
goods, we can reduce IR violations. We design two
core-selecting rules that always satisfy IR in expec-
tation. To study the performance of our rules we
perform a computational Bayes-Nash equilibrium
analysis. We show that, in equilibrium, our new
rules have better incentives, higher efficiency, and
a lower rate of ex-post IR violations than standard
core-selecting rules.
1 Introduction
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have been successfully applied
in many real-world settings, including procurement auctions
[Sandholm, 2013], TV advertising auctions [Goetzendorf et
al., 2015], and government spectrum auctions [Cramton, 2013;
Ausubel and Baranov, 2014]. CAs are specifically designed
for domains where bidders can have complex preferences over
bundles of heterogeneous items. An important and seemingly
“innocent” assumption in auction design is that all of the goods
will be available for consumption by the winning bidders.
While this assumption is often satisfied, there are some do-
mains where this is not the case. In these domains, standard
mechanisms perform poorly and new designs are required.
1.1 Uncertain Availability: A Motivating Example
In the US, public safety networks are used by the police, fire-
fighters, and emergency medical technicians during times of
emergencies. In 2012, following the events of 9/11 and hurri-
cane Katrina, the US congress even reserved some parts of the
700MHz spectrum “to public safety for use in a nationwide
broadband network” [FCC, 2016]. However, this legislation
also allows for the use of this spectrum by private companies
when the spectrum would otherwise be idle. The company
Rivada Networks for example is currently designing an auction
platform for this purpose [Cramton and Doyle, 2015]. These
auctions can happen on a weekly or daily basis, or even in real-
time; but bidders have to accept the risk that the spectrum they
purchased in the auction might become unavailable because
an emergency occured and the spectrum is needed for public
safety reasons.
There are many other CA domains with this kind of uncer-
tain availability of goods. For example, the company Band-
widthX has developed a platform to auction off bandwidth
from wireless hotspots, but those hotspots can also become
unavailable at any point in time [Seuken et al., 2015]. Fur-
thermore, Moor et al. [2015] introduced an auction for data,
where the sellers only have imprecise estimates of the data
they will actually be able to supply.
1.2 Execution-Contingent Auctions
Domains with uncertain availability of goods pose new chal-
lenges. As we will show, standard mechanisms perform very
poorly: they violate individual rationality (IR), even in expec-
tation, they have bad incentives, and low efficiency in equi-
librium. To address these shortcomings, Porter et al. [2008]
introduced execution-contingent mechanisms, which charge
payments dependent on the realized availabilities of the goods
(see [Ceppi et al., 2015; Ramchurn et al., 2009] for exten-
sions). Using this paradigm, one can design mechanisms that
satisfy IR and strategyproofness in expectation. For domains
as described above, where many small auctions may be run
repeatedly over time, some IR violations may be acceptable,
as long as IR in expectation is satisfied.
However, the execution-contingent mechanisms studied in
the literature so far [Porter et al., 2008; Ceppi et al., 2015;
Ramchurn et al., 2009] are not suitable for CAs in practice
because they charge VCG-like payments. Unfortunately, in
a CA domain, VCG has numerous problems [Ausubel and
Milgrom, 2006]. Most notably, VCG can lead to very low or
even zero revenue, which opens up opportunities for collusion
between the seller and collections of bidders.
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1.3 Core-Selecting Payment Rules
These drawbacks of VCG have led to the development of
core-selecting payment rules which offer a principled way to
ensure that the revenue in the auction is high enough such
that there are no opportunities for collusion [Milgrom, 2007;
Day and Milgrom, 2008; Day and Raghavan, 2007; Ausubel
and Baranov, 2016]. They have already been used successfully
in practice, for example in the UK, Canada, the Netherlands,
and Switzerland to auction off billions of dollars worth of
4G spectrum. In this paper, we design execution-contingent
core-selecting payment rules for domains with uncertainty
availability of goods. The first question we ask is “what is the
right notion of an execution-contingent core?” Second, we
find that our execution-contingent cores may sometimes be
empty, and thus, our rules will only be “core-selecting” in a
relaxed sense. Finally, in contrast to prior work on execution-
contingent mechanisms, we are not fully content with rules
that satisfy “IR in expectation,” but also want to minimize the
rate of ex-post IR violations.
1.4 Overview of Contributions
Our goal in this paper is to design payment rules that work
well in a domain with uncertain availability of goods. We
make the following contributions:
1. We generalize the EC-VCG mechanism introduced by
Porter et al. [2008] to domains with continuous and de-
pendent availabilities of goods.
2. We introduce two execution-contingent core-selecting
payment rules which satisfy IR in expectation.
3. We perform a computational Bayes-Nash equilibrium
(BNE) analysis evaluating our new rules in terms of in-
centives, efficiency, and ex-post IR violations.
The results from our BNE analysis show that our new pay-
ment rules have better incentives, higher efficiency, and a lower
rate of ex-post IR violations than standard core-selecting rules.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Formal Model
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of bidders and let s be the seller.
Let G = {A,B,C, ...} be the set of goods, with |G| = m.
Each bidder has a valuation function vi : 2G ! R which
specifies i0s value for every possible bundle S 2 2G.
We consider a two time-period model: at allocation time,
there is uncertainty regarding which bundles will eventually
be available, and at consumption time, some of the availabil-
ity (depending on the mechanism) will be revealed. With
every bundle S we associate a random variable a(S) which
represents the availability of the bundle S, i.e., the extent to
which S will be available at the time of consumption. We let
a˜(S) denote the realization of the random variable a(S) at
consumption time.
Let f be a joint probability mass function for all random
variables a(S). We assume that f is exogenous and known by
all agents.
The seller may have costs for providing the goods. We
denote costs by {c1, ..., cm}, where cj is the cost of the j-th
good. We assume that the cost function c(S) 2 R is additive,
such that c(S) =
P
S cj . We assume that the seller does not
strategize, as is common in the analysis of CAs [Day and
Cramton, 2012].
An allocation is denoted as x = {x1, ..., xn}, with xi de-
noting the bundle allocated to agent i and x i denoting the
vector of bundles of all agents except i. Similarly, for any
K ⇢ N , we use xK when referring to an allocation among
all bidders inK and use x K to denote an allocation among
bidders in N\K. We let vi(xi) denote bidder i’s true value
for its allocated bundle xi, and we let vˆi(xi) denote bidder
i’s value report for bundle xi (possibly non-truthful). We let
a(xi) denote the random variable corresponding to bundle xi,
and a˜(x⇤i ) denote the realized availability corresponding to
x⇤i . If bidder i is allocated bundle x
⇤
i then his realized value is
thus given by vi(x⇤i )a˜(x
⇤
i ).
Assumption 1. We assume that all bidders are “extremely”
single-minded, i.e., each bidder has non-zero value for exactly
one bundle S ✓ 2G, and zero value for all other bundles
S0 6= S (including supersets of S).
Remark 1. This assumption allows for the simple definition
of the realized value we have just provided, i.e., vi(x⇤i )a˜(x
⇤
i ).
Without this assumption, we would have to consider all sub-
bundles of a bidder’s allocated bundle to compute his realized
value, i.e., maxS✓x⇤i {v(S)a˜(S)}, which may be computation-
ally infeasible in domains with a large number of goods. But
more importantly, we make this assumption to simplify the
notation and the analysis of the mechanisms we will present.
In future work, we will extend our results to the full domain.
Let x be an allocation. We let Wx (the winners) denote
the set of allocated agents under this allocation, i.e., Wx =
{i|xi 6= ;}. The social welfare of the allocation x is
SW (x) =
X
i2Wx
(vi(xi)  c(xi))a˜(xi).
We assume quasilinear utilities ui(xi, pi) = vi(xi)   pi,
where pi is bidder i’s payment for xi; we let ps denote the
payment received by the seller. We let p = (ps, p1, p2, ..., pn)
denote the vector of payments received by the seller and paid
by all bidders. We let O = hx, pi denote an outcome, i.e., an
allocation and the payment vector.
2.2 Properties of Mechanisms
Let v = (v1, ..., vn) and c = (c1, ..., cm). We let a˜ denote
the vector of availabilities at consumption time (which may
depend on the mechanism and the domain), i.e., a˜ = (a˜(S) :
8S 2 2G, a˜(S) is known at consumption time). We let
M = hg, hi denote a mechanism, where g(v, c, f) = x is
an allocation rule and h(x, v, c, f, a˜M ) = p is a payment rule.
We now define a number of standard mechanism design proper-
ties; however, because we consider a domain with uncertainty,
we need to define most of these properties “in expectation.”
Definition 1. A mechanism M = hg, hi is strategyproof in
expectation if 8i 2 N , 8vi, for all vˆ i
Ef [ui(g(vi, vˆ i, c, f), pi)]   Ef [ui(g(vˆi, vˆ i, c, f), pi)].
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Definition 2. A mechanism M = hg, hi with
h(g(v, c, f), v, c, f, a˜M ) = p is ex-post individually
rational (IR) if 8i 2 N , 8vi, 8vˆ i
vi(g(vi, vˆ i, c, f))a˜(g(vi, vˆ i, c, f))  pi   0.
Definition 3. A mechanism M = hg, hi with
h(g(v, c, f), v, c, f, a˜M ) = p is individually rational in
expectation (IRE) if 8i 2 N , 8vi, for all vˆ i
Ef [ui(g(vi, vˆ i, c, f), pi)]   0.
Definition 4. The rate of ex-post IR violations of a mecha-
nism M = hg, hi with h(g(v, c, f), v, c, f, a˜M ) = p is de-
fined as the following probability:
P(vi(g(vi, vˆ i, c, f))a˜(g(vi, vˆ i, c, f))  pi < 0) (1)
Definition 5. A mechanism is budget balanced if the sum
of all payments paid by the bidders is equal to the payment
received by the seller, i.e.,X
i2N
pi = ps.
Definition 6. A mechanism is expected social welfare maxi-
mizing if its allocation rule selects an allocation x with
x 2 argmax
x
Ef [SW (x)].
2.3 VCG Mechanism
The famous VCG mechanism [Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971;
Groves, 1973] selects a social welfare maximizing allocation
and computes payments equal to the externality each agent
imposes on all other agents. We let x⇤ denote the allocation
which maximizes social welfare when all agents are consid-
ered, and x i denotes the allocation which maximizes social
social welfare when all agents except i are considered. VCG
payments are then:
pVCGi = SW (x
 i)  SW i(x⇤).
VCG is a particularly attractive mechanism because, in a
domain without uncertainty about the availability of goods, it
is social welfare maximizing, strategyproof and satisfies IR.
3 Execution-Contingent VCG
Porter et al. [2008] generalized the VCG mechanism to do-
mains with uncertain availability of goods by introducing
an execution-contingent variant of VCG. The main idea is to
make payments contingent on the realized availabilities, which
implies that the payments are not computed at allocation time,
but at consumption time (see Figure 1). They considered a do-
main with binary and independent random variables capturing
the availabilities, and proved that in this domain, their mecha-
nism is strategyproof and IR in expectation. However, in the
domains we described in the beginning, the availabilities of
the goods will typically be dependent (e.g., consider a terrorist
attack affecting a whole city) and the availabilities may be
continuous (e.g., a resource can be used partially). We now
introduce the ECC-VCG mechanism, which generalizes the
mechanism introduced by Porter et al. [2008] to also handle
continuous, dependent random variables.
TimeBidders 
submit bids
Allocation Consumption
time
Payments
computation
Figure 1: Flow chart of execution-contingent mechanisms.
ECC-VCGMechanism.
• Allocation rule: select x⇤ 2 argmaxx Ef [SW (x)]
• Payment rule:
pECC-VCGi = Ef [SW (x i)|a˜(x⇤j ), j 2Wx⇤ ]  SW i(x⇤)
The idea behind this execution-contingent conditional VCG
mechanism is similar to standard VCG: pECC-VCGi represents a
bidder’s externality on all other bidders, except that we do not
know this externality exactly and thus compute an estimate
by taking the conditional expectation. The following example
illustrates the ECC-VCG mechanism.
Example 1. Consider a setting with three bidders N =
{1, 2, 3}, two goods G = {A,B} and a seller s with no costs.
The bidders’ values are provided in the following table:
A B {A,B}
Bidder 1 0.1
Bidder 2 0.2
Bidder 3 0.3
Let a({A}), a({B}), a({A,B}) denote availabilities of
{A}, {B} and {A,B} respectively; let f denote the joint
probability mass function for these random variables. The
following table specifies f :
(a) a1 = 0
a2 a3 = 0 a3 = 1
0 0.25 0
1 0.25 0
(b) a1 = 1
a2 a3 = 0 a3 = 1
0 0.1 0
1 0 0.4
It is easy verify that the expected marginal availabilities
of the bundles {A}, {B}, and {A,B} are 0.5, 0.65 and 0.4
respectively. Thus, the efficient allocation is to allocate A to
bidder 1 and B to bidder 2, and Ef [SW (x)] = 0.1 · 0.5 +
0.2 · 0.65 = 0.18.
Now assume that after the allocation has happened the
realized availabilities are a˜1 = 0 and a˜2 = 1. Thus
Ef [a3|a˜1, a˜2] = 0. The execution-contingent payments are:
pECC-VCG1 = 0.2 · a˜2   (0.2 · a˜2) = 0 (2)
pECC-VCG2 = 0  (0.1 · a˜1) = 0 (3)
However, if realized availabilities were a˜1 = 1 and a˜2 = 1,
then Ef [a3|a˜1, a˜2] = 0.4 and execution contingent payments
would be
pECC-VCG1 = 0.2 · a˜2   (0.2 · a˜2) = 0 (4)
pECC-VCG2 = 0.3 · Ef [a3|a˜1, a˜2]  (0.1 · a˜1) = 0.02. (5)
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Note that the ECC-VCG mechanism only takes the realiza-
tion of the allocated bundles into account when computing
payments. If we know the realizations of all bundles at con-
sumption time, then we can use the following mechanism:
ECR-VCGMechanism.
• Allocation rule: select x⇤ 2 argmaxx Ef [SW (x)]
• Payment rule:
pECR-VCGi = Ef [SW (x i)|a˜(S), 8S]  SW i(x⇤)
This execution-contingent realized VCG mechanism is a
special case of ECC-VCG, as the payment rule uses a more
precise estimate of the externality imposed on other bidders.
Theorem 1. ECC-VCG and ECR-VCG are strategyproof in
expectation.
Proof. We prove the theorem for ECC-VCG; the proof for
ECR-VCG is analogous. We let vˆi denote a reported value
function of agent i 2 N and vi is the true value of the agent.
Let x⇤ be the optimal allocation given (vˆi, vˆ i). Consider the
conditional expectation in the payment rule:
Ef [SW (x i)|a˜(x⇤j ), j 2Wx⇤ ] (6)
=
X
k2W
x i
(vˆk(x
 i
k )  c(x ik ))Ef [a(x ik )|a˜(x⇤j ), j 2Wx⇤ ]. (7)
Now the payment of a bidder i 2Wx⇤ is
pECC-VCGi =
X
k2W
x i
(vˆk(x
 i
k )  c(x ik ))Ef [a(x ik )|a˜(x⇤j ), j 2Wx⇤ ]
 
X
k2Wx⇤\i
(vˆk(x
⇤
k)  c(x⇤k))a˜(x⇤k) + c(x⇤i )a˜(x⇤i )
The expected utility of bidder i in this case is
Ef [ui(x⇤)] = Ef [vi(x⇤i )a(x⇤i )  pECC-VCGi ] =
Ef
h
vi(x
⇤
i )a(x
⇤
i )  c(x⇤i )a(x⇤i ) +
X
k2Wx⇤\i
(vˆk(x
⇤
k)  c(x⇤k))a(x⇤k)
 
X
k2W
x i
(vˆk(x
 i
k )  c(x ik ))Ef [a(x ik )|a(x⇤j ), j 2Wx⇤ ]| {z }
does not depend on vˆi
i
The first three terms under the last expectation is equal to
expected social welfare if the agent reports truthfully. Thus,
because the allocation rule maximizes expected social welfare,
and because the last expression is independent of i’s report,
truthful reporting maximizes agent i’s expected utility. In this
case: Ef [ui(x⇤)] = Ef [SW (x⇤)]  Ef [SW (x i)].
Theorem 2. ECC-VCG and ECR-VCG are individually ratio-
nal in expectation.
Proof. We show the theorem for ECC-VCG. From the proof
of Theorem 1 we know that under truthful reporting
Ef [ui(x⇤)] = Ef [SW (x⇤)]  Ef [SW (x i)]. (8)
Because the allocation rule selects an expected social wel-
fare maximizing allocation we know that Ef [SW (x⇤)]  
Ef [SW (x i)]), and thus Ef [ui(x⇤)]   0. The proof is analo-
gous for ECR-VCG.
4 Core-Selecting Payment Rules
VCG-based rules are attractive because they are strategyproof
(or strategyproof in expectation, in our domain). However,
they are not suitable in CAs because they can lead to very
low or even zero revenue, which opens up opportunities for
collusion between the seller and collections of bidders. In this
section, we introduce our execution-contingent core-selecting
payment rules. To this end, we first need some definitions:
Definition 7. An outcomeO is blocked by a coalitionK ⇢ N
of bidders, if there exists another outcome O¯ which is weakly
preferred over O by every bidder i 2 K and which provides
higher utility for the seller. In this caseK is called a blocking
coalition.
Definition 8. An outcome O is in the core if it is (a) individu-
ally rational and (b) is not blocked by any coalition.
If O⇤ = hx⇤, pi andK ⇢ N is a coalition of bidders, thenP
i2K(vi(x
⇤
i )  pi) is the total opportunity cost of agents in
the coalition. We let !(K) denote the total welfare which
the coalition could achieve by redistributing goods among
themselves. The maximum additional value which K could
give to the seller is !(K)  Pi2K(vi(x⇤i )   pi). A core
constraint guarantees that this amount is not larger than what
the seller can already get under the current allocation, and this
core constraint has to hold for all possible coalitions:X
i2Wx⇤
(pi   c(x⇤i ))   !(K) 
X
i2K
(vi(x
⇤
i )  pi) 8K ✓ N
A core-selecting mechanism selects a social welfare max-
imizing allocation and picks payments from the core. Un-
fortunately, in general combinatorial auction domains (with
complements), even without uncertain availability of goods,
there does not exist a payment rule that is Bayes-Nash incen-
tive compatible and core-selecting [Goeree and Lien, 2016].
Of course, this impossibility extends to our new domain. Thus,
none of our core-selecting payment rules can be truthful.
The core in a domain with uncertainty. In contrast to the
standard domain, defining the core in a domain with uncertain
availability of goods is less straightforward. The difficulty
arises from the fact that in a domain with uncertainty agents
might be willing to deviate either before or after availabili-
ties of goods are realized. In the former case, we can talk
about an ex-ante core while the latter case implies an ex-post
core. Although these two concepts differ only in the amount of
information which is used to evaluate the expected total wel-
fare achieved by a coalition, we will show that these concepts
actually lead to quite different properties.
In the next section, we will first present an ex-ante core-
selecting payment rule, which is not execution contingent.
However, as we will later see in Section 5, this leads to a
relatively large rate of IR violations, compared to execution-
contingent payment rules. To address this, we will then study
ex-post core-selecting payment rules in Sections 4.2-4.5.
4.1 Ex-ante Core-Selecting Payment rules
A straightforward approach to generalize the idea of a core
to a domain with uncertainty is to apply the core constraints
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as defined in the previous section to the expected values of
the bidders. In this case the total expected welfare Ef [!(K)]
that a coalitionK can achieve in expectation is Ef [!(K)] =
maxx Ef [
P
i2K(vi(x)  ci(x))a(x)]. By limiting this value
to be smaller than the expected total utility which agents in
the coalition can get under the current allocation we ensure
that the agents in the coalition are not be willing to deviate
from the current allocation. Formally, this gives rise to the
following set of core constraints, which have to hold for all
K ✓ N :
Ef
h X
i2Wx⇤
(pi   c(x⇤i )a(x⇤i ))
i
  (9)
Ef
h
!(K)
i
 
X
i2K
Ef
h
(vi(x
⇤
i )a(x
⇤
i )  pi)
i
(10)
Even though this core is not execution contingent, it pro-
vides all core properties ex-ante, i.e., before availabilities of
goods are realized. Furthermore, the following corollary says
that this core is never empty:
Corollary 1. In a domain with uncertain availability of goods,
the ex-ante core is never empty.
The corollary follows from the fact that the core must con-
tain at least one point, namely pay-as-bid (see [Day and Mil-
grom, 2008, Footnote 1]).
4.2 Impossibility of Ex-post Core-Selecting
Payment Rules in Domains with Uncertainty
In this section, we will show the surprising result that there
does not, in general, exist an ex-post core-selecting payment
rule in a domain with uncertain availability of goods. For this,
we first need a few more definitions. Assume that hx⇤, pi is
an auction outcome and let L ✓ 2G be a fixed set of bundles.
Definition 9. A generalized expected coalitional value
!ge(K,L) of a coalitionK ✓ N given the set L is the maxi-
mum expected welfare the coalition can achieve given realized
availabilities corresponding to bundles from L. Formally,
!ge(K,L) = max
x
Ef
hX
i2K
(vi(xi)  c(xi))a(xi)
   a˜(S), S 2 Li
Note that bidders have a total opportunity cost ofP
i2K(vi(x
⇤
i )a˜(x
⇤
i )   pi) for joining coalition K. If they
decide to join, then in expectation they can achieve a to-
tal welfare of !ge(K,L) and thus they can provide at most
!ge(K,L)  
P
i2K(vi(x
⇤
i )a˜(x
⇤
i )   pi) of additional value
to the seller, which gives rise to the following set of core
constraints:
Generalized Ex-post Core Constraint 8K ✓ N :
X
i2Wx⇤
(pi c(x⇤i )a˜(x⇤i ))   !ge(K,L) 
X
i2K
(vi(x
⇤
i )a˜(x
⇤
i ) pi)
Note that different choices ofL lead to a different definitions
of an ex-post core. However, we refer to any of these cores as
ex-post cores, which reflects the fact that the core property is
guaranteed for the point in time when availabilities have been
realized.
Unfortunately, in our domain, the ex-post core can some-
times be empty.
Theorem 3. In a domain with uncertainty, there does not
exist a mechanism that is budget balanced and ex-post core-
selecting.
Proof. Consider a setting with two bidders N = {1, 2} and a
seller s. Assume that there are only two goods A and B. We
assume that the first bidder has an value v1({A}) for a bundle
{A} and the second bidder has a value v2({AB}) for a bundle
{AB}. We let v1({A}) > 0 and v2({AB}) > 0. We also let
the costs of those goods to be equal to zero.
Given this specific set-up, there are seven different alloca-
tion rules we must consider: the allocation rule can allocate
none of the items; it can allocate item A to bidder 1 and noth-
ing to bidder 2; it can allocate item A to bidder 2 and nothing
to bidder 1; etc. For each of these seven different allocation
rules, there exists a joint probability mass function and a set
of realized availabilities, such that we can construct an empty
core.
We first consider the case where bidder 1 is allocated item
A and bidder 2 is allocated the empty set. We let a({A})
and a({AB}) denote the availabilities of the bundles {A} and
{AB} respectively, and we let f denote the corresponding
joint probability mass function, which is defined as follows:
(a) a({AB}) = 0
a(A) a(B) = 0 a(B) = 1
0  000  010
1  100  110
(b) a({AB}) = 1
a(B) = 0 a(B) = 1
 001  011
 101  111
Here 0 <  ijk < 1, i, j, k 2 {0, 1}, denotes the probability
of the event that a({A}) = i, a({B}) = j, and a({AB}) = k.
Now we assume that a˜({A}) = 0, a˜({B}) = 0, a˜({AB}) =
1. We can show that for any L ✓ 2G, the corresponding ex-
post core is empty. Indeed, 8L ✓ 2G : E[a({AB})|a˜(S), S 2
L] > 0. Thus, the ex-post core constraint is then:
!ge({s, 2}, L) =
v2({AB}) · E[a({AB})|a˜(S), S 2 L]  0 + ps = p1.
Here, p1 and ps are payments of the first bidder and the
seller respectively (which are equal, given budget balance, i.e.,
p1 + ps = 0). Now, taking into account that v2({AB}) >
0 but p1  v1({A})a˜({A}) = 0 (another core constraint),
we get a contradiction. The proof for the other six possible
allocations is analogous.
4.3 Framework for Execution-Contingent
Mechanisms
Given that the ex-ante core can lead to large IR violations
(as we will show in Section 5), and given the impossibility
result regarding ex-post cores from Theorem 3, this raises
the question which core to consider in practice. In this sec-
tion, we put forward the idea of designing mechanisms that
select payments inside an ex-post core whenever this core is
not empty. Specifically, we design two execution-contingent
payment rules. As we will later show in Section 5, for these
payment rules, the empty core cases happen relatively rarely.
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We will now first define a mechanism framework for
execution-contingent payment rules which we then instantiate
in two different ways:
Execution-Contingent Core-selecting Mechanism
Framework
• Framework parameters:
1. Reference point: p⇤
2. Core constraints: Core⇤
• Allocation rule: select x⇤ 2 argmaxx Ef [SW (x)]
• Payment rule:
p =
⇢
p 2 argminp2⇧ ||p  p⇤||2 if Core* \ IR 6= ;
p⇤ else
where ⇧ = Core⇤ \ IR \MRC.
The first framework parameter, p⇤, is a reference point,
which we will either instantiate to p⇤ = pECC-VCG or pECR-VCG,
as defined by the ECC-VCG and ECR-VCG mechanisms.
The second framework parameter is a set of core constraints
Core⇤, which we will accordingly instantiate to ECC-Core
or ECR-Core, to be defined next. The ultimate core-selecting
payment rule then first tries to find a payment vector p that
minimizes the Euclidean distance to the reference point p⇤,
from among all payment vectors in the core that also minimize
the revenue for the seller (the so-called minimize-revenue con-
straint (MRC)). We defined the mechanism framework this
way to be analogous to the Quadratic rule [Day and Cramton,
2012], i.e., the core-selecting rule most commonly used in
practice. In a domain with uncertain availabilities, however,
the core (i.e., the intersection of the core constraints and the
IR constraints) can be empty. In this case, we charge the refer-
ence point p⇤, which will then be outside the core. Thus, all
of these execution-contingent mechanisms are only ex-post
core selecting whenever the core is non-empty. In Section 5,
we will analyze how often such “empty core” cases occur in
equilibrium.
4.4 ECC-Core Mechanism
Before we can introduce the ECC-Core mechanism, we need
one more definition.
Definition 10. An expected coalitional value !e(K) of a coali-
tion K ⇢ N is the maximum expected welfare the coalition
can achieve knowing realized availabilities of allocated bun-
dles. Formally,
!e(K) = max
x
Ef
hX
i2K
(vi(xi)  c(xi))a(xi)
   a˜(x⇤i ), i 2Wx⇤i
Note, that this is a special case of Definition 9 when assum-
ing L = {S ✓ x⇤i , i 2Wx⇤}1.
Knowing realized availabilities of allocated bundles, bidders
have a total opportunity cost of
P
i2K(vi(x
⇤
i )a˜(x
⇤
i )  pi) for
joining coalitionK. If they decide to join, then in expectation
1Depending on the information structure of the domain, the avail-
ability that is revealed to the mechanismmay only be a˜(x⇤i ), i 2Wx⇤
or a˜(S), 8S ✓ x⇤i , i 2Wx⇤
they can achieve the total welfare of !e(K) and thus they
can provide at most !e(K)  
P
i2K(vi(x
⇤
i )a˜(x
⇤
i )   pi) of
additional value to the seller, which gives rise to the following
set of core constraints:
ECC-Core Constraint 8K ⇢ N :X
i2Wx⇤
(pi c(x⇤i )a˜(x⇤i ))   !e(K) 
X
i2K
(vi(x
⇤
i )a˜(x
⇤
i ) pi)
By plugging these constraints as Core⇤ into the mechanism
framework together with p⇤ = pECC-VCG as the reference point,
we obtain a full specification of the execution-contingent con-
ditional core (ECC-Core) mechanism. The following example
demonstrates how a coalition imposes a core constraint:
Example 2. Consider the setting from Example 1, with coali-
tion K = {b3, s}. The expected coalitional value for this
coalition is !e(K) = 0.3 · 0.4 = 0.12. The corresponding
core constraint is p1 + p2   0.12.
4.5 ECR-Core Mechanism
If we know the realizations of the availabilities of all bundles at
the consumption time, and not only of those allocated, then we
can use more accurate execution-contingent core constraints:
ECR-Core Constraint 8K ⇢ N :X
i2Wx⇤
(pi  c(x⇤i )a˜(x⇤i ))   !(K) 
X
i2K
(vi(x
⇤
i )a˜(x
⇤
i ) pi),
where !(K) = maxx
P
i2K(vi(xi)  c(xi))a˜(xi)
Note that this definition is a special case of Definition 9
assuming L = {S : S 2 2G}. To get a full specification of
the mechanism we use these core constraints together with
pECR-VCG as parameters for the execution-contingent mecha-
nism framework. As we will show in Section 5 exploiting this
additional knowledge can significantly decrease the rate of IR
violations.
The following theorem shows that ECC-VCG and ECR-
VCG provide lower bounds for the corresponding core-
selecting payment rules. This is useful to know, because it also
implies that using these payment vectors as reference points
in the overall mechanism framework makes sense.
Theorem 4. ECC-Core and ECR-Core payments are lower-
bounded by ECC-VCG and ECR-VCG payments respectively.
Proof. Consider ECC-Core mechanism. If the ECC-Core
is empty, then the mechanism charges ECC-VCG payments
which are trivially lower-bounded by ECC-VCG payments. If
the ECC-Core is not empty, then consider a coalition K =
N\{k}, where k 2Wx⇤ . In this case
E[!(K)] = Ef [SW (x i)|a˜(x⇤i ), i 2Wx⇤ ]
Then,
pi   Ef [SW (x i)|a˜(x⇤i ), i 2Wx⇤ ] X
i2Wx⇤\k
(vi(x
⇤
i )  c(x⇤i ))a˜(x⇤i )  c(x⇤k)a˜(x⇤k) = pECC-VCGi .
The proof for ECR-Core is analogous.
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Figure 2: Additive shading factors of local bidders depending
on costs distribution c ⇠ U [0, cmax] for two levels of variance
of the availabilities a.
5 Comparison in Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
Our core-selecting payment rules are not strategyproof in ex-
pectation, and indeed, there do not even exist strategyproof
core-selecting rules in domains without uncertainty [Goeree
and Lien, 2016]. For this reason, we must analyze the proper-
ties (efficiency, IR violations, etc.) of our rules in equilibrium.
The equilibrium concept we adopt for our auction domain is
a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, i.e., where each bidder knows his
own value, but only knows the distribution over other bidders’
values, the seller’s costs, and the availabilities.
Unfortunately, deriving the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of core-
selecting payment rules analytically is very complex, and only
feasible for very simple settings [Goeree and Lien, 2016]. For
this reason we follow the approach by [Lubin and Parkes,
2009] and [Lubin et al., 2016], and use a computational ap-
proach to find approximate BNEs for our rules. Concretely,
we restrict the strategy space of the agents to additive shading
strategies, and then use an algorithm based on fictitious play
which, using an iterative best response method, converges to
an ✏-BNE in this restricted strategy space. Specifically, all the
equilibria we report in this paper are ✏-BNEs with ✏=0.01.
5.1 Benchmark Rules
In addition to the ECC-Core and ECR-Core mechanisms, we
also study the following three benchmark rules:
• Std-Core Mechanism: This refers to the standard core-
selecting payment rule (the Quadratic rule as defined in [Day
and Cramton, 2012]). The allocation rule selects an alloca-
tion assuming that all items are available, and payments are
computed at allocation time.
• Exp-Core Mechanism This mechanism uses the ex-ante
core as defined in Section 4.1, and then picks payments from
this ex-ante core using the Quadratic rule [Day and Cram-
ton, 2012]. Note that this mechanism satisfies individual
rationality in expectation.
• IR-ECR-Core Mechanism: This refers to a rather artificial
but still interesting mechanism. The allocation rule first
maximizes expected social welfare, but then checks for every
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Figure 3: Efficiency depending on costs distribution c ⇠
U [0, cmax] for two levels of variance of the availabilities a.
possible realization of the availabilities whether the resulting
payments will satisfy ex-post IR. Only if this is the case
will the allocation be made - otherwise no trade will happen.
Thus, this rule is guaranteed to satisfy ex-post IR by design.
5.2 The Local-Local-Global (LLG) Domain
We study the well-known LLG domain. In this domain, there
are two goods A and B. There are two local bidders who
are each interested in one of the goods, and their values are
drawn uniformly from [0, 1], and there is a global bidders who
is only interested in the bundle consisting of both goods, and
his value for the whole bundle is drawn uniformly from [0, 2].
The seller’s costs are drawn uniformly from [0, cmax], where
cmax is a parameter which we vary in our analysis.
It is easy to show that under Exp-Core, ECC-Core, ECR-
Core, and IR-ECR-Core, if the global bidder gets allocated,
he is charged the respective generalized version of the VCG
payment. Thus, by Theorem 1, ECC-Core and ECR-Core
are strategyproof in expectation for the global bidder, and the
same result can be shown for Exp-Core and IR-ECR-Core.
For this reason, we only need to compute the BNE strategies
of the local bidders for those rules. For Std-Core, we also
compute the BNE strategy for the global bidder.
5.3 Results
Strategies. Figure 2 shows the BNE strategies of the local
bidders; on the left side for a domain with low variance in the
availabilities of the goods, and on the right side for high vari-
ance in the availabilities of the goods. Note that these results
are not “simulations,” but that each point in these figures is the
result of our BNE algorithm (and it takes about 8 hours to find
a BNE for one payment rule on a machine with 20 cores).
We see that Std-Core has the worst incentives; the global
bidder actually also shades (not shown in Figure 2), with a
shading factor roughly twice as high as that of the local bidders.
ECC-Core, ECR-Core and Exp-Core have very similar incen-
tives, and IR-ECR-Core has the best incentives. Furthermore,
the higher the costs, the lower the shading factors (except for
Std-Core), which makes sense, because with higher costs, the
opportunities for trade get smaller, and thus it gets more risky
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to shade. We also see that the shading factors are lower in the
high variance domain, which makes sense, because the higher
the uncertainty, the more risky it is to shade.
Efficiency. Figure 3 shows the efficiency achieved by all
mechanisms (we simulate 1 million auctions using the compu-
ated BNE strategies to calulate the efficiency). We see that our
new mechanisms achieve higher efficiency than both, Std-Core
as well as IR-ECR-Core.2 By comparing the low variance and
high variance domains, we see in what sense the IR-ECR-
Core mechanism is really just a straw-man: while it works
well in the low variance domain, in the high variance domain
the mechanism has to cancel a lot of allocations because it
cannot guarantee ex-post IR for all possible realizations of the
availabilities, which drives down efficiency. In contrast, our
execution-contingent mechanisms can handle this uncertainty.
Rate of Ex-post IR Violations. Figure 4 shows the rate
of ex-post IR violations. Again, Std-Core performs worst.
But this analysis now also demonstrates the advantages of
ECC-Core and ECR-Core over Exp-Core. While all three
mechanisms had good incentives and high efficiency, we now
see that ECC-Core and ECR-Core have a significantly lower
rate of ex-post IR violations, which makes sense because ECC-
Core and ECR-Core are execution-contingent. This advantage
is even more pronounced for the high-variance domain. In
this domain, we even see a small advantage of ECR-Core over
ECC-Core, which makes sense, because ECR-Core takes even
more information into account when computing payments.
Empty Core Analysis. While in a domain without uncer-
tainty, there always exists a price vector in the core, one of
2There is one exception: with zero costs, Std-Core achieve 99%
efficiency while our rules achieve 98% efficiency. This happens
because under our rules, the global bidder plays truthful and the
local bidders shave, which leads to an efficiency loss. Under Std-
Core, all bidders shave roughly proportionally, which leads to almost
no efficiency loss in equilibrium (with zero costs). However, this
peculiarity of the LLG domain does not generalize to larger domains.
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the interesting and perhaps unexpected features of our domain
is that the ECC-Core as well as the ECR-Core can be empty.
For this reason, we also study how often this happens in our
domain. Figure 5 shows that in the low variance domain, the
core is typically not empty, especially if the costs are non-zero
then the probability of an empty core is close to 0. However, in
the high variance domain, the rate of empty core cases is sig-
nificantly higher. This is explained by the fact that the higher
the variance in availabilities of bundles, the more flexible the
core constraints are, and thus the more likely they can be in
conflict with each other (and thus lead to an empty core).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied mechanisms for combinatorial
auctions with uncertain availabilities of goods. We have intro-
duced two execution-contingent core-selecting payment rules
which both satisfy IR in expectation. Furthermore, we have
performed an extensive computational Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium analysis, comparing our new rules with three benchmark
rules to study the trade-off between different mechanism de-
sign objectives. Our results show that, compared to a standard
core-selecting auction, our rules have significantly higher effi-
ciency and lower ex-post IR violations. Furthermore, compar-
ing our two execution-contingent mechanisms, we conclude
that the more information about realized availabilities the
mechanism has, the more of it should be exploited in the com-
putation of the payments, as this leads to an lower rate of IR
violations. Moreover, by comparing our rules to an ex-post
IR rule, we have shown that by relaxing the strict ex-post IR
constraint, we can gain a lot in efficiency. Thus, if a small rate
of ex-post IR violations is acceptable, then we recommend us-
ing one of our new payment rules for a combinatorial auction
domain with uncertain availabilities of goods.
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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a model of a production economy of data markets. Such
markets typically exhibit a complex production structure when the databases produced by
different data providers can be joined to produce answers for buyers’ queries. We focus on
three specific challenges: (1) different providers have the capability to produce different
sets of databases; (2) data providers have high fixed costs for producing a database; and (3)
buyers have combinatorial values over which databases are produced and thereby become
available in the marketplace. To illustrate our model, we provide a possible market design
solution for this domain. The key idea of our solution is to use a reverse auction for the
sellers, a posted-price mechanism for the buyers, and a fixed-point iteration algorithm for
finding an outcome that balances the two sides of the market. To achieve this, we illustrate
how to infer values of buyers for particular databases from the values for their queries. Via
simulations, we show how our market distributes the surplus between buyers and sellers.
In particular, we demonstrate that our design rewards providers of ‘‘unique” data much
more than providers of ‘‘common data.”
1. Introduction
Many datasets on the Web are unstructured, i.e., they can be interpreted by humans but
not by machines. There are numerous domains in which we would benefit greatly from
data published in a structured way, for example, as a database. This allows machines to
understand relationships between different pieces of data (Bernstein et al., 2016). Conse-
quently, this significantly reduces the effort for humans to analyze lots of unstructured
datasets that are discovered by traditional search engines. Instead, one could delegate this
task to automatic query processing algorithms. For example, in the life sciences, researchers
submit queries that join data from multiple databases provided by different companies. Each
of these databases contains information on chemical compounds, disease data, biological
function, and biomarkers. Automatic aggregation and processing of this data leads to faster
and more efficient drug discovery (HCLS, 2001). Another example is IBM Watson, a large
scale question answering system that defeated the human champions in the well-known TV
show Jeopardy. This system heavily relies on querying structured data from distributed
databases (Ferrucci et al., 2010) and has numerous applications in cancer treatment and
clinical research, financial advisory, and retail.
Technology that enables automatic aggregation and processing of structured data already
exists, for example, the Web of Data (WoD) (W3C, 2014). This technology does all the
1
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work of joining and processing the data and returns a precise answer to the user’s query.
However, despite the apparent power of the WoD approach, the technology has not yet seen
widespread adoption. One of the reasons for this underutilization is of economic nature: most
of the data produced for the WoD so far was either subsidized by governments or produced
at a loss (Buil-Aranda et al., 2013). This suggests that one of the most important reasons
preventing wide adoption of the WoD is a lack of financial incentives for data providers
to publish their data in a structured way. Indeed, data providers may incur high costs for
producing their databases, i.e., for structuring their data and linking it against databases
of other data providers. Naturally, data providers hope to recoup these costs. However,
advertisement, the main source of income for many data publishers as well as traditional
search engines, does not work in the Web of Data because in the WoD, data is processed by
machines rather than by humans and the machine can simply ignore any ad. Therefore, new
sources of revenue for data providers are needed. One possible way to achieve this is via a
market in which providers sell data to users and trade is mediated by a market platform. In
this paper, we propose a model of the economy that enables to implement such a market.
1.1 Call for Data Markets
The need for data markets was recognized by both business and academic communities.
In a recent McKinsey report (2016), for example, the authors explained the need for data
markets by referring to the inefficient use of constantly increasing amounts of data produced
by businesses adopting IoT technologies.
Schomm et al. (2013) provide a good overview of existing data markets. One prominent
practical data market was operated by Microsoft with the Microsoft Azure Data Marketplace
platform, but seized operation in 2016 due to a ‘‘lack of sustained customer interest” (Ramel,
2016). This lack of interest, however, does not imply a lack of demand for data. A more
likely explanation is an inadequate business model. This explanation is supported by the fact
that companies like Thomson Reuters, LexisNexis and Bloomberg still make large profits by
selling access to their proprietary databases (Thomson-Reuters, 2015; Greg, 2011). However,
it is not possible to easily combine and process their data with data from databases produced
by other data providers.
There are numerous challenges when designing markets for information goods such as
data. Already more than 20 years ago, Varian (1995, 1997) highlighted the problem of high
sunk and low marginal production costs for these goods. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999)
studied the problem that buyers may have high uncertainty regarding their valuations for
information goods. More recently, Moor et al. (2015) and Grubenmann et al. (2018a) argued
that, in data markets, the combinatorial preferences of buyers should be taken into account
when the buyers are able to join multiple databases. This idea of combinatorial preferences
is further emphasized by Agarwal et al. (2019) who suggested a possible solution for a
marketplace that sells data for machine learning tasks. In their paper, the authors proposed
a design of a market for a setting when data providers have already incurred high sunk costs
for producing their data and would naturally like to minimize their regret. In contrast to
that, in our work, we aim at designing such a market that would incentivize sellers who
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have not yet produced their data to do so. In particularly, we want to guarantee that these
sellers always get fully compensated for producing their databases. 1
1.2 Overview of our Approach
In this paper, we propose a game theoretical model of the production economy of data
markets. We focus on three challenges: (1) databases are distributed (produced by different
data providers) and can be joined to produce an answer to a query; (2) data providers have
high fixed costs for producing a database; and (3) buyers have combinatorial values over
which databases are available (i.e., different combinations of databases lead to more or less
valuable answers to a buyer’s query).
Goldberg et al. (2001), Goldberg and Hartline (2001, 2003) also studied markets for
information goods. They proposed an auction for selling goods in unlimited supply (such
as data) in a setting with a single seller. However, they did not consider a setting with
multiple distributed sellers or buyers with combinatorial values.
In recent papers by Balazinska et al. (2013), Koutris et al. (2013, 2015) and Deep and
Koutris (2016), the authors aimed at designing a data market with quoted prices. The basic
idea was to charge a different price for different views of the database in a way that would
guarantee a no-arbitrage property. However, their approach does not allow joining data
from multiple different data providers and ignores the costs of production.
While many authors (e.g., Varian (1995), Goldberg et al. (2001)) have previously studied
the economic problem of how to sell an information good (such as music files or videos),
their approaches do not translate to data markets. The main reason is the combinatorial
structure that arises in a data market once we allow databases to be joined: a buyer’s value
for receiving answers based on one database may be zero while it may be very large once
two databases are joined. This combinatorial structure is not present with music or video
files which is why data markets require a new design.
The general approach we adopt to model such a two-sided market is as follows. First,
we design an auction to elicit the data providers’ production costs. The objective of the
auction is to allocate data providers (and respective databases) in a way that maximizes the
total utility of buyers. This needs to be done subject to the constraint that the production
costs of data providers are recouped. Second, we suggest a uniform posted pricing scheme
that is presented to buyers submitting their queries. Apart from its simplicity, the use of
uniform posted prices prevents complex strategic behavior of buyers who are assumed to
be price-takers. Finally, we propose a mechanism that makes the overall market budget
balanced, i.e., that guarantees that the total expected amount of money collected from
buyers is equal to the total payment that needs to be accrued to data providers. While
there are many possible equilibria that can arise in such a market (for example, a trivial
equilibrium where nobody is allocated), our mechanism targets at finding the one with the
highest surplus. This balancing mechanism ties together with the reverse auction on the
one side and the posted price mechanism on the other side.
1. These two different market design objectives result in different amounts of information that the market
designer needs to know to compute allocation and payments. In particular, the design of Agarwal et al.
(2019) does not rely on prior knowledge of distributions of sellers’ costs while our design does.
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Figure 1: Market structure. Buyers consume rows of database tables corresponding to their
queries for a posted price p per row. The reverse auction A elicits fixed costs of sellers. The
market platform balances both sides of the market, i.e., the total payment collected from
buyers needs to be equal to the total payment accrued to sellers.
Scope of this work. To keep our model simple, we focus only on the most essential
economic features of the domain such as high fixed costs and low marginal costs of produc-
tion of data, the distributed nature of production and the combinatorial aspect of users’
preferences. We argue that these features have the most significant implications on market
design. The list of all possible features may include privacy and quality of data, dynamic
arrival of sellers to the market etc. Accounting for privacy and quality of data can make the
model unreasonably complicated and are therefore outside the scope of the current paper.
Dynamic arrival of sellers may play an important role in designing combinatorial markets.
This follows from the fact that an allocation of a seller today depends on whether another
seller with a complementary database arrives tomorrow. However, even our static model
already enables us to capture most of the interesting aspects of practical data markets while
remaining relatively simple. Thus, we leave the dynamic arrival of sellers to be studied in
future extensions of this work.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 Formal Model
Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of the market we will design. We assume that there
are N sellers (i.e., data providers), s1, ..., sN ; and L buyers (or users), b1, ..., bL, who submit
their queries; N,L > 0 are given exogenously. To keep the model simple, we assume that
each buyer submits a single query. The answer to a buyer’s query consists of multiple rows
of a database table (possibly joined over multiple databases) that satisfy the buyer’s query.
Thus, the buyer can buy some of these rows in exchange for money. This means that there
are two goods involved in the exchange: money and rows of database tables corresponding
to buyers’ queries.
Market Structure. The market is mediated by a market platform. This market platform
operates a so-called query engine, which executes buyers’ queries and produces answers for
4
The Design of a Combinatorial Data Market
these queries. Given a query from buyer bj , the query engine takes databases of different
sellers as inputs and then outputs Rj ∈ N rows by joining those databases.
In our market design, the market platform is a neutral (and, in particular, non-profit
maximizing) entity for two primary reasons. First, observe that there are two levels of
production: the sellers produce their databases, and the query engine then takes/joins those
databases to produce answers to buyers’ queries. Thus, it is highly convenient to consider
the query engine a separate entity residing at the market platform. Second, one can show
that in a domain with zero marginal costs of production (such as our domain), a (non-trivial)
competitive equilibrium (i.e., where the seller maximizes her profits and the buyer maximizes
his utility) is not guaranteed to exist (Mas-Colell et al., 1995).2 Similar problems occur in
markets with natural monopolies (Tirole & Laffont, 1993). In practice, such markets require
a regulator, and the regulator is usually a governmental organization that induces prices
based on its own analysis of production costs and market demand. This fact comprises our
second argument for the use of the neutral (non-strategic) market platform that acts as a
‘‘regulator.’’
In our case, it is the market platform that ‘‘sets prices” based on two key factors: the
sellers’ production costs and the market demand for the databases. To elicit the production
costs of the sellers we argue for the use of a reverse auction A (defined formally later in this
section). We also argue for the use of a uniform posted price per row that is exposed to
buyers for estimating the demand for databases (see Figure 1).
Sellers. We assume that every seller can produce a single database and that ci ∈ R≥0
is the fixed cost of si for producing her database.
34 For the sake of simplicity we assume
that different databases are disjoint. Let c = (c1, ..., cN ) be the cost profile of sellers. Let
D be the number of different databases, D ≤ N . For every database k ∈ {1, ..., D} we let
i(k) = (i1(k), ..., iq(k)) denote the indices of sellers that can produce the database k.
We assume that the ci are independent random variables distributed according to
cumulative probability distributions Fi, i = 1, ..., N . We let fi be the corresponding
probability density. We assume that fi(ci) has full support on some interval [αi, βi]. Then,
the joint probability density is f(c) =
∏N
i=1 fi(ci). Similarly, f−i(c−i) =
∏
j 6=i fj(cj) is the
joint probability density of all sellers except si.
Let t = (t1, ..., tN ) denote transfers (payments) received by si and a = (a1, ..., aN ) denote
an allocation decision of the reverse auction A, i.e., ai ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that si is
allocated. 5 The utility of seller si is assumed to be quasi-linear, i.e, ui(a, ci, t) = ti − aici.
Sellers are strategic and can thus misreport their costs. Let cˆi denote the reported
cost of si. Then, (cˆ1, ..., cˆN ) is a reported cost profile of all sellers. Similarly, cˆ−i =
(cˆ1, ..., cˆi−1, cˆi+1, ..., cˆN ) denotes a reported cost profile of all sellers except si.
Buyers. We assume that every buyer bj is equipped with an initial endowment of money
e ∈ R≥0. A buyer can use his endowment to acquire rows of the database table corresponding
2. This follows from the fact that the profit maximizing seller will produce the maximum possible number
of rows at zero marginal cost if the price per row is positive. The buyer, however, may not be willing to
pay for all these rows unless the price is 0.
3. We assume marginal costs, i.e., costs of maintaining a database and answering queries, to be zero.
4. Throughout the paper we use ‘‘she’’ for sellers and ‘‘he’’ for buyers.
5. For technical reasons and simplicity of some proofs we assume that the allocation is probabilistic. The
resulting mechanism that we will present in Section 3 however, will be deterministic.
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to his query and keep the rest of this money, mj ∈ R≥0, in his wallet. Let rj ∈ N denote
the number of rows acquired by bj .
rj
vj
rj
vj
(a)
(a)(a)rj
Figure 2: Value function of the buyer
bj . Here, rj(a) and v
′
j(a) are the
threshold and the marginal value of
bj when the allocation is a.
We assume that the buyers in our market are
institutional agents, i.e., agents which are buying
data for an institution and not an individual person.
They could be pharmaceutical companies, operators of
cloud applications or some other kind of intermediary.
Importantly, we assume that the buyers in our domain
can estimate their value for rows of the database
tables. We assume that buyers are risk-neutral the
bj ’s preferences are described by a quasi-linear utility
function uj(mj , rj , a) = vj(rj , a)+mj . Here, vj is the
value function of bj . Notice that the value function
depends on the allocation decision a of A regarding
data providers. This follows from the assumption
that the larger the number of allocated sellers, the more ‘‘informative” (and thus valuable)
an answer for the buyer’s query becomes. For simplicity, we assume that for any a, vj(rj , a)
is linear and non-decreasing in rj up to a certain threshold rj(a) ≥ 0, and exhibits zero
marginal increase for every additional row rj > rj(a) (see Figure 2).
6 Depending on the
allocation a, each buyer can decided to buy less or more data, and thus, the threshold
rj(a) depends on the allocation a. Shortly, we will elaborate on this dependency. Formally,
vj(rj , a) = v
′
j(a)min{rj , rj(a)}. Here, v′j(a) is the marginal value for rows if the allocation
is a. We let Fv′(a) and Fr(a) denote the cumulative distribution functions of v
′
j(a) and rj(a),
respectively.
We make two assumptions regarding how buyers’ preferences change when additional
sellers (and thus, additional databases) are allocated. Assume that a = (a1, ..., ai, ..., aN )
is an allocation and let us define δai = (0, ..., δ, ..., 0) with the ith element equal to δ,
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1− ai.
Assumption 1 (Monotonicity of the Marginal Value). For every j = 1, ..., L, ∀i =
1, ..., N the following inequality holds v′j(a+ δai) ≥ v′j(a).
The intuition behind this assumption is as follows: As more sellers are allocated, the
marginal value of every buyer bj for the answer of his query cannot decrease. This assumption
is justified by the fact that the more information there is available, the more precise the
answer to the query will be. Indeed, joining two or more databases implies computation of
a certain relational predicate on the data. This results in obtaining conditional distributions
over the data and consequently, in more precise answers.7
Assumption 2 (Monotonicity of the Maximum Buyer’s Value). For every j =
1, ..., L, ∀i = 1, ..., N it holds v′j(a+ δai)rj(a+ δai) ≥ v′j(a)rj(a).
6. Generally speaking, buyers could have a decreasing marginal value for additional rows. However, the
assumption of a constant marginal value and a threshold is not too restrictive as it still captures convex
preferences of buyers while providing us with a relatively simple model.
7. While this model captures a number of different JOIN operations over the databases (e.g., inner JOIN,
outer JOIN, etc.), it may seem less applicable for UNION operations. Our model resolves by treating a
query that takes the union of two databases as two separate queries.
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This assumption can be interpreted as follows. Buyers submit their queries in order
to answer a particular question. As answers for queries become more valuable (due to
Assumption 1), each buyer can decide to buy more or fewer rows. However, this doesn’t
change the value of answering the particular question they had in mind: more information
simply permits a better approximation of the question because it makes use of more databases.
This makes the total value of a query answer, v′j(a)rj(a), non-decreasing.
Finally, we assume that buyers are indifferent between identities of sellers who produce
a database k.
Allocation and Pricing. Let p denote the posted price per row in an answer to a query.
The price p will be set independent of the query to prevent buyers from engaging in complex
strategic behavior when deciding which queries to submit (e.g., to get cheaper answers
to their questions). While this may seem counterintuitive at first sight, remember that
producing any answer has zero marginal costs for the seller. Further, we assume the number
of buyers L to be large, such that buyers are price takers and thus cannot manipulate the
market price.
Given price p and allocation probabilities a, every buyer bj solves his consumption
problem of maximizing his utility subject to the budget constraint (Mas-Colell et al., 1995):
max
mj ,rj
uj(mj , rj , a)
s.t. p · rj +mj ≤ e, (1)
mj ≥ 0, rj ≤ Rj .
Let (m∗j (p, a), r
∗
j (p, a)) be a solution to the consumption problem when the posted price
is p and the allocation is a. Here, r∗j (p, a) is the (Marshalian) demand of bj for rows when
the posted price is p and the allocation is a. Similarly, m∗j (p, a) is the demand of the buyer
for money (i.e., how much money the buyer wants to keep). Observe that m∗j (p, a) and
r∗j (p, a) need not be functions. In fact, they are correspondences (Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
Let A = 〈g, h〉 be the reverse auction adopted by the market platform. Here, g : RN →
[0, 1]N denotes an allocation rule that maps the cost profile c = (c1, ..., cN ) to the allocation
decision (a1, ..., aN ); ai = gi(ci, c−i), where gi(ci, c−i) : RN → [0, 1] computes the probability
that si is allocated. If a is an allocation, we let back be the corresponding allocation in
which sellers producing database k are not allocated. We let h denote the payment rule that
maps the cost profile c = (c1, ..., cN ) to the vector of payments (t1, ..., tN ) to be paid to the
sellers. As we shall see in Section 3, these payments need to be made ‘‘in expectation” due
to the random nature of buyers’ values and sellers’ costs. As we discuss in Section 3, when
A computes the allocation and payments it takes into account Fi for all i = 1, ..., N as well
as both Fv′(a) and Fr(a) for all possible deterministic allocations a ∈ {0, 1}N of sellers.8
Given all of the above information, the market platform can compute the price per row
p ≥ 0, which is exposed to buyers, and payments ti ≥ 0 to be paid to sellers.
8. Observe that as the number of databases increases, the number of possible deterministic allocations
increases exponentially. In practice, the valuations of buyers for different allocations may be very similar.
This would allow the market platform to considerably reduce the amount of information it needs to
collect and this would also simplify pricing. In this paper however, we do not discuss such optimizations.
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Remark 2.1. In practice, the market platform will need to do some market research to
learn the distributions Fi, Fv′(a), Fr(a). Such learning can be done by building an appropriate
regression model that captures the connectivity of different databases, their topics, the
validity of the data, etc. The design of an appropriate learning procedure, however, is
outside of the scope of this paper.
Finally, we define the social welfare as the total utility of buyers and sellers obtained
in the market given allocation a, payments t and the posted price p, i.e., SW (a, t, p) =∑N
i=1 ui(a, ci, t) +
∑L
j=1 uj(m
∗
j (p, a), r
∗
j (p, a), a).
2.2 Market Properties
We now discuss a number of properties we would like the reverse auction A and the overall
market mechanism to satisfy.
Auction Properties. We begin with the properties we would like the reverse auction A
to satisfy.
Definition 1. The reverse auction A = 〈g, h〉 is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
(BNIC), if ∀i = 1, ..., N ∀ci ∀cˆi ∀c−i
Ef−i [ui(g(ci, c−i), ci, h(ci, c−i))] ≥ Ef−i [ui(g(cˆi, c−i), ci, h(cˆi, c−i))]. (2)
In our work, we look for a reverse auction A that satisfies BNIC.
The following property guarantees participation of sellers in the reverse auction:
Definition 2. The reverse auction A = 〈g, h〉 is individually rational (IR) for sellers,
if ∀i = 1, ..., N , ∀ci,∀c−i
Ef−i [ui(g(ci, c−i), ci, h(ci, c−i))] ≥ 0. (3)
Market Mechanism Properties. Now, we switch to a discussion of the properties that
the overall market mechanism should have.
First, observe that individual rationality is satisfied for buyers automatically. This
follows from the fact that when solving their consumption problem (1), buyers always have
the option not to consume rows and to keep their whole endowment e.
Additionally, we would like the market mechanism to be budget balanced. Formally:
Definition 3. The market mechanism is budget balanced (BB) if ∀c, ∀Fv′(a), Fr(a), ∀Fi
(i = 1, ..., N), the price p, the allocation and payments computed by A = 〈g, h〉 satisfy
N∑
i=1
ti =
L∑
j=1
(e−m∗j (p, a)), (4)
where (t1, ..., tN ) = h(c) and a = g(c).
In words, the total payment to sellers computed by A should be equal to the total amount
of money collected from buyers. As A uses Fv′(a), Fr(a) and Fi, i = 1, ..., N to compute
the allocation and payments (see Section 2.1), this property should hold for arbitrary
distributions.
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Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Sellers arrive
MP computes a, t, p
Sellers produce DBs Buyers arrive and pay
Figure 3: Temporal model of the market. During the first time period, sellers arrive and
report their costs. In the second time period, the market platform computes an allocation
and payments to sellers, as well as the posted price p. During the third time period, buyers
arrive and consume the desired number of rows of database tables corresponding to their
queries.
2.3 Temporal Structure
Figure 3 illustrates the temporal structure of the data market we propose. First, for
simplicity, we present the model with only three time periods and then elaborate on how it
can be generalized for an arbitrary time horizon T.
In time period τ = 1, all sellers si, i = 1, ..., N arrive to the market and report their
costs to the market platform. Then, in time period τ = 2, the market platform computes
allocation a = (a1, ..., aN ) and payments t = (t1, ..., tN ) as well as the posted price per row,
p, based on reported costs received from sellers and the value model of buyers (i.e., Fv′(a)
and Fr(a)). Once the allocation is computed, allocated sellers can produce their databases
(this happens during the same time period τ = 2). Finally, in time period τ = 3, buyers
arrive to the market, submit their queries and pay a price p per row of answers to their
queries.
This simple model can be generalized straightforwardly to a setting where buyers do not
arrive to the market at the same time, but over a certain time horizon T. In this setting,
we assume that each database remains fully relevant (i.e., the value of the buyers remains
the same) for T time periods, but that the data in the database becomes obsolete and thus
has zero value after T time periods.9 This means that we assume that T is the timeliness of
data (i.e., a period of time during which the data is still up to date).
The market platform promises to the sellers that over the time horizon T, every allocated
seller si will receive payments that are expected to add up to ti.
10 This means that the
market platform does not pay ti to the seller si immediately at time τ = 1. Instead, it will
accrue money paid by buyers coming to the market over the time horizon T. We assume
that L buyers arrive to the market over the time horizon T, each paying e−m∗j (p, a) to the
market platform to get r∗j (p, a) rows of database tables (possibly joined) corresponding to
their queries. These payments go directly to sellers until all promises are fulfilled (i.e., each
seller si receives ti).
9. It is also possible to use a discounting factor for the value of data. We leave this direction for future
work.
10. In our model, we assume that exactly L buyers arrive. In practice, more or fewer buyers would arrive.
Our model extends straightforwardly to these cases by including an additional expectation over the
number of buyers.
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3. Market Design
In this section, we present our main contribution: a market design solution for selling
distributed data. We demonstrate how the reverse auction A should be designed as well as
how the posted price p must be computed to achieve our design goals.
3.1 Market Design Objective and Constraints
Social Choice Function. The result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) in domains
when buyers and sellers are both strategic implies that there does not exist a social welfare
maximizing mechanism that is BNIC, IR and budget balanced. Thus, optimizing social
welfare is not feasible in this domain. Instead, we find it acceptable to sacrifice a bit of
social welfare as long as the resulting market is BNIC and guarantees IR and BB. Given
this, we can consider either optimizing the total utility of buyers or the revenues of sellers,
subject to the aforementioned constraints.
As discussed in Section 1.1, non-negative profits for sellers is a crucial constraint for
the viability of markets for distributed data. This is why maximizing the revenue of sellers
could be a potential objective. This objective, however, does not seem very attractive, as we
envision the market for distributed data to give rise to many novel AI applications coming
from the buyers’ side. Distributing all the surplus in favor of the sellers (who are often
‘‘monopolists” of their data) can make the market uninteresting for many potential buyers.
This is why we focus on optimizing the total utility of buyers subject to the constraint
that the fixed costs of the allocated sellers can be recouped and the market is overall budget
balanced.
3.2 Deriving a Value for Databases
To compute the allocation and payments of the sellers, we now derive the induced values of
the buyers for the databases of the sellers. To this end, we first define the aggregate value
of buyers for rows of database tables corresponding to their queries. Based on this aggregate
value function, we can compute the positive externalities that different databases impose on
buyers. Finally, we use these externalities to define buyers’ values for different databases.
Given an allocation a ∈ [0, 1]N and price per row p, the market demand for rows is
r∗(p, a) =
∑L
j=1 r
∗
j (p, a). The market demand for money m
∗(p, a) is defined analogously,
i.e., m∗(p, a) =
∑L
j=1m
∗
j (p, a). We begin with the following definition:
Definition 4. An aggregate buyer is a fictional buyer with an endowment E = L · e and
the utility U(m, r, a) = V (r, a) +m. Here, V (r, a) is an aggregate value function, i.e., a
function that makes the solution of the consumption problem (1) for the aggregate buyer
equal to the market demand m∗(p, a), r∗(p, a).
This means that the aggregate buyer is a fictional agent that acts in the same way as
all buyers would act together when responding to the price p and the allocation a. The
following proposition provides a way to compute the aggregate value function.
Proposition 3.1. Given allocation a ∈ [0, 1]N , the aggregate value function is
V (r, a) =
∫ r
0
pi(z, a)dz, (5)
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where pi(z, a) = maxr∗(p′,a)=z p
′.11
Proof. From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (Mas-Colell et al., 1995) for the aggregate con-
sumer’s problem (see Equation (1)), we have:
dV
dr
(r∗, a) = p. (6)
If r∗(p, a) was a function, then the right hand side in Equation (6) would be the inverse
demand function r∗−1(p, a). However, r∗(p, a) is a correspondence and, therefore, there can
be many different prices p that support the solution r∗ = r∗(p, a). To resolve ambiguity, we
let
dV
dr
(r∗, a) = max
r∗(p′,a)=r∗
p′. (7)
Integrating Equation (7) and replacing maxr∗(p′,a)=z p
′ with pi(z, a) we get V (r, a) =∫ r
0 pi(z, a)dz. Thus, solving Equation (6) with this aggregate value function gives us a
solution r∗(p, a), which is a market demand for rows. The demand of the aggregate buyer for
money is then equal to E−p·r∗(p, a) =∑Lj=1 e−p∑Lj=1 r∗j (p, a) =∑Lj=1m∗j (p, a) = m∗(p, a),
which is exactly the market demand for money. Thus, V (r, a) is the aggregate value func-
tion.
Now that we know how to compute the aggregate value function we can analyze some of
its properties. We begin by showing that the aggregate value of buyers can only increase
when more databases are allocated:
Proposition 3.2. For all r ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ [0, 1]N , ∀i = 1, ..., N the following holds:
∂V
∂ai
(r, a) ≥ 0.
Proof. Consider a single buyer bj . Let δa = (0, ..., δai, ..., 0), with δai ≥ 0. Then ∀r,
vj(r, a+ δa) = vj(r, a) + δai
∂vj
∂ai
(r, a). Consequently,
∂vj
∂ai
(r, a) = 1δai (vj(r, a+ δa)− vj(r, a)).
From Assumptions 1 and 2 it follows that vj(r, a+δa) ≥ vj(r, a) for all r ≥ 0, ∀a,∀j = 1, ..., L.
Therefore,
∂vj
∂ai
(r, a) ≥ 0. This means that every buyer’s value for r rows can only increase
with the increase of ai. Consequently, the aggregate value can also only increase.
Example 1. Assume that L = N = 2 and that e = 10; each seller produces a single database.
Consider a setting where s1 is allocated while s2 is not, i.e., a = (1, 0). Assume bj (j = 1, 2)
submits a query against the database of s1 and has the following value function for her data:
v1(r1, a) = 4 ·min{r1, 1}, v2(r2, a) = 1 ·min{r2, 2}. Buyers solve their consumption problems,
see Equation (1). From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we obtain the buyers’ demands when
11. This corresponds to the maximal inverse demand function.
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the allocation is a:12
r∗1(p, a) =

1, if p < 4
[0, 1], if p = 4
0, otherwise
r∗2(p, a) =

2, if p < 1
[0, 2], if p = 1
0, otherwise.
Consequently, the market demand is
r∗(p, a) =

3, if 0 < p < 1
[1, 3], if p = 1
1, if 1 < p < 4
[0, 1], if p = 4
0, if 4 < p.
(8)
It is easy to check that this market demand is equal to the demand of the aggregate buyer
with an endowment of E = 2e and utility U(m, r, a) = V (r, a) +m, where
V (r, a) =

4r, if 0 ≤ r ≤ 1
3 + r, if 1 ≤ r ≤ 3
6, if 3 ≤ r
is the aggregate value function. For example, here the aggregate value for the first row
(0 ≤ r ≤ 1) is equal to 4. Therefore, if p > 4, the aggregate buyer’s demand must be 0.
Equation (8) confirms this as r∗(p, a) = 0 for p > 4. Other cases are analogous.
Remember, that if a is an allocation, then back stands for a similar allocation in which
the database k is not allocated. We now define the externality imposed by a database k on
all buyers as follows:
Definition 5. For a given allocation a and a posted price p, the externality imposed by the
database k is
extk(a, p) = V (r
∗(p, a), a)− V (r∗(p, back), back). (9)
The externality reflects how much additional value the database k brings to all buyers.
Note that this quantity could be zero if the database k is not allocated in a. To define the
value of buyers for a database k in a consistent way, we split the aggregate value achieved
by all buyers proportionally to extk(a, p). Formally:
Definition 6. Given allocation a ∈ {0, 1}N and price p, the induced value Wk(a, p)
of the aggregate buyer for the database k is the share of the aggregate value that is
proportional to the externality that database k imposes on the aggregate buyer, i.e.,
Wk(a, p) =
extk(a, p)∑D
`=1 ext`(a, p)
V (r∗(p, a), a). (10)
12. The result is quite intuitive. Indeed, bj is not willing to buy query answers as long as the price p per
answer is larger than his marginal value for the answer (which is equal to 4 for b1 and 1 for b2). As soon
as the price is smaller than the marginal value, b1 and b2 are willing to buy up to one and two query
answers respectively.
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Observe thatWk(a, p) depends on the posted price p and on the whole allocation a. Thus,
indirectly it depends on allocations of all other databases. The dependency on allocation a
reflects the important fact that buyers may have combinatorial valuations, i.e., they can
value database k higher if a complementary database is also available.
The fact that Wk(a, p) depends on price p has the following intuition: If price p is
too high such that no one can afford to buy a single row, the externality imposed by any
database is zero. If prices are low, externalities become positive.
We impose an additional assumption: all allocated databases are (weak) complements
for the aggregate buyer. Thus, his valuation of databases is supermodular (Chambers &
Echenique, 2009). Intuitively, supermodularity can be described as follows. Consider any
two databases `, k. Supermodularity says that the induced value of database k can only
increase as the allocation probability of the other database ` increases. Formally:
Assumption 3 (Weak Complementarity). For any two databases ` and k, for any
a ∈ {0, 1}N , ∀p ≥ 0 the following inequality holds:
Wk(a, p) ≥Wk(bac`, p). (11)
Remark 3.1. This assumption is quite intuitive: If the database ` complements another
database k, an increase in allocation probability of ` leads to an increase in the induced
value of database k for the aggregate buyer. Imposing this assumption on the aggregate
buyer is natural: given that this buyer can be considered as the whole population, it makes
sense to allocate those databases that are complementary. Note that, for individual buyers
different databases can still be either complements or substitutes.
While Assumption 3 is intuitive, it does not follow directly from Assumption 1 and
Assumption 2. Indeed, one could construct an example where Assumptions 1 and 2 are
satisfied but Assumption 3 is not. To eliminate these corner cases we state the Assumption
3 explicitly.
Example 2. We follow the setup of Example 1. The externality that s1 imposes on buyers
when the allocation is a = (1, 0) and the posted price is p is ext1(a, p) = V (r
∗(p, a), a) −
V (r∗(p, bac1), bac1), where bac1 = (0, 0). Here, the aggregate value when the allocation is
bac1 is V (r, bac1) = 0 as no queries can be answered. Similarly, the externality that s2
imposes on buyers under allocation a is 0 (as s2 is not allocated). Thus, for example, if
p = 1 − , then the market demand r∗(p, a) = 3 and the induced value of the database of
s1 is W1(p, a) =
6
6+0 · 6 = 6. Example 3 extends the current example for the case when all
databases are allocated.
3.3 Designing the Reverse Auction
Now that we have defined the induced values for different databases, Wk(a, p), we can
define an appropriate auction A that maximizes the total utility of buyers, subject to the
constraint that the fixed costs of allocated sellers are recouped. In this auction, the market
platform computes the allocation a and payments t based on the costs reported by sellers.
We design this auction in a way that is similar to the optimal auction of Myerson (1981).
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First, observe that the expected total utility of buyers is equal to the difference between
the expected value that the aggregate buyer can achieve under the allocation g(c) and the
total payment that the buyers must make to the sellers. Formally,
Ef [U(g(c), h)] =Ef
[
V (r∗(p, g(c)), g(c))−
N∑
i=1
hi(c)
]
=Ef
[ D∑
k=1
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
−
N∑
i=1
hi(c)
]
. (12)
Here, Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
is the expected induced value of the database k with the probabilistic
allocation of sellers g(c) (see the formal definition of this term in Appendix B). The market
design problem now is to find an auction A = 〈g, h〉 that maximizes Ef [U(g(c), h)] subject
to BNIC, IR and the following constraints:∑
i∈i(k)
gi(c) ≤ 1 ∀k = 1, ..., D ∀c ∈ [0, 1]N , (13)
gi(c) ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ..., N ∀c ∈ [0, 1]N . (14)
Constraints (13) and (14) ensure that each database is allocated at most once and that the
allocation probabilities are non-negative.
We let φi(ci) = ci +
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
denote the virtual cost of seller si. We assume that the distri-
butions of costs of sellers fi are regular, i.e., φi(ci) are monotone and strictly increasing (My-
erson, 1981). Let us also define the virtual surplus as S˜(a) =
∑D
k=1Wk(a, p)−
∑N
i=1 φi(ci)ai,
a ∈ {0, 1}N . We let bS˜ci(a) denote the virtual surplus achieved by all agents apart of si, i.e.,
bS˜ci(a) =
∑D
k=1Wk(a, p) −
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φj(cj)aj . Now, we are ready to present the optimal
reverse auction.
Buyer-Optimal Reverse Auction (BORA)
Allocation rule: a∗ ∈ argmaxa∈{0,1}N S˜(a); use random tie breaking in the case of ties.
Payment rule: For each seller si:
If ai = 1, then
ti = φ
−1
i
(
bS˜ci(a∗)− S˜(bac∗i )
)
. (15)
If ai = 0, then ti = 0.
In words, the allocation rule says that the auction allocates sellers in a way that maximizes
the virtual surplus. We break ties randomly. Informally, the payment of the allocated agent
is computed in a similar way as VCG payments, where agents report their virtual costs
instead of their true costs. To better understand the intuition behind the payment rule, let
us consider several special cases.
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One database, one seller. Let us first consider the setting with a single seller, i.e., N = 1,
and consequently, D = 1. In this case, the seller is allocated whenever her virtual cost is
smaller than the induced value of buyers for her database, i.e., φ1(c1) ≤ W1(a, p). From
Equation (15) it follows that the payment to the seller must be equal to t1 = φ
−1
1 (W1(a, p)).
This payment is similar to the Myerson (1981) reserve payment. In words, the reserve
payment is equal to the cost that the seller would have had to make her virtual cost to be
equal to the induced value of the aggregate buyer for her database.
One database, multiple sellers. Let us now assume that there are multiple sellers that
can produce the same database, i.e., D = 1 and N > 1. In this case, the seller with the
smallest virtual cost is allocated as long as her virtual cost is smaller than the induced value
of buyers for her database. W.l.o.g., let us assume that φ1(c1) is the smallest virtual cost and
φ2(c2) is the second smallest virtual cost. Then, the payment of the allocated seller is equal to
the minimum of φ−11 (φ2(c2)) and φ
−1
1 (W1(a, p)), i.e., t1 = min{φ−11 (φ2(c2)), φ−11 (W1(a, p))}.
In other words, the payment of the allocated agent is computed as the minimum of the
reserve payment and the critical value. Here, the critical value is defined similarly to (Nisan
et al., 2007), i.e., it is equal to the largest cost that the seller could have reported while still
being allocated, i.e., φ−1i
(
minj∈i(k)\i φj(cj)
)
.
Two databases, two sellers. Consider the setting with two distinct databases, each
produced by a single seller. Assume further that φ1(c1) > W1(a, p) for a = (1, 1) and for all
p. In contrast to the setting with a single database and a single seller discussed above, in
this case, one can happen that the database 1 is allocated (i.e., despite of the fact that its
virtual cost is larger than the induced value of the respective database). Such a situation
is possible, for example, when the database 1 has a very strong complementary effect on
the database 2. Thus, the presence of the database 1 can increase the induced value of the
second database, W2(a, p), as this induced value depends on the whole allocation a. As a
result this may lead to a higher virtual surplus. Therefore, it may be optimal to allocate
both databases. Example 4 in Appendix A illustrates this case.
Multiple databases, multiple sellers. In this most general case, the intuition behind
the payment rule (15) mimics the intuition of the standard VCG mechanism. Indeed, the
first two summand in the Equation (15), (φi(ci) + S˜(a
∗)), correspond to the total virtual
surplus achieved by all sellers apart of si at the optimal allocation a
∗. The last summand,
S˜(bac∗i ), corresponds to the optimal virtual surplus achieved in a similar setting but without
the seller si being present. Thus, the argument of the inverse virtual cost function can be
interpreted as a virtual externality imposed by the seller si.
Observe also that in the general case, the objective of maximizing the virtual surplus in
the allocation rule of the BORA auction is non-linear. This follows from the fact that the
induced values of databases need not depend linearly on different allocations. This poses
a number of computational challenges that we will address in Section 3.5. Appendix A
presents a number of worked examples that illustrate the BORA auction.
Theorem 3.3. If the distributions fi are regular for all i = 1, ..., N , and the databases are
weakly complementary for the aggregate buyer, then the BORA auction maximizes buyers
utilities and satisfies constraints (13), (14), BNIC and IR.
15
Moor, Seuken, Grubenmann, & Bernstein
Proof. First, let Ef−i [gi(ci, c−i)] be an ex-interim allocation probability of si. As Myerson
(1981) showed, BNIC, IR and constraints (13) and (14) imply monotonicity of ex-interim
allocation (see Lemma B.1 in Appendix B). We use this result to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.4. Consider the allocation rule g : RN≥0 → [0, 1]N that maximizes
Ef
[ D∑
k=1
(
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
−
∑
i∈i(k)
(
ci +
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
)
gi(c)
)]
(16)
subject to monotonicity of the ex-interim allocation and constraints (13) and (14). Further,
consider the payment rule hi(c) = gi(c)ci +
∫ βi
ci
gi(cˆi, c−i)dcˆi for every i = 1, ..., N , ∀c. Then,
A = 〈g, h〉 maximizes buyers’ utilities under the constraints (13) and (14), BNIC and IR.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix B.
Now we would like to show that if a database ` is allocated with a positive probability,
then this probability must be equal to 1. To achieve this, we first present the following
proposition that shows that constraints (13) are binding when databases are complements:
Lemma 3.5. Let g∗(c) be a solution of (16). Then, if for a database ` there exists a seller
si with i ∈ i(`) such that g∗i (c) > 0, then
∑
i∈i(`) g
∗
i (c) = 1.
Proof. See Appendix B for the proof.
From Lemma 3.5 and Lemma B.2 (see Appendix B), it follows that, there must ex-
ist a deterministic allocation g∗(c) that maximizes Equation (16). This narrows down
the search space of optimal mechanisms to only the deterministic ones. Consider a
mechanism that for any reported cost profile c maximizes the virtual surplus S˜(a) =∑D
k=1Wk(a, p)−
∑D
k=1
∑
i∈i(k) φi(ci)ai, where a ∈ {0, 1}N . This allocation also maximizes
Equation (16). Remember that the distributions fi are regular.
13 Thus, φi(ci) must be
monotone. Consequently, the ex-interim allocation is also monotone.
From Lemma 3.4 it follows that in order guarantee BNIC, the payments of sellers must
satisfy
hi(c) = g
∗
i (c)ci +
∫ βi
ci
g∗i (cˆi, c−i)dcˆi (17)
for every i = 1, ..., N , ∀c. If a seller sj is not allocated (i.e., aj = 0), then from monotonicity
of the ex-interim allocation (see Lemma B.1) it follows that sj is not allocated for any other
cost qj ≥ cj . Consequently, hj(c) = 0. If a seller sj is allocated (i.e., aj = 1), then Equation
(17) can be simplified as follows
hj(c) = cj +
∫ ζj
cj
dcˆj = cj + ζj − cj = ζj , (18)
where
ζj = sup{c|φj(c) ≤ φi(ci) ∀i ∈ i(k)\j and φj(c) ≤ φj(cj) + S˜(a∗)− S˜(bac∗j )}. (19)
13. For irregular distributions we could use ironing in a similar way as in (Myerson, 1981).
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p
B(p, a)
A
GDC
Figure 4: Example of the dependency of the budget surplus B(p, a) on posted price p. Point
C corresponds to the minimal p that satisfies overall budget balance.
Now, let us exclude the seller sj who produces a database k from the mechanism and
consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, the resulting allocation of databases stays the
same, i.e., the database k is still produced but perhaps by a different seller i ∈ i(k). In this
case, it must hold that φi(ci) = min{φq(cq), q ∈ i(k)}. Thus, the second inequality in (19)
implies the first one. In the second scenario, the database k is not allocated anymore. Thus,
it must be that φi(ci) − φj(cj) ≥ S˜(a∗) − S˜(bac∗j ), where φi(ci) = min{φq(cq), q ∈ i(k)}.
Equivalently, φi(ci) ≥ φj(cj) + S˜(a∗)− S˜(bac∗j ) and therefore, the first inequality in (19) is
again implied by the second one. Therefore, from the monotonicity of φj(cj) it follows that
the payment of any seller sj can now be rewritten as follows:
hj(c) = φ
−1
j
(
φj(cj) + S˜(a
∗)− S˜(bac∗j )
)
. (20)
3.4 The Overall Market Mechanism
The reverse auction designed in the previous section does not guarantee that the market
mechanism is budget balanced. Instead, it assumes that the market platform can always
pay the sellers. To guarantee that the market is budget balanced, the market mechanism
needs to set a posted price p, such that the total amount of money collected from the buyers,∑L
j=1(e−m∗j (p, a)), is equal to the total payment
∑N
i=1 ti received by the sellers.
Consider the budget surplus14 achieved when the allocation is a and the price is p:
B(p, a) =
L∑
j=1
(e−m∗j (p, a))−
N∑
i=1
ti. (21)
Observe that the total payment to be accrued to sellers depends on allocation a and on
price p. To see this, notice that if p = 0, buyers can gain a lot of value from submitting
queries against all databases (for free). Thus, the induced value of any database k, Wk(a, p),
is large, and it is likely that the database is allocated. As a result, the second term in (21)
is positive. At the same time, buyers do not pay anything and, consequently, the first term
in Equation (21) is zero. This means that if p = 0, then B(p, a) < 0. This case is illustrated
by point A in Figure 4. A similar argument works for a situation in which p =∞. In this
case, both terms in B(p, a) are zero, which corresponds to the trivial equilibrium when no
14. In microeconomic literature, this quantity is also often called the excess demand for money (Mas-Colell
et al., 1995).
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sellers are allocated. Point G in Figure 4 illustrates this scenario. As can be seen in Figure
4, the non-trivial equilibrium prices that satisfy the budget balance constraint correspond to
points C and D. In general, there may be multiple solutions for which B(p, a) = 0 (such as
points G, C and D in Figure 4). Consequently, there may be many different posted prices
that guarantee budget balance. However, we aim to find the smallest such price, as it would
deliver the largest total utility to buyers.
Data: Fi(ci), i = 1, ..., N ; Fv′(a), Fr(a) for all a ∈ {0, 1}N
Result: Allocation a, payments t, posted price p
1 δ ← 0.01 // Step size
2 ι← 0
3 p(ι) = 0
4 a(ι)← (a1, ..., aN ), s.t., ∀k ≤ D holds
∑
i∈i(k) ai = 1
5 ask sellers to report cˆ = (cˆ1, ..., cˆN )
6 repeat
7 compute Wk(a(ι), p(ι)) for all k ≤ D // See Definition 6
8 set up A = 〈g, h〉 parametrized by Wk(a(ι), p(ι)) // See BORA
9 solve A, i.e., compute a← g(cˆ) and t← h(cˆ) // See BORA
10 compute buyers’ demand for money m∗j (p(ι), a(ι))
11 B(p(ι), a(ι))←∑Lj=1 (e−m∗j (p(ι), a(ι)))−∑Ni=1 ti // Budget surplus
12 p(ι+ 1)← p(ι)−B(p(ι), a(ι)) · δ // Price update
13 ι← ι+ 1
14 until |B(p(ι), a(ι))| ≤ ;
15 p← p(ι)
16 return a, t, p
Algorithm 1: Fixed-point iteration for computation of the allocation and the price.
To find a solution, we adopt an idea similar to the Tatonnement process (Cheng &
Wellman, 1998). More concretely, in Algorithm 1, we design an iterative procedure that
updates the price, allocation and payments of sellers at every iteration ι (see line 2 of
Algorithm 1). We begin from an initial price p0 = 0 that corresponds to a situation when
rows of database tables corresponding to buyers’ queries are free. At this step we also
assume that all databases are allocated (lines 3-4 of Algorithm 1). In lines 6-14 of Algorithm
1, we then perform a fixed-point iteration by increasing the posted price p(ι) as a function
of the iteration ι, as well as adjusting allocation probabilities a(ι). At every iteration ι, we
evaluate Wk(a(ι), p(ι)) and compute the tentative allocation a and payments t of the auction
A (lines 7-9). Observe, that given the price p(ι) we can also compute the buyers’ demand
for money m∗j (p(ι), a(ι)) (see line 10). Consequently, the amount of money that buyers are
willing to pay for their queries at iteration ι is
∑L
j=1
(
e−m∗j (p(ι), a(ι))
)
. Thus, in line 11
of Algorithm 1, we now can compute the budget surplus, B(p(ι), a(ι)), at this iteration. As
long as B(p(ι), a(ι)) is negative, we increase the price p(ι). We stop the algorithm when the
budget surplus is smaller than the chosen tolerance threshold (see line 14 of Algorithm 1).
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Remember that the sellers are asked to report their costs only once. Precisely, this
happens at time τ = 1 of our temporal model (see Figure 3). We assume that the sellers
understand Algorithm 1 and the rules of the BORA auction. Thus, they can make a truthful
report cˆ = c (see line 5 of Algorithm 1).
Note also that Algorithm 1 does not require any interaction with the buyers. Instead, it
is considered a heuristic procedure for computing an equilibrium price and allocation. Thus,
this algorithm must be executed at time period τ = 2 of our temporal model (see Figure 3),
in other words, before actual buyers arrive to the market. This implies that the iterative
nature of the algorithm does not change the incentives of the buyers to behave truthfully
and the truthfulness of the overall market follows immediately from the truthfulness of the
BORA auction.
Second, observe that a non-trivial equilibrium does not always exist. Consequently, our
algorithm may return a null allocation and zero payments. Consider, for example, about a
domain with a single seller with a high fixed cost and assume that there is a single buyer with
a very small marginal value and a small value threshold. In this case, it is not possible to
compensate the seller for producing her database. This result, however, does not constitute
a failure of our market design: Indeed, if the society does not value the data highly enough,
then the data should not be produced in the first place. In other words, we are aiming at
designing a market that incentivizes data providers to produce useful data rather than any
data. 15
Finally, note that, even though we designed our market with the goal of optimizing the
buyers’ surplus, it is not possible to provide any meaningful lower bound on the share of the
surplus obtained by buyers in general. The following proposition states this result formally:
Proposition 3.6. The share of the buyers’ surplus achieved by Algorithm 1 auction is lower
bounded by zero.
Proof. To prove the statement we construct a corner case where all sellers have zero costs
and face no competition for producing their databases. At the same time, only joining all
databases brings value to every buyer, while joining any other combination of databases
has zero value. In this case, we can show that the buyers’ surplus is zero (and it can’t be
negative as buyers can always decide not to participate in the trade). The full proof is
provided in Appendix B.
The corner case used to prove Proposition 3.6 is obviously pathological, and we would
not expect such cases in practice. To study how much surplus buyers can get in more
realistic settings, we have performed a number of computational experiments (see Section
4).
3.5 Winner Determination via Mixed-Integer Allocation Programming
In this section, we discuss computational challenges that arise in practical implementation
of our proposed BORA auction. First, remember that buyers are indifferent about the
15. Remember, that our choice of the initial price p0 = 0 follows the idea that we want to find an equilibrium
with the largest surplus for buyers. Clearly, if the initial price was too high, then the trivial equilibrium
in which nobody is allocated could be reached immediately. Technically, we could also launch Algorithm
1 from several starting points. However, our experiments show that even starting with p = 0, we can
obtain high levels of surplus. Example 5 in Appendix A illustrates our approach.
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identities of sellers. Thus, it follows that the induced values of databases Wk(a, p) are
constant for any allocation of sellers as long as the allocation of the respective databases stay
the same. As the number of databases D is typically much lower than the number of sellers
N , we can now compute the induced values of databases for every possible deterministic
allocation α ∈ {0, 1}D of databases rather than for every possible deterministic allocation
a ∈ {0, 1}N of sellers. With a slight abuse of notation we let Wk(α, p) be the induced value
of the database k when the allocation of databases is α.
Further, remember that the winner determination problem in the BORA auction is
non-linear. In order to linearize it, we can pre-compute the induced values of databases for
every possible deterministic allocation of databases. We then include these pre-computed
values into the objective function with auxiliary binary optimization variables indicating
whether a particular deterministic allocation of databases is chosen. This idea is illustrated
with the following linearized mixed integer program:
max
ai,i=1,...,N
zα,α∈{0,1}D
∑
α∈{0,1}D
[
zα ·
D∑
k=1
Wk(α, p)
]
−
N∑
i=1
φi(ci)ai (22)
s.t. zα ≤
∑
j∈i(k)
aj ∀α ∈ {0, 1}D ∀k = 1, ..., D s.t. α(k) = 1 (23)
zα ≤
∑
j∈i(k)
(1− aj) ∀α ∈ {0, 1}D ∀k = 1, ..., D s.t. α(k) = 0 (24)
ai ∈ {0, 1} ∀i = 1, ..., N (25)
zα ∈ {0, 1} ∀α ∈ {0, 1}D. (26)
Here, binary optimization variables ai represent the allocation decisions of the BORA
auction regarding sellers si, i = 1, ..., N . Further, the auxiliary optimization variable zα
is equal to 1 if the deterministic allocation of databases is α ∈ {0, 1}D. Here, constraints
(23) and (24) build a bridge between allocation decisions regarding different sellers and
the chosen deterministic allocation of databases produced by these sellers. In particular,
constraints (23) guarantee that the deterministic allocation α in which the database k is
allocated (α(k) = 1) is not feasible (zα = 0) if none of the sellers producing database k
are allocated. Similarly, the constraint (24) sets zα = 0 if at least one seller producing the
database k is allocated even though the database k should not be allocated (α(k) = 0).
Looking into the objective function (22), we see that constraints (23) and (24) guarantee
that there is only a single term of the total induced value of databases that gets activated
for a specific allocation of databases and sellers. In particular, if the allocation of databases
is α and the allocation of sellers a satisfies constraints (23) and (24), then the objective
function value is
∑D
k=1Wk(α, p)−
∑N
i=1 φi(ci)ai.
Observe, that such a linearization of the allocation problem of the BORA auction comes
at a high cost. Indeed, in order to achieve the linear formulation, we have introduced a
number of auxiliary optimization variables zα, and this number grows exponentially in
the number of databases D. However, the high complexity of our approach seems to be
unavoidable and follows directly from the combinatorial preferences of buyers for different
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allocations of databases.16 Example 4 in Appendix A illustrates the advantages of using
the combinatorial design of the auction to achieve higher buyer surplus compared to a
non-combinatorial design.
4. Experiments
To study the economic properties of our market design, we carry out a set of computational
experiments. These experiments allow to quantify a number of practically important
economic parameters (such as surplus distribution, monopoly power of unique data providers
etc.) and to check how robust are some of the assumptions we have made at scale. To do
this, we first implement a simulation set up to generate buyers and sellers according to the
model described in Section 2.1. We then run our market mechanism based on Algorithm 1
and measure the social welfare, as well as the share of the social welfare obtained by buyers
and sellers, respectively. Note that, at first, we perform all of our experiments in a small
‘‘stylized” setting to gain a detailed understanding of the behavior of our market mechanism.
To study the scalability of our approach, we then perform a number of experiments in a
medium-sized domain, in which we increase the number of databases, sellers and buyers.
Even more realistic, large-scale market simulations would require a thorough examination of
buyers’ preferences for data in a particular domain. We defer such large-scale simulations
to future work.
4.1 Small Experimental Set-up
We simulate a setting with N = 3 sellers and D = 2 databases. We assume that seller s1
can produce database 1, and both sellers s2 and s3 can produce database 2. We assume that
costs ci of all sellers are i.i.d., ci ∼ U [0, 20], i = 1, 2, 3. This models a scenario in which seller
s1 is a unique producer of database 1 (i.e., s1 has a monopolistic ownership of her data),
while sellers s2 and s3 are competing to produce database 2. Because the BORA auction is
BNIC (Theorem 3.3) we assume that sellers report their costs truthfully.
We vary the number of buyers L from 1 to 128 while keeping the number of sellers and
databases fixed. Each buyer has an initial endowment of money e = 10. For simplicity, we
assume that the marginal value v′j and the threshold rj of any buyer bj only depends on the
number of allocated databases but not on the identities of these databases. If there are no
databases allocated, the marginal value and the threshold of each buyer are equal to zero.
If there is exactly one allocated database, then the marginal value of each buyer is drawn
from U [0, 2]. The threshold, in this case, is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution
U{0, 5}. Finally, if there are exactly two databases allocated then the marginal value vj is
incremented by a random variable drawn from U [0, 2], while rj is incremented by a random
variable drawn from U{0, 5}.
We call the auction instances with the same number of buyers a setting. For each setting
(with 1, 2, 4, ... buyers) we generate 10 random instances as described above. This allows
us to estimate the mean values and confidence intervals for every setting.
16. In Section 4.2, we provide a further discussion of how this complexity can be reduced by partitioning
available databases into loosely connected sets, and running the market mechanism for each set of such a
partitioning.
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Figure 5: The top graph shows the probability that the market is in a trivial equilibrium.
We vary the number of buyers from 1 to 128. The bottom graph shows the dependency
of price p on the number of buyers, L. Error bars indicate confidence intervals at 0.05
significance level.
4.1.1 Probability of ‘‘No Trade’’
Consider Figure 5 (top), which shows the probability that the market mechanism only finds
the trivial equilibrium (‘‘no trade’’). We see that when L is small (≤ 8), then it is likely
that there are not enough buyers to cover the fixed costs of sellers, whatever the price p. If
L ≥ 8, then both databases are always allocated. In this case, seller s1 produces database 1
and either s2 or s3 produces database 2.
4.1.2 Posted Price
Consider Figure 5 (bottom), which shows the dependency of the posted price (in a non-trivial
equilibrium) on the number of buyers L. As L grows, the amount of money that must be
collected from each buyer to achieve BB decreases. Consequently, the price p also decreases.
As the number of buyers increases, the marginal effect of every additional buyer on the
price decreases (the price curve becomes less steep). This is expected, as the impact of an
individual buyer on the aggregate demand decreases as L increases, which leads to more
and more‘‘price-taking behavior’’.
4.1.3 Efficiency and Social Welfare
We now study the most important question: How efficient is our market mechanism? To
this end, consider Figure 6. In the graph in the center, we observe that the absolute value
of social welfare grows linearly as the number of buyers increases (an exponential trend
in the logarithmic scale). This is what we would expect. Now, consider Figure 6 (top),
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Figure 6: The top graph shows efficiency reached in a non-trivial equilibrium. The middle
graph shows social welfare separated by buyers and allocated sellers. The bottom graph
shows the relative distribution of the achieved welfare. Small differences in the mean surplus
of sellers s2 and s3 are not statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level.
which shows the efficiency of our market mechanism.17 For illustration reasons we omit
the efficiency measurement that corresponds to L = 1. 18 If both databases are allocated
(L > 32), the efficiency is 95%. As L increases further, the efficiency stabilizes. This is due
to the fact that the posted price p becomes more flat (see Figure 5 (bottom)), such that
there is a constant fraction of buyers with a marginal value per row smaller than the posted
price p. These buyers do not buy anything, causing the efficiency loss. Thus, as the change
in p gets smaller for larger number of buyers, the efficiency also becomes nearly constant.
4.1.4 Shares of Social Welfare
Consider Figure 6 (bottom), which shows how social welfare is distributed between buyers
and sellers. Observe that seller s1’s share increases as the number of buyers increases (as
long as L ≤ 8), while the shares of the other sellers decrease (see also Table 1 for the
absolute values and standard errors). To understand this result, remember that seller s1
is a monopolist, i.e., she faces no competition for her database. Thus, her payment is
solely determined by the reserve price set by the auction, which only depends on the value
that database 1 is expected to generate for all buyers. As L increases, this value naturally
increases, which means that the seller receives a larger payment. However, this payment
is bounded by the upper bound of the support of the distribution of sellers’ costs (which
is 20 in this set up). This is why as soon as L ≥ 16, the share of s1 can only decrease. In
17. Efficiency is defined in the standard way, as the fraction of the social welfare achieved by our mechanism
and the social welfare of an optimal (omniscient) mechanism which can disregard incentive constraints.
18. The reason for that is that in this case our market reaches almost 100% efficiency. This is due to the
fact that when the number of buyers is small, the market stays in the ‘‘no trade’’ equilibrium most of
the time (see Figure 5 (top)). Even when there is trade, only one database gets allocated, which makes
achieving high efficiency easier.
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Number of buyers
Surplus 2 4 8 16 32 64 128
Buyers
7.20 17.66 45.00 128.02 280.82 583 1198.23
(1.28) (2.25) (6.17) (8.23) (6.18) (7.97) (15.65)
Seller s1
1.17 4.39 8.61 9.57 9.57 9.57 9.57
(0.62) (1.46) (1.40) (1.26) (1.26) (1.26) (1.26)
Seller s2
0.54 0.80 3.40 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06
(0.35) (0.62) (1.16) (1.33) (1.33) (1.33) (1.33)
Seller s3
0.59 1.74 3.26 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.43
(0.41) (0.67) (0.87) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97)
Table 1: Mean values and standard errors for the surplus of buyers and sellers for the small
setup reached in a non-trivial equilibrium.
contrast, s3’s payment is constant for L ≥ 20 and depends only on the virtual cost of her
competitor s2.
19 Finally, there is no significant evidence that sellers s2 and s3 get different
surplus in the market at the 0.05 significance level, as is expected due to their symmetry.
4.2 Medium Experimental Set-up.
To study the scalability of our approach, we perform a number of computational experiments
with more realistic numbers of sellers, databases and buyers. In practice, the exact numbers
would be domain specific. We expect them to be on the order of dozens to hundreds for
sellers and thousands for buyers. Some evidence for these numbers is derived from an
examination of existing data marketplaces. For example, a recent report on the Oracle
proprietary digital data marketplace for selling marketing data presents a domain with more
than 200 data providers and 200 customers across multiple industries (Blue Kai, Inc., 2011).
Assuming that a typical query against real-world databases joins only two to four of these
databases, we can split buyers into different groups based on the databases they are most
often interested in. 20 Thus, in our medium-sized experiments, we vary the number of
databases D from 2 to 10. While some databases can be produced by unique data providers
(monopolistic data ownership), others can be produced by many different data providers.
This allows us to vary the number of data providers N from 2 to 100. Similarly to the small
set-up, we generate sellers’ costs from a uniform distribution U [0, 20].
In this set-up, we vary the number of buyers L from 8 to 1024. We use the same simple
value model for buyers as in the small set-up. Specifically, we assume that the allocation of
an additional database has two effects on buyers. First, it leads to an increase in the marginal
19. When L ≤ 8, then the reserve payment is smaller than the virtual cost of s2. Then s3’s payment
sometimes depends on the reserve payment.
20. In this case, buyers within a group are assumed to submit most of their queries against 5 to 15 databases
and very few queries against the remaining databases. In other words, we assume that the overall market
can be partitioned into several sets of databases with loose pairwise connections between these sets. Such
partitioning reduces the number of databases and buyers in each set, which therefore leads to a lower
computational burden. Therefore, for our experiments, we assume that such a partitioning can be carried
out effectively using a certain clustering technique, and we can run our market mechanism for each set of
the partitioning. The design of the exact clustering procedure is beyond the scope of this work.
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value vj of a buyer by a random amount drawn from U [0, 2]. Second, it causes an increase
in the threshold rj by a random number drawn from U{0, 5}. The main complication of the
medium-sized set-up compared to the small set-up is of a computational nature: Due to the
combinatorial structure of the problem, we must now specify the value function of every
buyer for all 2D possible deterministic allocations of databases. As previously discussed, in
practice, many buyers submit their queries against only a small subset of available databases.
This means that, on average, the marginal change of a buyer’s value due to the allocation
of an additional database gets smaller as the number of allocated databases grows. As a
result, the computational problem of estimating the typical value function of a buyer may
be somewhat simpler than in our experiments. However, modeling more realistic value
functions is a domain specific task as it depends on the typical queries that buyers submit.
Modeling such realistic value functions is one of the directions of our future work.
4.2.1 Aggregate Demand
To illustrate combinatorial preferences of buyers, we compute aggregate demand curves
that correspond to different deterministic allocations of databases. Remember that the
value model we adopted for our simulations assumes, for simplicity, that marginal values
v′j and thresholds rj of buyers depend only on the number of allocated databases but not
on the identities of those databases. Thus, we can restrict our attention to considering
only 10 different deterministic allocations that correspond to different numbers of allocated
databases.
Figure 7 illustrates how the demand curve changes as the number of allocated databases
increases (with the price on the y-axis, and the demand for rows on the x-axis). There
are two effects happening in parallel as the number of allocated databases grows. First, as
discussed in the experimental set-up, the threshold rj weakly increases with the number
of allocated databases (see Section 4.2). This implies that for larger number of allocated
databases buyers demand weakly more rows at any price p. This shifts the demand curve
to the right. Second, the marginal values of buyers also increase (see Assumption 1). As
a result, for high prices, the number of buyers who can afford to buy rows at these prices
increases. Consequently, the demand becomes more elastic, i.e., the slope of the demand
curve gets smaller. To see this more clearly, compare the leftmost curve that corresponds
to the case with a single allocated database to the second curve that corresponds to the
case with two allocated databases. We see that, if the price p > 2, no rows are consumed
in the first scenario. This happens because marginal values of all buyers are smaller than
this price (remember that marginal values in this case are drawn from U [0, 2]). In contrast,
the marginal values of the buyers in the case of two allocated databases are drawn from a
distribution with a larger support, i.e., [0, 4]. Thus, more buyers are now reacting to price
changes at the price level p = 2.
We see the opposite effect for low prices, i.e., the demand curve becomes less elastic for
low prices (in other words, the slope of the demand curve gets larger). To understand the
intuition behind this, assume, for example, that the 1st percentile of buyers’ marginal values
in the case of a single allocated database, is equal to p′. If we allocate an additional database,
this percentile weakly increases. Consequently, in the case of two allocated databases, there
are less buyers with marginal values lower than p′. This means that there are less buyers
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Figure 7: Aggregate demand curves in the domain with 1024 buyers and 10 databases.
Different curves correspond to different numbers of allocated databases. As the number of
allocated databases increases, the respective demand curve shifts to the right. The difference
between two demand curves gets smaller as the number of allocated databases grows.
who switch from buying to not buying if the price changes from p′ to p′ + , for some small
 > 0. This results in a steeper demand curve in the area of low prices for two databases
comparing to the one with a single allocated database.21
The main insight from this experiment is that the difference between demand curves gets
smaller as the number of databases increases (see Figure 7). In practice, such ‘‘convergence” of
demand curves may allow us to reduce the computational burden arising from combinatorial
preferences of buyers by considering smaller domains. We conjecture that, in this case, we
could bound the efficiency loss caused by approximating the demand curve of a large domain
with the one corresponding to a smaller domain. However, we leave this direction to future
work.
4.2.2 Expected Profit
We now study how the expected profits of sellers respond to the level of competition between
sellers for producing their databases. To this end, we fix the number of databases D = 10
and the number of buyers L = 1024. We further assume that database 1 can be produced
only by a single data provider s1, who has a monopolistic ownership for the respective data.
Similarly, for each database k ≤ D, we assume that it can be produced by k different data
providers who compete with each other in the BORA auction to produce the database.
21. The steep area of the demand curve in the area of low prices, however, gets ’’smaller” for larger number of
allocated databases. This is why, in Figure 7, the steep part is hardly visible if the number of databases
is larger than 5.
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Figure 8: Expected profit of a seller in a market with 10 DBs and 1024 buyers. A seller
extracts a positive expected surplus for any level of competition. The larger the number of
sellers competing for producing a database, the smaller the surplus such a seller can expect
to obtain.
Thus, the total number of data providers in this scenario is
D∑
k=1
k = 1 + 2 + ...+ 10 = 55.
Figure 8 demonstrates that seller s1 enjoys the largest expected surplus. To explain this
result, remember that s1 faces no competition in the BORA auction, as she is a unique data
provider for database 1. This means that the externality imposed by s1 is potentially larger
that the externality exposed by any other seller facing a stronger competition. Consequently,
the payment must also be larger.
This also demonstrates that, even though that all allocated data providers can recoup
their fixed costs, our market rewards data providers who innovate (produce original data)
substantially more than those who produce databases containing common knowledge.
4.2.3 Shares of Social Welfare
Now, we study how the achieved social welfare is distributed between buyers and sellers.
Table 2 presents the social welfare as well as the distribution of the social welfare between
buyers and sellers achieved in the market as the number of buyers increases from 16 to 1024.
As in Section 4.2.2, we set the number of databases D = 10 and we assume that database 1
can be produced by only a single data provider s1, while database k can be produced by k
different data providers.
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Number of buyers
Surplus 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024
Buyers, % 99.5 99.7 99.8 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9
Sellers, % 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Social Welfare 8186 16585 33247 66504 133129 266344 532728
Table 2: Social welfare and the shares of buyers and sellers.
The table confirms that buyers receive the largest share of the social welfare which is
expected given that the BORA auction is designed to maximize the buyers’ surplus. The
figure also suggests that the share of sellers’ surplus stays nearly constant as the number of
buyers increases. This result is expected: indeed, the payment of s1 approaches its maximum
value of φ−1(20) (in this experiment, c1 ∼ U [0, 20]) as the number of buyers increases. At
the same time, the payments of other sellers are essentially second price payments. These
payments depend on the cost distributions Fi of sellers rather than on the number of buyers.
Consequently, the total payment to be accrued to sellers does not depend much on the
number of buyers. Finally, the total social welfare achieved in the market grows linearly as
the number of buyers increases.
4.3 Discussion
The results of our computational experiments raise a number of interesting points regarding
the design of a market for distributed data.
First, the design we proposed solves the original problem we posed. Specifically, the
market brings high surplus to buyers and compensates the allocated sellers. As we showed,
such a market gives stronger incentives to data providers to innovate, i.e., to produce
unique data sets instead of transforming common knowledge into a structured form. The
inequality in profits between unique and non-unique data providers arises from the fact that
the production of a unique database reduces competition in the BORA auction. This allows
data providers with monopolistic ownership of data to receive payments that are typically
larger than the ‘‘second price” payment. However, even those allocated data providers who
do not have access to unique data can expect positive profits.
Second, our market awards a large portion of the achieved welfare to buyers. In fact, in
our experiments, even in the most extreme cases, when all data providers enjoy high profits
from monopolistic ownership over their data, the buyers still get a substantial portion of
the achieved welfare. In practice, providing a high share of surplus to buyers can be crucial
when designing such a market. It allows for a shift in the current paradigm, meaning that
the data must be free, and thus makes buyers less resistant to entering the market (some
discussion on this topic in the area of Linked Data can be found, for example in Grubenmann
et al. (2018b), Grubenmann et al. (2017)).
Finally, our experiments give us reason to think that the complex combinatorial prefer-
ences of buyers do not constitute an unsolvable issue. In fact, we think that the combinatorial
structure can be tackled efficiently when we aggregate buyers and compute the posted price
based on their aggregated preferences. In particular, we showed that, as the number of
databases grows, the aggregate demand curve does not change significantly. This opens
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up an opportunity to approximate the aggregate demand curve for a large domain by
considering only a smaller part of it. We conjecture that this can reduce the complexity of
our approach with a bounded loss in efficiency. However, we leave this direction to future
work.
Limitations. In our computational experiments, we have considered buyers coming from
the same value model. This means that, despite the fact that different buyers in our
experiments have different marginal values vj and thresholds rj , these values are still
drawn from the same distribution. We have also assumed that all buyers are endowed
with the same initial amount of money and that the preferences of all buyers depend on
the number of allocated databases, not on the identities of these databases. All of these
simplifying assumptions were made for better clarity of the experimental results, rather
than to circumvent any complications arising in computations of the equilibrium allocation
and prices. Any of these assumptions can be easily relaxed, but we expect the results to
qualitatively remain the same.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a combinatorial market for distributed data. Our research
is motivated by the increasing value of data, while the design of good mechanisms for buying
and selling data has proved to be elusive. We have argued that data is different from other
information goods such as music or videos because databases produced by different data
providers can be joined and buyers have combinatorial values over which databases are
available. The key idea behind our solution is to use two different mechanisms for the two
sides of the market and to employ a fixed-point iteration algorithm for finding an outcome
that balances the entire market. Our experimental results are consistent with our theoretical
predictions. With a small number of buyers, it is likely that no trade happens because the
buyers’ values are not large enough to warrant the high fixed costs of the data providers.
But, as more and more buyers arrive on the market, the probability of trade approaches
one, and the posted price quickly stabilizes. We have also shown that, as the number of
allocated databases increases, the marginal change in the aggregate demand gets smaller.
This opens the door for future opportunities to design an approximation algorithm that
would efficiently tackle the computational hardness of the equilibrium price computation
procedure for larger domains. Another important discovery of our model highlights the
fact that data providers who innovate by producing unique data sets can expect to receive
larger rewards than those who simply provide common knowledge data. Future work can
build on our model and consider various extensions, such as the dynamic arrival of sellers
to the market or endogenous demand (i.e., where the number of buyers varies depending
on the price). One particularly important subject of future work is the development of a
realistic domain generator and large-scale simulations to study the behavior of our market
mechanism under real-world conditions (e.g., with preferences of doctors or drug developers
using life sciences databases (Hall et al., 2013) or of marketers in the digital marketing
domain (Blue Kai, Inc., 2011)).
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Appendix A. Examples
Example 3. We use the setting of Example 2 but assume now that both sellers s1 and
s2 are allocated, i.e., a
′′ = (1, 1). As there is now more data available to buyers, their
preferences change. Assume that value functions of buyers for the new allocation are
v1(r1, a
′′) = 6min{r1, 1} and v2(r2, a′′) = min{r2, 4}. Now, the aggregate buyer has the
following aggregate value V (r, a′′) and demand r∗(p, a′′):
V (r, a′′) =

6r, if r ∈ [0, 1]
5 + r, if r ∈ [1, 5]
10, if 5 ≤ r
r∗(p, a′′) =

5, if p ∈ (0, 1)
[1, 5], if p = 1
1, if p ∈ (1, 6)
[0, 1], if p = 6
0, if 6 < p.
In this case, the positive externality imposed by s2 is ext2(a
′′, p) = V (r∗(p, a′′), a′′) −
V (r∗(p, a), a). Again, if p = 1− , then the market demand r∗(p, a′′) = 5 and the aggregate
value of having both databases is V (r∗(p, a′′), a′′) = V (5, a′′) = 10. Then, the externality
imposed by s2 is ext2(a
′′, p) = V (r∗(p, a′′), a′′)−V (r∗(p, a), a) = 10−6 = 4. If we now assume
that for allocation a′′′ = (0, 1) agents have same preferences as for allocation a = (1, 0), then
ext1(a
′′, p) = V (r∗(p, a′′), a′′)− V (r∗(p, a′′′), a′′′) = 10− 6 = 4. Thus, the induced value of
the databases are W1(p, a
′′) = 4·108 = 5, W2(p, a
′′) = 4·108 = 5. Observe, that the presence of
s2 increased the induced value W1(p, a
′′) for the database of s1.
Example 4. Consider a domain with a single buyer, L = 1. Assume that there are N = 2
sellers each producing a single database, i.e., D = 2. Let c1, c2 ∼ U [0, 2] and c1 = 1.5,
c2 = 0.5. In this case, the virtual cost function for both sellers is φ(c) = c +
F (c)
f(c) = 2c;
consequently, φ1(c1) = 3 and φ2(c2) = 1. Assume that the value function of the buyer is
v1(r1, a) = 5min{r1, 1} if both databases are allocated (i.e., a = (1, 1)) and v1(r1, a) = 0
otherwise. The buyer has an endowment e = 4. As there is only a single buyer, the aggregate
value function corresponds to the value function of this buyer, i.e., V (r, a) = v1(r, a). The
endowment of the aggregate buyer is E = e.
Let us now compute the induced values of both databases. First, ext1(a, p) = ext2(a, p) =
5 for all p ≤ 5 and for a = (1, 1). Also ext1(a, p) = ext2(a, p) = 0 if a 6= (1, 1) or
if p > 5. Thus, W1(a, p) = W2(a, p) =
1
2 · 5 = 2.5 for any p ≤ 5 if a = (1, 1) and
W1(a, p) =W2(a, p) = 0 for other cases. Obviously, the solution to the allocation problem is
a∗ = (a∗1, a∗2) = (1, 1). In this case, the objective is 2.5 + 2.5− 3− 1 = 1 for any p ≤ 5. The
payments are computed as follows: t1 =
1
2(3 + 1− 0) = 2, t2 = 12(1 + 1− 0) = 1.
Observe that if we run instead two BORA auctions for each of the databases separately,
we first would not allocate the first database as its virtual cost φ1(c1) = 3 is larger than the
induced value of the database W1(a, p) = 2.5. Consequently, the second database would also
not be allocated as the buyer has a positive value only for both databases.
Finally, if we set p = 3, then the buyer would decide to pay e−m∗1(p, a) = 3 for a single
row of answers for his query, r∗1(p, a) = 1. Such a price makes the overall market balanced
as the total payment to the sellers must be t1 + t2 = 3.
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Example 5. In this example, we would like to demonstrate that even if there exist multiple
non-trivial equilibria, our mechanism finds the ‘‘best” one, i.e., the equilibrium with the
largest surplus for buyers.
Consider a domain with a single buyer, L = 1. Assume that there are N = 2 sellers
each producing a single database. Let c1, c2 ∼ U [0, 1] and c1 = c2 = 0.5. In this case,
the virtual cost functions are φ1(c1) = φ2(c2) = 1. Assume that the value function of
the buyer is v1(r1, a) = 2min{r1, 6} if both databases are allocated (i.e., a = (1, 1)) and
v1(r1, a) = 2min{r1, 2} if only one database is allocated. The buyer has an endowment
e = 10. The aggregate value function is V (r, a) = v1(r, a) (the endowment of the aggregate
buyer is E = e).
Suppose Algorithm 1 starts with p = 0. In this case, both databases must be allocated.
However, the market is not budget balanced as the buyer pays 0. Assume now that after
several iterations of Algorithm 1, the price increases to p = 1. In this case, an allocation
a = (1, 0) makes the market budget balanced. Indeed, in this case, W1(a, p) = 4 while
W2(a, p) = 0. Consequently, the virtual surplus is S˜ = 4 − 1 = 3 and the payments are
t1 = 2 and t2 = 0. Given this price, the buyer decides to buy two rows and thus pays the
total amount of 2 which implies budget balancedness. In this equilibrium, the buyer gets a
surplus of 2.
Observe however, that the allocation a = (1, 0) does not maximize the virtual surplus
given the price p = 1. Instead, the BORA auction would allocate both databases. This would
lead to a virtual surplus of S˜ = 10 and payments t1 = 4, t2 = 4. This, makes the market
unbalanced as buyers can pay only 6. Consequently, the price must increase up to p = 4/3
for the market to become budget balanced. In the new equilibrium, the buyer gets a surplus
of 4 and pays the total amount of t1 + t2 = 8 to sellers.
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Appendix B. Proofs
Let Gi(g, ci) =
∫
c−i gi(ci, c−i)f−i(c−i)dc−i denote the ex-interim allocation of si.
Definition 7. A mechanism A = 〈g, h〉 is feasible if it satisfies BNIC, IR, and∑i∈i(k) gi(c) ≤
1, ∀k = 1, ..., D, gi(c) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, ..., N .
Lemma B.1. A mechanism A = 〈g, h〉 is feasible if and only if the following conditions
hold:
1. ci ≤ qi implies Gi(g, qi) ≤ Gi(g, ci) for any qi, ∀ci ∈ [αi, βi], i = 1, ..., N ,
2. Ef−i [ui(g, ci, h)] = Ef−i [ui(g, βi, h)] +
∫ βi
ci
Gi(g, qi)dqi,
3. Ef−i [ui(g, βi, h)] ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., N ,
and
∑
i∈i(k) gi(c) ≤ 1, gi(c) ≥ 0 for all k = 1, ..., D, ∀c ∈
∏N
i=1[αi, βi].
Proof. The proof repeats the respective proof provided in (Myerson, 1981) for a reverse
auction setting.
In words, the first condition of the previous Lemma means monotonicity of ex-interim
allocation while the second and the third conditions are more technical and will be used in
derivation of the surplus optimal mechanism.
Now, remember that the probabilistic allocation of sellers g(c) induces a probabilistic
allocation of databases. We can define the expected induced value of a database k as follows:
Definition 8. The expected induced value of the database k given the probabilistic
allocation g(c) of sellers is
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
=
∑
a∈{0,1}N
N∏
i=1
gaii (c)(1− gi(c))1−aiWk(a, p).
In a setting when multiple sellers compete for producing a database `, an assignment of
the full allocation probability γ ≥ 0 to only one of them leads to weakly higher expected
induced values of all databases than any other assignment of γ. The following lemma shows
this fact formally:
Lemma B.2. Let g(c) be a probabilistic allocation of sellers such that
∑
i∈i(`) gi(c) = γ for
some ` ≤ D, 0 ≤ γ ≤ |i(`)|. Then, for any allocation g′(c) such that g′q = min{1, γ} for
some q ∈ i(`), g′s = 0 ∀s ∈ i(`)\q, and g′j = gj ∀j 6∈ i(`) we have
Eg′(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
≥ Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
, ∀k ≤ D.
Proof. W. l. o. g. let s1, ..., sd be sellers producing the database ` (here, d = |i(`)|).
We first introduce some helpful notation. Specifically, let a1:d = (a1, ..., ad) ∈ {0, 1}d and
a−1:d = (ad+1, ..., aN ) ∈ {0, 1}N−d be the allocation of the first d sellers and of the rest of
the sellers respectively. Thus, we can rewrite a = (a1:d, a−1:d).
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In this case, from Lemma B.3 it follows that ∀a−1:d, ∀p, for any two a1:d, a′1:d : ||a1:d|| >
0, ||a′1:d|| > 0, we have Wk((a1:d, a−1:d), p) =Wk((a′1:d, a−1:d), p) for any k ≤ D.
Consider now the expected induced value of a database k under the probabilistic allocation
g(c):
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
=
∑
a∈{0,1}N
N∏
i=1
gaii (c)(1− gi(c))1−aiWk(a, p) =
∑
a−1:d∈{0,1}N−d
(1− g1) · ... · (1− gd)
N−d∏
i=1
g
a−1:d(i)
d+i (1− gd+i)1−a−1:d(i)Wk((0, ..., 0, a−1:d), p)+
∑
a−1:d∈{0,1}N−d
g1 · ... · (1− gd)
N−d∏
i=1
g
a−1:d(i)
d+i (1− gd+i)1−a−1:d(i)Wk((1, ..., 0, a−1:d), p)+
...∑
a−1:d∈{0,1}N−d
g1 · ... · gd
N−d∏
i=1
g
a−1:d(i)
d+i (1− gd+i)1−a−1:d(i)Wk((1, ..., 1, a−1:d), p) =
∑
a−1:d∈{0,1}N−d
(1− g1) · ... · (1− gd)
N−d∏
i=1
g
a−1:d(i)
d+i (1− gd+i)1−a−1:d(i)Wk((0, ..., 0, a−1:d), p)+
∑
a−1:d∈{0,1}N−d
(1− (1− g1) · ... · (1− gd))
N−d∏
i=1
g
a−1:d(i)
d+i (1− gd+i)1−a−1:d(i)Wk((a1:d, a−1:d), p).
Here, ||a1:d|| > 0 implies that there exists q ≤ d, s.t., a1:d(q) = 1. We now can rewrite the
expression above as
∑
a−1:d∈{0,1}N−d
(1− g1) · ... · (1− gd)
N−d∏
i=1
g
a−1:d(i)
d+i (1− gd+i)1−a−1:d(i)Wk((0, ..., 0, a−1:d), p)+
∑
a−1:d∈{0,1}N−d
N−d∏
i=1
g
a−1:d(i)
d+i (1− gd+i)1−a−1:d(i)Wk((a1:d, a−1:d), p)−
∑
a−1:d∈{0,1}N−d
(1− g1) · ... · (1− gd)
N−d∏
i=1
g
a−1:d(i)
d+i (1− gd+i)1−a−1:d(i)Wk((a1:d, a−1:d), p) =
∑
a−1:d∈{0,1}N−d
N−d∏
i=1
g
a−1:d(i)
d+i (1− gd+i)1−a−1:d(i)Wk((a1:d, a−1:d), p)+
∑
a−1:d∈{0,1}N−d
(1− g1) · ... · (1− gd)
N−d∏
i=1
g
a−1:d(i)
d+i (1− gd+i)1−a−1:d(i)×
(Wk((0, ..., 0, a−1:d), p)−Wk((a1:d, a−1:d), p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ 0
).
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Notice that the last term in the expression above is non-positive due to Assumption
3. At the same time, the first summand does not depend on g1, ..., gd. Thus, the problem
now is to find such an assignment of g1, ..., gd that is feasible (i.e., 0 ≤ gi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ i(`) and∑
i∈i(`) gi = γ) and that minimizes (1− g1) · ... · (1− gd). We claim that gq = min{γ, 1} for
some q ∈ i(`) and gs = 0 ∀s ∈ i(`)\q is such an assignment.
To see this, let’s consider only the case when q = 1 (all other cases are symmetric).
We proceed by induction in d. If d = 1, the statement is trivial. Indeed, in this case,
g1 = min{1, γ} minimizes (1− g1). Now consider the case d = 2. In this case, we are solving
the following problem:
min
g1,g2
(1− g1)(1− g2)
s.t. g1 + g2 = γ
g1, g2 ∈ [0, 1].
If γ ≥ 1, let us rewrite the objective function as ming2(1−γ+g2)(1−g2) = ming2 1−g22−γ+γg2.
In this case, the concave objective function is minimized at the boundary of the [0, 1] interval,
namely when g2 = 0 (respectively, g1 = min{1, γ} = 1). The optimal objective value in this
case is 0.
If γ < 1, let us rewrite the objective as ming1(1−γ+ g1)(1− g1) = ming1 1− g21−γ+γg1.
In this case, g1 = γ minimizes the objective function. The optimal objective value in this
case is 1− γ.
Assume now that the statement is true for some r, 1 ≤ r ≤ d, i.e., (1− g1) · ... · (1− gr)
is minimized by setting g1 = min{1, γ}. Consider the following problem for r + 1:
min
g1,...,gr+1
(1− g1) · ... · (1− gr+1)
s.t.
r+1∑
i=1
gi = γ
gi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i = 1, ..., r + 1.
We can rewrite it as
min
g1,...,gr+1
(1− g1)
(
(1− g2)... · (1− gr+1)
)
s.t.
r+1∑
i=2
gi = γ − g1
gi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i = 1, ..., r + 1.
From the induction hypothesis, it follows that for any 0 ≤ g1 ≤ γ setting g2 = γ − g1,
g3 = ... = gr+1 = 0 minimizes (1− g2) · ... · (1− gr+1). Therefore, the problem is to find such
g1, g2 that solve
min
g1,g2
(1− g1)(1− g2)
s.t. g2 = γ − g1
g1, g2 ∈ [0, 1].
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As we have shown above, the solution to this problem is g1 = min{1, γ}, g2 = 0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3.4. Let g : RN≥0 → [0, 1]N maximizes
Ef
[ D∑
k=1
(
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
−
∑
i∈i(k)
(
ci +
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
)
gi(c)
)]
subject to monotonicity of ex-interim allocation and constraints (13), (14). Let also hi(c) =
gi(c)ci +
∫ βi
ci
gi(qi, c−i)dqi for every i = 1, ..., N , ∀c. Then A = 〈g, h〉 is an optimal surplus
maximizing reverse auction.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one presented in (Myerson, 1981). Consider the surplus
of the auctioneer.
Ef [U(g, h)] = Ef
[ D∑
k=1
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
−
N∑
i=1
hi(c)
]
=
∫
c
( D∑
k=1
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
−
N∑
i=1
hi(c)
)
f(c)dc =
∫
c
D∑
k=1
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
f(c)dc−
∫
c
N∑
i=1
hi(c)f(c)dc =
D∑
k=1
∫
c
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
f(c)dc−
N∑
i=1
∫
c
cigi(c)f(c)dc+
N∑
i=1
∫
c
cigi(c)f(c)dc−
∫
c
N∑
i=1
hi(c)f(c)dc =
D∑
k=1
∫
c
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
f(c)dc−
D∑
k=1
∑
i∈i(k)
∫
c
cigi(c)f(c)dc+
N∑
i=1
∫
c
cigi(c)f(c)dc−
N∑
i=1
∫
c
hi(c)f(c)dc =
D∑
k=1
∫
c
(
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
−
∑
i∈i(k)
cigi(c)
)
f(c)dc
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
N∑
i=1
∫
c
(
cigi(c)− hi(c)
)
f(c)dc =
A+
N∑
i=1
∫
ci
∫
c−i
(cigi(c)− hi(c))fi(ci)f−i(c−i)dcidc−i = A−
N∑
i=1
∫
ci
Ef−i [ui(g, ci, h)]fi(ci)dci.
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Given that we are looking for a feasible mechanism, we can rewrite Ef−i [ui(g, ci, h)] =
Ef−i [ui(g, βi, h)] +
∫ βi
ci
Gi(g, qi)dqi (see condition 2 of Lemma B.1). Therefore,
Ef [U(g, h)] = A−
N∑
i=1
∫
ci
Ef−i [ui(g, βi, h)]fi(ci)dci −
N∑
i=1
∫
ci
∫ βi
ci
Gi(g, qi)dqifi(ci)dci =
A−
N∑
i=1
Ef−i [ui(g, βi, h)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
−
N∑
i=1
∫
ci
∫ βi
ci
Gi(g, qi)dqifi(ci)dci = A−B −
N∑
i=1
∫
ci
∫ βi
ci
Gi(g, qi)dqidFi(ci) =
A−B −
N∑
i=1
[
Fi(ci)
∫ βi
ci
Gi(g, qi)dqi
∣∣∣βi
αi
−
∫ βi
αi
Fi(ci)d
∫ βi
ci
Gi(g, qi)dqi
]
=
A−B −
N∑
i=1
[
0 +
∫ βi
αi
Fi(ci)Gi(g, ci)dci
]
= A−B −
N∑
i=1
∫ βi
αi
∫
c−i
gi(ci, c−i)f−i(c−i)dc−iFi(ci)dci =
A−B −
N∑
i=1
∫
c
gi(ci, c−i)
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
f(c)dc =
D∑
k=1
∫
c
(
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
−
∑
i∈i(k)
(
ci +
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
)
gi(c)
)
f(c)dc−B.
From Lemma B.1 it follows that
B =
N∑
i=1
Ef−i [ui(g, βi, h)] =
N∑
i=1
(
Ef−i [ui(g, ci, h)]−
∫ βi
ci
Gi(g, qi)dqi
)
=
N∑
i=1
(∫
c−i
(hi(c)− gi(c)ci)f−i(c−i)dc−i −
∫ βi
ci
∫
c−i
gi(qi, c−i)f−i(c−i)dc−idqi
)
=
N∑
i=1
(∫
c−i
(hi(c)− gi(c)ci −
∫ βi
ci
gi(qi, c−i)dqi)f−i(c−i)dc−i
)
.
From the third condition of Lemma B.1 it follows that hi(c)− gi(c)ci−
∫ βi
ci
gi(qi, c−i)dqi ≥ 0.
This means that the payment rule that maximizes the expected surplus of the auctioneer,
Ef [U(g, h)], must satisfy hi(c) − gi(c)ci −
∫ βi
ci
gi(qi, c−i)dqi = 0. Consequently, hi(c) =
gi(c)ci +
∫ βi
ci
gi(qi, c−i)dqi.
This means that the problem now is reduced to finding such an allocation function g
that maximizes
Ef
[ D∑
k=1
(
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
−
∑
i∈i(k)
(
ci +
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
)
gi(c)
)]
.
Q.E.D.
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Lemma 3.5. Let g∗(c) be a solution of (16). Then, if for a database ` there exists a seller
si with i ∈ i(`) such that g∗i (c) > 0, then
∑
i∈i(`) g
∗
i (c) = 1.
Proof. Assume that there are d sellers s1, ..., sd who produce the database `, i.e. 1, ..., d ∈ i(`).
Assume that g∗1(c) > 0 but
∑
i∈i(`) g
∗
i (c) < 1. Consequently, g
∗
1(c) < 1. Consider the first
term under the expectation in Equation 16:
D∑
k=1
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
=
D∑
k=1
∑
a−1:d∈{0,1}N−d
g1 · ... · gd
N−d∏
i=1
g
a−1:d(i)
i (1− gi)1−aiWk((1, ..., 1, a−1:d), p)+
D∑
k=1
∑
a−1:d∈{0,1}N−d
g1 · ... · (1− gd)
N−d∏
i=1
g
a−1:d(i)
i (1− gi)1−aiWk((1, ..., 0, a−1:d), p)+
...
D∑
k=1
∑
a−1:d∈{0,1}N−d
(1− g1) · ... · (1− gd)
N−d∏
i=1
g
a−1:d(i)
i (1− gi)1−aiWk((0, ..., 0, a−1:d), p).
Observe, that the sum above is linear in g1, i.e., we can rewrite it as
D∑
k=1
Eg(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
= g1λ(g−1) + γ(g−1),
where λ(g−1) and γ(g−1) are independent of g1. Now, we can rewrite Equation 16 as follows
Ef
[ D∑
k=1
(
Eg∗(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
−
∑
i∈i(k)
(
ci +
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
)
g∗i (c)
)]
=
Ef
[
g∗1(c)λ(g
∗
−1)− φ1(c1)g∗1(c)− ...− φd(cd)g∗d(c)−
D∑
k=2
∑
i∈i(k)
φi(ci)g
∗
i (c) + γ(g
∗
−1)
]
=
Ef
[
g∗1(c)
(
λ(g∗−1)− φ1(c1)
)
− φ2(c2)g∗2(c)...− φd(cd)g∗d(c)−
D∑
k=2
∑
i∈i(k)
φi(ci)g
∗
i (c) + γ(g
∗
−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
does not depend on g∗1(c)
]
.
Here, g∗1(c) > 0 implies that λ(g∗−1) ≥ φ1(c1). Thus, if for some positive  ≤ 1− g∗1 we take
any g′(c) such that g′1(c) = g∗1(c) +  and g′i(c) = g
∗
i (c) for all i 6= 1, then
Ef
[ D∑
k=1
(
Eg′(c)
[
Wk(a, p)
]
−
∑
i∈i(k)
(
ci +
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
)
g′i(c)
]
=
Ef
[
(g∗1(c) + )
(
λ(g∗−1)− φ1(c1)
)
− ...− φd(cd)g∗d(c)−
D∑
k=2
∑
i∈i(k)
φi(ci)g
∗
i (c) + γ(g
∗
−1)
]
≥
Ef
[
g∗1(c)
(
λ(g∗−1)− φ1(c1)
)
− ...− φd(cd)g∗d(c)−
D∑
k=2
∑
i∈i(k)
φi(ci)g
∗
i (c) + γ(g
∗
−1)
]
.
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This means that g∗(c) cannot be an optimal solution. Contradiction. Q.E.D.
Lemma B.3. For any database k and any price p, for any a, a′ ∈ {0, 1}N such that
∀` 6∈ i(k): a` = a′` and ∃s, q ∈ i(k) : aq = 1, a′s = 1 it follows
Wk(a, p) =Wk(a
′, p).
Proof. From our assumption that buyers are indifferent about the identities of sellers it
follows that ∀k, ∀bj , ∀p and for any a and a′ satisfying the conditions above, we have
r∗j (p, a) = r
∗
j (p, a
′) and m∗j (p, a) = m
∗
j (p, a
′). Consequently, r∗(p, a) =
∑L
j=1 r
∗
j (p, a) =∑L
j=1 r
∗
j (p, a
′) = r∗(p, a′); similarly, m∗(p, a) = m∗(p, a′).
It follows that pi(z, a) = pi(z, a′). This results in V (r, a) = V (r, a′) and consequently
in extk(a, p) = extk(a
′, p). From this it immediately follows that Wk(a, p) = Wk(a′, p).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3.6. The share of the buyers’ surplus achieved in Algorithm 1 auction is lower
bounded by zero.
Proof. We prove this statement by providing an example of the domain in which buyers
reach zero surplus. Consider a domain with a single buyer, L = 1. Assume that there
are N = 2 sellers each producing a single database, i.e., D = 2. Let c1, c2 ∼ U [0, 3] and
c1 = c2 = 0. The virtual cost function for both sellers is φ(c) = c +
F (c)
f(c) = 2c; thus,
φ1(c1) = φ2(c2) = 0.
Assume that the value function of the buyer is v1(r1, a) = 5min{r1, 1} if both databases
are allocated (i.e., a = (1, 1)) and v1(r1, a) = 0 otherwise. The buyer’s endowment is e = 5.
With a single buyer, the aggregate value function V (r, a) = v1(r, a) and the aggregate
endowment E = e.
Let us now compute the induced values. First, ext1(a, p) = ext2(a, p) = 5 for all
p ≤ 5 and a = (1, 1). Also ext1(a, p) = ext2(a, p) = 0 if a 6= (1, 1) or if p > 5. Thus,
W1(a, p) =W2(a, p) = 2.5 for any p ≤ 5 if a = (1, 1) and W1(a, p) =W2(a, p) = 0 otherwise.
Given price p, the allocation problem in this case is maxa1,a2
{
W1((a1, a2), p)+W2((a1, a2), p)−
φ1(c1)a1 − φ2(c2)a2
}
. The solution to this problem is (a∗1, a∗2) = (1, 1). In this case, the
objective value is 2.5 + 2.5 − 0 · 1 − 0 · 1 = 5 for any p ≤ 5. Payments are computed as
follows: t1 =
1
2(0 + 5− 0) = 2.5, t2 = 12(0 + 5− 0) = 2.5. Setting the price p = 5, the market
becomes balanced. In this case, the buyer pays 5 = (t1 + t2) for a single row of answers for
his query, r∗1(p, a) = 1. However, the buyer’s surplus is 0. Q.E.D.
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5 Data Markets with Dynamic Arrival
of Buyers and Sellers
The only reason for time is so that
everything doesn't happen at once.
Albert Einstein
The content of this chapter will soon (in slightly revised form) appear in:
Moor, D. (2019). Data Markets with Dynamic Arrival of Buyers and Sellers.
In Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems
and Computation, NetEcon, Phoenix, AZ.
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ABSTRACT
We propose a market design solution for a market for distributed
data. The main challenges addressed by our solution are (1) differ-
ent data providers produce different databases that can be joined
to produce answers for users’ queries; (2) data providers have high
fixed costs for producing their databases; and (3) buyers and sellers
can arrive dynamically to the market. Our design relies on using a
Markov chain with states corresponding to different numbers of
allocated databases. The transition probabilities between different
states are governed by the payments suggested by the market plat-
form to the data providers. The main challenge in this setting is
to guarantee dynamic incentive compatibility, i.e., to ensure that
buyers and sellers are not incentivized to arrive late to the market
or to misreport their costs or values. To achieve this, we disentangle
the payments suggested by the market platform to the sellers from
the posted prices exposed to the buyers. We prove that the buyer-
optimal payments that are exposed to sellers are non-increasing
which prevents late arrivals of sellers. Further, we demonstrate that
the posted prices exposed to buyers constitute a martingale process
(i.e., late arrivals lead to the same expected price). Finally, we show
that our design guarantees zero expected average budget deficit
and we perform a number of simulations to validate our model.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many datasets on the Web are unstructured. This means that they
can be easily interpreted by humans but not by machines. Imposing
some structure on the data by publishing it as a database and linking
it to other databases can help machines to make sense of the content
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of the data. This significantly reduces the effort of humans for
the search, analysis and making predictions based on this data
by delegating many of these tasks to the machine. This naturally
results in great benefits for society (see Bernstein et al. [2016]).
The technology for producing and querying such structured and
distributed data already exists and used in numerous areas (e.g.,
[W3C 2014]). Despite of all its potential benefits, this technology
is not highly utilized. One of the reasons for that is the lack of
financial incentives of data providers to publish their data in a
structured format. This happens because the high fixed costs that
the data providers incur for producing their databases, structuring
the data and linking it to the datasets of other data providers can
never be recouped ([Moor et al. 2019]). As a result, a different
system of incentives is required to compensate the data providers.
In this paper, we propose such a system by designing a market for
distributed data.
1.1 Call for Data Markets
In recent years, there were numerous attempts to design a market
for data. Koutris et al. [2015] aim at designing a market for selling
different views of a database while satisfying a no-arbitrage con-
straint. However, their approach does not easily extend to domains
when users join data produced by multiple data providers.
Moor et al. [2015, 2019] and Agarwal et al. [2019] emphasize the
importance of joining data coming from different data providers.
They argue that the combinatorial preferences of buyers is a crucial
feature for data markets as many databases can complement each
other. As a result, the buyer who can access more databases gets a
more precise and thus, valuable answer for his query.
However, none of these studies consider the dynamics of the data
market. While in many combinatorial markets the dynamics may
not play a critical role, data markets are inherently dynamic.1 This
means that both buyers and sellers in these markets arrive regularly
and can strategically delay their arrivals if they expect to be better
off by doing so. Due to the combinatorial nature of preferences of
buyers such delays can have a dramatic effect on the operation of
the market. Indeed, the late arrivals of sellers may result in a very
low surplus reached by the buyers who arrive earlier and thus, can
access only very few databases. In our work, we focus on both of
these aspects, i.e., on the complementary nature of the data and on
the dynamics of the market.
1.2 Overview of our approach
In this paper, we propose a model for a dynamic data market. We
focus on the following challenges: (1) the data providers have high
1For example, combinatorial spectrum auctions typically happen once in several years
(Cramton [2013]). Within this time frame the technology can change dramatically
making it impractical for the bidders to misreport their bids based on the expected
outcome of one of the future auctions.
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fixed costs for producing their databases; (2) the databases can be
complementary for the buyers, i.e., joining two databases generates
some additional value for the buyers; (3) buyers and sellers can
arrive to the market over time and can strategically decide when to
arrive.
We adopt a similar approach as proposed by Moor et al. [2019],
i.e., we design a market that aims at optimizing the surplus of
buyers while guaranteeing that the sellers’ costs for producing
their databases are compensated. In contrast to [Moor et al. 2019],
we design a market that uses posted prices for both sellers and
buyers. The rationale for this design decision is twofold. On the one
hand, the market with posted prices has a very simple interface for
possibly non-sophisticated buyers and sellers. On the other hand,
the restriction of using the posted prices results in a much simpler
strategic behavior of buyers and sellers. Indeed, in this case, they
do not have to compute their optimal bid but can simply respond
to the proposed posted prices.2
The market platform in our market plays the role of a regulator,
i.e., it decides on which sellers to allocate, which queries to execute
and how much the buyers need to pay to the sellers. Thus, on the
one hand, the market platform computes payments for the sellers
and allows the sellers to respond to these payments. If the seller’s
cost is smaller than the proposed payment, then the seller gets
allocated, i.e., she creates and delivers her database to the market
platform. On the other hand, the market platform computes the
posted prices (per query) that are exposed to the buyers. The market
platform then receives the buyers’ queries, executes them, collects
the respective amounts of money from the buyers and transfers
them to the sellers.
We demonstrate how to compute the payments suggested to the
sellers and the posted prices for the buyers in a way that neither
sellers nor buyers have an incentive to strategically delay their
arrival or misreport their costs or values. This guarantees dynamic
incentive compatibility. Furthermore, we argue that while the tradi-
tional notion of budget balancedness is incompatible with dynamic
incentive compatibility, our market design still satisfies zero ex-
pected average budget deficit. In other words, we show that, as the
number of databases grows, the expected budget deficit per seller
decreases to zero. Finally, we validate our approach via simulations.
2 FORMAL MODEL
We assume that time is discrete and we consider an infinite horizon
problem where t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞ are the consecutive time steps. We
let N ∈ N be the maximum number of databases that the market
platform can allocate.
Sellers. Data providers arrive to the market independently at
different time steps. At every time step at most one data provider
with the new database can arrive with probability r .3 Each data
provider can produce a single database.
We let θi = ⟨ai , ci ⟩ be the type of the data provider i . Here,
ai ∈ N is the arrival time of the data provider, i.e., the time step
when the data provider obtains her data; ci is the fixed cost that the
data provider incurs for producing the database out of her data. We
2In what follows we will use the word (posted) payments for sellers and posted prices
for buyers.
3In practice, this can be achieved by making time intervals small enough. Considering
a continuous time model with a Poisson arrival process is a possible future extension.
assume that all ci are drawn independently from the cumulative
distribution F (c), f (c) is the corresponding density function. We
assume that ci includes mainly the labor cost for producing the
database, i.e., costs for setting up the database, structuring the
data, linking the data against other existing databases etc.4 We
assume that θi is a private knowledge of the data provider and let
θˆi = ⟨aˆi , cˆi ⟩ be the reported type of the data provider.
Consider the data provider i who obtains her data at time t ,
i.e., ai = t . This data provider can decide to structure her data
and to produce a database. We assume that the database can be
produced immediately after the data provider gets her data. As the
data provider is strategic, she can decide to deliver her database to
the market at a different reported arrival time aˆi , ai if she expects
to be better off by doing so. We impose the following assumption
on early arrivals:
Assumption 1 (Sellers’ Limited Misreports). For every data
provider i it must hold aˆi ≥ ai .
This assumption is not too restrictive as data providers cannot
produce and deliver their databases before they obtain the actual
data (which happens at time t ).
Let Xt ∈ N denote the number of databases allocated at time t ,
X0 = 0. Also, let p(Xt ) be the payment that the market platform is
willing to pay for the new database when Xt − 1 databases have
already been allocated. Then,
Xt+1 = Xt +
∑
θˆi : aˆi=t+1
1{cˆi ≤ p(Xt + 1)}.
Informally, this means that a new database is allocated at time t + 1
if there is an arrival of a new data provider at time t + 1 and the
cost of the data provider is not larger than the payment p(Xt + 1)
proposed by the market platform.
We assume that data providers have quasi-linear utility functions,
i.e., the present value of the utility of the data provider i who
obtains her data at time ai but decides to deliver it at time aˆi is
ui (θi , θˆi ) = −ci +δ aˆi−aip(Xaˆi ); here p(Xaˆi ) is the payment paid by
the market platform to the data provider; δ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant
discount rate for money. 5
Buyers. Generally speaking, at every time step multiple buyers
with different queries can arrive. Each buyer is willing to pay a
certain amount of money for an answer for his query. To keep our
model simple, instead of considering the demand of each buyer
separately, we consider an aggregate demand of all buyers. In other
words, we assume that at every time step there is a single risk-
neutral aggregate buyer willing to get an answer for his question
by submitting a query. In what follows, we will always refer to the
aggregate buyer as simply a “buyer".
A buyer who arrives with his question at time t can strategically
submit his query late at time tˆ , t if he expects to be better off by
doing so. We assume that the buyer cannot submit his query before
he gets his question to ask:
4We assume zero marginal costs, i.e., the electricity costs, the costs of maintaining the
data etc.
5Notice, that the sellers discount only their future payments but not the costs. This
follows from the fact that these are the “labor" costs and must be indexed over time
with the same rate δ (i.e., ci is the constant present value of the future labor costs).
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Assumption 2 (Buyers’ Limited Misreports). Buyers cannot
arrive earlier, i.e., tˆ ≥ t .
In this setting, the instantaneous utility of the buyer who gets
his question at time t but submits his query at time tˆ is Ut (tˆ) =
γ tˆ−t
(
V (X tˆ ) − τtˆ (X tˆ )
)
, where γ ∈ [0,δ ) is the discount factor for
the buyer’s utility;6 τtˆ (X tˆ ) is the posted price faced by the buyer at
time tˆ if X tˆ databases are allocated. Observe that in our setting, the
posted prices τt (Xt ) depend on the number of allocated databases
and thus, constitute a stochastic process (see Section 4 for more
details). The expected value V (.) of the buyer for the answer for
his query depends on the number of allocated databases Xt . We
assume that V (.) is concave and strictly increasing. This reflects
the fact that the larger is the number of available databases, the
more informative (and thus, valuable) an answer for the buyer’s
query can be. Furthermore, the marginal value of an additional data-
base becomes smaller as the number of allocated databases grows.
Thus, such a shape of V (.) captures the complementarity aspect
of the buyers’ preferences and the diminishing value of additional
databases. Important here is that all databases are assumed to be
homogeneous, i.e., they have similar values for possibly different
groups of individual buyers. This assumption excludes the “junk"
data, i.e., the data that has no value for any individual buyer. We
elaborate on this value model in Appendix B. We also assume that
V (.) is known by the market platform.7
Remark 1. In practice, the value of each individual (not aggregate)
buyer for his query can depend not only on the number of allocated
databases Xt but also on the identities of those databases. While these
preferences of individual buyers may be very diverse (and generally
unknown), the aggregate preferences are typically much simpler to
predict. This idea was discussed by [Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999]
who suggested bundling of information goods as a way to obtain
consumers’ valuations for those goods. With this interpretation, in our
model the buyers pay for an access to a bundle of databases. Under
mild assumptions one can let the value of the buyers for such an access
to be concave and strictly increasing in the number of databases in
the bundle.
Market Platform. Our design relies on modeling the dynamics
of the market via a Markov chain. The states of this Markov chain
correspond to different numbers of allocated databases. The transi-
tion probabilities are defined by the arrival rates of the sellers and
the payments suggested by the market platform to the sellers. To
compute these payments, we adopt a similar approach as proposed
by [Moor et al. 2019], i.e., we aim at optimizing the total expected
future discounted utility of buyers while guaranteeing that the fixed
costs of the allocated sellers are compensated. The rationale for
such a market design objective comes from the fact that in data
markets, the sellers can be “monopolists" for their data. Thus, the
market platform should play the role of a regulator that prevents
the rent extracting behavior of the sellers (see [Moor et al. 2019]).
6 Buyers are typically not willing to wait for a long time before getting their queries
answered. Consequently, γ is normally much smaller than δ . We also assume that γ
is a common knowledge.
7Similarly to [Moor et al. 2019], the buyers’ side of themarket is thick and one can easily
sample buyers to learn their valuations. In practice, such learning can be performed by
the market platform by iteratively updating its belief about V (.) when observing the
responses of the buyers for the posted prices. The design of the respective learning
procedure, however, is outside the scope of this paper.
Formally, we can think about our market platform as a Markov
chain with N + 1 states. A state is characterized by the number
of databases being allocated at this state. Assume that at time t
the market platform is in the state Xt ∈ {0, 1, ...,N }. At this state,
the market platform announces a payment p(Xt + 1) for the seller
arriving next. Data providers observe the proposed payments and
decide whether to produce their databases. We set explicitly p(N +
1) = 0 to indicate that in the terminal state, no further databases
can be allocated.
We impose a number of constraints on our market design.
Definition 1 (DIC for Sellers). The mechanism is dynamic
incentive compatible for sellers if for any seller i and ∀θi , θˆi that
satisfy Assumption 1 we have ui (θi ,θi ) ≥ EXaˆi [ui (θi , θˆi )|Xai ].
In words, we say that the mechanism is dynamic incentive com-
patible for sellers, if neither seller can expect to get a higher utility at
any of the future states Xaˆi by misreporting her cost or by delaying
her arrival.
Definition 2 (DIC for Buyers). The mechanism is dynamic
incentive compatible for buyers if ∃t∗ > 0 s.t., for any t ≥ t∗ we
haveUt (t) ≥ EX tˆ [Ut (tˆ)|Xt ] for any tˆ , t that satisfy Assumption 2.
In words, we say that the mechanism is dynamic incentive com-
patible for buyers if once the market gets sufficiently large (i.e.,
many databases are available), the buyers cannot expect to get a
higher utility by delaying their arrival. The latter definition rules
out some corner cases that can occur when the market just starts op-
erating, i.e., during the interval [0, t∗]when only very few databases
are available.
Given these design constraints, we can now formally define the
transitions of the Markov chain. Let i, j be the states of the Markov
chain and let P = [Pi j ](N+1)×(N+1) be the stochastic transition
matrix of this Markov chain with
Pi j =

rF
(
p(i + 1)), if j = i + 1
1 − rF (p(i + 1)), if j = i
0, otherwise.
(1)
Thus, the Markov chain transitions from the state i to the state i + 1
if there is an arrival of a seller (with probability r ) and the cost of
the seller is not larger than the payment proposed to this seller
(which happens with probability F
(
p(i + 1))). Let Pn = P · Pn−1,
n = 2, 3, ....
A commonly used property of budget balancedness (see, e.g.,
[Mas-Colell et al. 1995]) can be informally stated as follows: A
mechanism is budget balanced if the total amount of money paid to
the sellers net the total amount collected from the buyers is equal to
zero. Observe that in our setting, the notion of budget balancedness
is not compatible with DIC for Buyers. Indeed, assume that at some
time step the posted price for the buyer is τ0 > 0 and allN databases
are already allocated. If at some time step t∗ > 0 the mechanism is
budget balanced, then for any ϵ > 0 and for any t ≥ t∗ the amount
of money that should be collected from buyers is smaller than ϵ .
Let us choose ϵ < τ0. Then, the posted price at any time t ≥ t∗
must be smaller than ϵ and consequently, smaller than τ0. Thus, the
buyer who does not discount the future strongly (i.e., γ ≈ 1) would
always prefer to wait until t∗ to submit his query. This violates the
DIC for Buyers.
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Thus, instead of focusing on the traditional notion of budget
balancedness, we aim at achieving zero expected average budget
deficit, i.e., we show that the shortfall per seller decreases as the
number of databases increases.We can define this property formally
in the following way: Let p˜(t) be the present value (at time t ) of
all the past payments that have been already paid to the allocated
sellers up to time t . Similarly, let τ˜ (t) be the present value of all the
payments made by the buyers up to time t . Thus, the budget deficit
at time t can be defined as BD(t) = p˜(t) − τ˜ (t).
Definition 3 (Expected Budget Deficit). The expected budget
deficit is
E[BD] = lim
t→∞Eθi [BD(t)],
where the expectation is over different types of sellers θi .
In words, the expected budget deficit is equal to the expected
residual amount of money that even in the limit cannot be col-
lected from the buyers to fully compensate the sellers. Zero average
expected budget deficit requires that this loss per-seller becomes
negligibly small as the market grows, i.e.,
Definition 4 (Zero Expected Av. Budget Deficit). The mech-
anism has zero average expected budget deficit if
lim
N→∞
E[BD]
N
= 0.
The mechanism we propose is individually rational for buyers
(sellers) as they can always opt-out if the proposed price (payment)
is larger (smaller) than their value (cost).
3 COMPUTING PAYMENTS TO SELLERS
Remember that the market platform maximizes the total expected
future discounted surplus of buyers. Let ν∗k be the maximal expected
total future discounted surplus of buyers when k databases are
already allocated. Consider the Bellman equations for the market
platform:
ν∗N =
V (N )
1 − γ (2)
ν∗k−1 = maxp(k)
{
V (k − 1) + γrF (p(k)) (ν∗k − p(k)) (3)
+
(
1 − rF (p(k)) )γν∗k−1}
for k = 1, ...,N . Informally, the maximal expected total future
discounted surplus of buyers in the state k − 1 of the Markov chain
is equal to the immediate “reward" in this state, i.e., V (k − 1), plus
the discounted expected future maximal surplus in the next state.
The latter one depends on whether the Markov chain stays in the
state k − 1 (i.e., if no allocation happens) or if it transitions to the
state k .
The first-order conditions imply
ν∗k − p∗(k) − ν∗k−1 =
F
(
p∗(k))
f
(
p∗(k)) . (4)
Now, we can rewrite
ν∗k−1 = V (k − 1) + rγ
F 2(p∗(k))
f (p∗(k)) + γν
∗
k−1 (5)
Equations (4) and (5) constitute a system of 2N non-linear equations
with 2N unknowns.8 The solution of these equations gives us the
payments for sellers p∗(k) at every state k of the Markov chains
(along with the values ν∗k ).
Now, we claim that the sellers have no incentive to arrive late.
This follows from the fact that in such a setting the payments
proposed by the market platform can only decrease with time. This
proves dynamic incentive compatibility for sellers. The following
theorem states this formally.
Definition 5. We say that a distribution f (c) is strongly regu-
lar if F (c)f (c) is monotone and strictly increasing.
Theorem 1. If f (.) is strongly regular, then the mechanism is
dynamic incentive compatible for sellers.
Proof. Wefirst show that if f (.) is strongly regular, thenp(1),p(2), ...
weakly decreases with time. The Bellman equations can be rewrit-
ten as follows:
ν∗k−1 − ν∗k−2 =
1
1 − γ
[
V (k − 1) −V (k − 2)+
γr
( F 2 (p∗(k))
f
(
p∗(k)) − F 2
(
p∗(k − 1))
f
(
p∗(k − 1)) )]
for k = 1, ...,N . Using Equation (4) we can rewrite:
p∗(k − 1) + F
(
p∗(k − 1))
f
(
p∗(k − 1)) + γr1 − γ F 2
(
p∗(k − 1))
f
(
p∗(k − 1)) =
1
1 − γ
[
V (k − 1) −V (k − 2) + γr F
2 (p∗(k))
f
(
p∗(k)) ] .
By induction, we see thatp(N+1) = 0,p(N ) > 0; the l.h.s. is a strictly
increasing function while the r.h.s. gets larger as k → 0 (due to the
concavity of V (.) and the induction hypothesis p∗(k) ≥ p∗(k + 1)).
Thus, the solution for p∗(k − 1) must also get larger as k → 0, i.e.,
p∗(k − 1) ≥ p∗(k).
Finally, for any θi , θˆi that satisfy Assumption 1 we have
ui (θi , θˆi ) = −ci + δ aˆi−aip(Xaˆi ) ≤ −ci + δ aˆi−aip(Xai )
≤ −ci + p(Xai ) = ui (θi ,θi ).
Q.E.D. 
4 COMPUTING PRICES FOR BUYERS
Observe that if we set the posted prices for the buyer equal to the
payments for sellers, i.e., τt (Xt ) = p(Xt ), then the mechanism can-
not satisfy DIC for Buyers. Indeed, as we have shown in Theorem
1, the payments p(Xt ) can only decrease with time. In this case, the
posted price would also only decrease. This would incentivize the
buyers to arrive late which violates DIC for Buyers. Therefore, we
need to disentangle the posted prices exposed to the buyer from
the payments paid to the sellers. There are two main requirements
to constructing such posted prices:
R1. The posted prices τt must guarantee DIC for Buyers;
R2. τt and p(Xt ) must satisfy zero expected average budget
deficit.
8We solve it with the Newton method.
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In this section, we show how to construct a pricing scheme satisfy-
ing these two requirements.
First, the solution of Equations (4) and (5) allows us to compute
the transition matrix P as defined in Equation (1). Now, let π˜ (k)
denote the present value of the future total payment to sellers when
the Markov chain is in the state k . Thus, for each k we can compute
the expected value of π˜ (k) at this state as follows:
E[π˜ (k)] =δrF (p(k + 1))(p(k + 1) + E[π˜ (k + 1)])+ (6)
δ
(
1 − rF (p(k + 1)) )E[π˜ (k)], ∀k = 0, 1, ...,N .
In words, if the Markov chain is in the state k , then two things can
happen. Either an allocation happens, and therefore, the Markov
chain transitions to the state k + 1. In this case, the market platform
must make an “immediate" payment p(k + 1) and expects to make a
future payment of E[π˜ (k + 1)]. Alternatively, no allocation happens.
In this case, the market platform stays in the state k and expects
to make a future payment of E[π˜ (k)]. Thus, the present value of
the expected future total payment to the sellers in state k is equal
to the discounted convex combination of the two aforementioned
terms. Equations (6) constitute a system of N + 1 linear equations
with N + 1 unknowns E[π˜ (k)], k = 0, ...,N .
Now remember, that Pni j is the probability that the Markov chain
transitions from the state i to the state j within n time intervals.
Thus, to satisfy the requirement R1 at time t = 0 we must have
τ0(0) + δ
(
P00τ1(0) + P01τ1(1) + ...
)
+ (7)
δ2
(
P200τ2(0) + P201τ2(1) + P202τ2(2) + ...
)
+ ... = E[π˜ (0)].
To satisfy the requirement R2 we compute the prices in a way
that at any time step t and any allocation of databases Xt at time
t , the expected future posted price at any possible future time
interval is equal to the current posted price (i.e. to the posted price
at time t ). Thus, for t = 0 we set P00τ1(0) + P01τ1(1) + ... = τ0(0),
(P200τ2(0)+ P201τ2(1)+ P202τ2(2)+ ...) = τ0(0) etc. for any tˆ > t . Now,
we can simplify the Equation (7): τ0(0) = (1 − δ )E[π˜ (0)]. Generally,
if at time t the Markov chain is in the state k , we set
τt (k) = (1 − δ )
(
E[π˜ (k)] + p˜(t) − τ˜ (t − 1)
δ
)
. (8)
Finally, the overall mechanism looks as follows:
Dynamic Data Market Mechanism
Payments to Sellers: At time t = 0, solve Equations (4) and (5):
ν∗k−1 = V (k − 1) + rγ
F 2(p∗(k))
f (p∗(k)) + γν
∗
k−1,
ν∗k − p∗(k) − ν∗k−1 =
F
(
p∗(k))
f
(
p∗(k)) , k = 1, ...,N .
Here, p∗(k) is the payment proposed by the market platform
for the k’th database, k = 1, ...,N .
Allocation of Sellers: At each time t > 0, a seller with cost ci
may arrive and respond to p∗(Xt−1 + 1). If ci ≤ p∗(Xt−1 + 1),
the seller is allocated, Xt = Xt−1 + 1. Otherwise, the seller is
not allocated, Xt = Xt−1.
Posted Prices for Buyers: At each time t , the market platform
computes the posted price for this interval according to Equa-
tion (8):
τt (Xt ) = (1 − δ )
(
E[π˜ (Xt )] + p˜(t) − τ˜ (t − 1)
δ
)
.
The dynamic incentive compatibility for buyers follows from the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. The process τt (Xt ) is a martingale.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
To complete the proof of DIC for Buyers, observe thatγV (Xt+1) ≤
γV (Xt + 1) = γ (V (Xt + 1) − V (Xt )) + γV (Xt ). From concavity
of V (.) it follows that as Xt gets sufficiently large, the difference
(V (Xt + 1) −V (Xt )) gets small. This fact together with Theorem
2 proves that if the market is large enough, the buyers do not get
more value from delaying their arrival. Formally,
E[Ut (tˆ = t + 1)|Xt ] =E[γV (Xt+1)|Xt ] − γE[τtˆ (X tˆ )|Xt ] ≤
γE[V (Xt + 1) −V (Xt )]︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
Goes to 0 as Xt grows.
+γUt (t).
Finally, the following theorem shows that the proposed mecha-
nism satisfies zero expected average budget deficit.
Theorem 3. The dynamic data market mechanism has zero ex-
pected average budget deficit.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
5 EXPERIMENTS
To validate our model, we carry out a number of simulations of the
proposed market under different simulation scenarios. We assume
that for all scenarios, the costs of sellers are drawn from the uniform
distribution, ci ∼ U [0, 1]. We further assume that the value of the
buyer is V (Xt ) =
√
Xt . The discount rate is δ = 0.9.
Payments for Sellers. First, we perform a simulationwithN = 100
databases while varying r and γ . Figure 1 illustrates the payment
p(i) for the newly arriving database i ≤ N when (i − 1) databases
are already allocated. Here, we vary r ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1.0} while fixing
γ = 0.9. In line with our results proved in Theorem 1, the payments
decrease over time. From this figure, we also see that as the arrival
rate r gets smaller, the market platform suggests higher payments
to the sellers. This result follows form the fact that as the probability
of arrival of a seller decreases, the opportunity cost of the market
platform for waiting increases. Indeed, if at time t the seller does
not arrive, and Xt = Xt−1, then the buyer enjoys a smaller value
of V (Xt−1) instead of the value V (Xt−1 + 1) he could have enjoyed
if the seller arrived at time t and delivered her database. Thus, the
market platform “loses" the possible higher value of the buyer and
consequently, has a higher opportunity cost for waiting. Due to
the increased opportunity costs, the market platform increases the
payments.
Now, let us look into the dependency of the payments to the
sellers on the discount factor γ of the buyer. Figure 2 illustrates
the payments of the market platform for the i’th database when
(i − 1) databases are already allocated. Here, we fix r = 1 and vary
γ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. The figure demonstrates that the stronger the
buyer discounts the future, the smaller the payments proposed to
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Figure 1: Payment for the i’th allocated database for differ-
ent arrival rates r of sellers.
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Figure 2: Payment for the i’th allocated database for differ-
ent discount factors γ of buyers.
the sellers by the market platform. The explanation of this phe-
nomenon comes from a similar opportunity cost argument: Indeed,
stronger discounting of the future value of the buyer decreases
the opportunity cost of “losing" the future buyer’s surplus. Thus,
the opportunity cost of not allocating the seller now gets smaller.
Consequently, the payments suggested by the market platform to
the sellers must also decrease.
Posted Prices for the Buyer. We illustrate the posted prices ex-
posed to the buyer by generating 10 trajectories corresponding to
the process τt (Xt ). To achieve this, we sample 10 different arrival
scenarios and costs ci . We set γ = 0.5, r = 1, N = 100. We then
let the simulated sellers arrive to the market and respond to the
suggested payments. At each time step t we compute the number of
allocated databases Xt as well as the posted price τt (Xt ) according
to Equation (8). Figure 3 (top) illustrates the different trajectories
corresponding to the martingale process of the posted price τt (Xt )
while Figure 3 (bottom) demonstrates the respective trajectories of
the process Xt . From comparing the Figure 3 (top) with the Figure
3 (bottom) we see that if an allocation does not happen at time
t (i.e., the trajectory of Xt has a plateau), then the posted price
τt (Xt ) decreases. If an allocation happens at time t , then there is a
respective spike in the posted price.
Expected Average Budget Deficit. We illustrate the convergence of
the expected average budget deficit, E[BD]N , to zero as the number of
allocated databases N grows. Figure 4 illustrates our findings. Here,
we sample 1000 different trajectories corresponding to different
arrivals and costs of sellers. We then compute the mean values and
the standard errors of the resulting expected average budget deficit.
As expected, the result goes in hand with our Theorem 3.
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Figure 3: Trajectories of the posted price τt (Xt ) (top) and the
number of allocated databases Xt (bottom). For every trajec-
tory Xt , the respective trajectory τt (Xt ) is depicted with the
same color.
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Figure 4: Expected Average Budget Deficit for different num-
bers of N . Here, r = 1, γ = 0.5.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the dynamics of the combinatorial
data market. We proposed a mechanism that optimizes the expected
future discounted surplus of buyers while compensating the fixed
costs of allocated sellers and satisfying the two key properties: dy-
namic incentive compatibility and zero expected average budget
deficit. We further studied the proposed mechanism in a simula-
tion environment. Our results confirm our intuition regarding the
changes in prices and in the budget deficit when slightly changing
the parameters of the mechanism. In future work, we are plan-
ning to expand these simulations and to study a number of further
economic properties of the proposed mechanism.
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A PROOFS
Lemma 1. For any state k = 0, ...,N the following inequality holds:
E[π˜ (k)] − E[π˜ (k + 1)] ≤ p(k + 1).
Proof. Follows from Equation (6). We can rewrite(
1 + 1 − δ
δrF
(
p(k + 1)) )E[π˜ (k)] − E[π˜ (k + 1)] = p(k + 1). (9)
Here, 1 + 1−δ
δ r F
(
p(k+1)
) ≥ 1. Therefore,
E[π˜ (k)] − E[π˜ (k + 1)] ≤ p(k + 1).

Lemma 2. For any time t > 0 it holds p˜(t) − τ˜ (t) > 0.
Proof. We proceed by induction. For t = 1, the payment p(1) is
maximal and the result holds, i.e., BD(1) = p(1) − τ0(0)δ − τ1(ℓ) > 0.
Consider an arbitrary time t > 1 and Xt = ℓ. We have
BD(t) = p˜(t) − τ˜ (t) = p˜(t) − τ˜ (t − 1)
δ
−
(1 − δ )
(
E[π˜ (ℓ)] + p˜(t) − τ˜ (t − 1)
δ
)
=
δp˜(t) − τ˜ (t − 1) − (1 − δ )E[π˜ (ℓ)] =
δ
(
p˜(t) − τ (t − 1)
δ
)
− (1 − δ )E[π˜ (ℓ)] =
δ
( p˜(t − 1)
δ
+ p(Xt ) − τ˜ (t − 1)
δ
)
− (1 − δ )E[π˜ (ℓ)] =
BD(t − 1) + δp(Xt ) − (1 − δ )E[π˜ (ℓ)].
Now, consider two cases: p(Xt ) = p(ℓ) and p(Xt ) = p(ℓ + 1) (i.e.,
dependent on whether there is an allocation has happened at time
t ).
In the former case, using Equation (9) we can rewrite:
BD(t) =BD(t − 1) +
(
δ +
1 − δ
rF
(
p(ℓ)) )E[π˜ (ℓ − 1)]−
δE[π˜ (ℓ)] − (1 − δ )E[π˜ (ℓ)] =
BD(t − 1) +
(
δ +
1 − δ
rF
(
p(ℓ)) )E[π˜ (ℓ − 1)] − E[π˜ (ℓ)]
≥ BD(t − 1) ≥ 0.
In the latter case,
BD(t) =BD(t − 1) +
(
δ +
1 − δ
rF
(
p(ℓ)) )E[π˜ (ℓ)]−
δE[π˜ (ℓ + 1)] − (1 − δ )E[π˜ (ℓ)] =
BD(t − 1) +
(
δ +
1 − δ
rF
(
p(ℓ)) − (1 − δ ))E[π˜ (ℓ)]−
δE[π˜ (ℓ + 1)] ≥ BD(t − 1) ≥ 0.
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3 1. The mechanism has zero expected average budget
deficit.
Proof. We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4. For any state k = 0, ...,N the following inequality holds:
E[π˜ (k)] − E[π˜ (k + 1)] ≤ p(k + 1). (10)
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Now, we can show that for any time t > 0, the budget deficit is
non-negative.
Lemma 5. For any time t > 0 it holds p˜(t) − τ˜ (t) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Now, let us consider the budget deficit at time t , i.e., BD(t) =
p˜(t) − τ˜ (t). We know that BD(0) = 0 − τ˜ (0) = −(1 − δ )E[π˜ (0)]. The
expected budget deficit at time t = 1 is
E[BD(1)] =rF (p(1)) (p(1) − τ1(1)) − τ0(0)
δ
−
(
1 − rF (p(1)) )τ1(0) =
rF
(
p(1)) (p(1) − τ1(1) + τ1(0)) − τ0(0)
δ
− τ1(0).
Observe, that τ1(1) = τ1(0)+ (1−δ )(p(1)+E[π˜ (1)]−E[π˜ (0)]). Thus,
we can rewrite
E[BD(1)] = rF (p(1)) (p(1) − (1 − δ )(p(1) + E[π˜ (1)] − E[π˜ (0)]))−
τ0(0)
δ
− τ1(0) =
rF
(
p(1)) (E[π˜ (0)] − E[π˜ (1)]) + δrF (p(1)) (p(1) + E[π˜ (1)])−
δrF
(
p(1))E[π˜ (0)] − τ0(0)
δ
− τ1(0) =
rF
(
p(1)) (E[π˜ (0)] − E[π˜ (1)]) + δrF (p(1)) (p(1) + E[π˜ (1)])+
δ
(
1 − rF (p(1)) )E[π˜ (0)]
−δE[π˜ (0)] − τ0(0)
δ
− (1 − δ )
(
E[π˜ (0)] − τ0(0)
δ
)
= rF
(
p(1)) (E[π˜ (0)] − E[π˜ (1)]) + BD(0).
From Lemma 4 it follows that
E[BD(1)] ≤ BD(0) + rF (p(1))p(1).
Now, consider the expected budget deficit at time t > 1:
E[BD(t)] =E[BD(t − 1)]+∑
ℓ
Pr(state = ℓ)
[
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1))(p(ℓ + 1) − τt (ℓ + 1))+(
1 − rF (p(ℓ + 1)) )(−τt (ℓ))] .
Observe, that
τt (ℓ + 1) = τt (ℓ) + (1 − δ )
(
E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)] − E[π˜ (ℓ)] + p(ℓ + 1)
)
.
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Thus, we can rewrite
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (p(ℓ + 1) − τt (ℓ + 1))+(
1 − rF (p(ℓ + 1)) )( − τt (ℓ)) =
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (p(ℓ + 1) − τt (ℓ + 1) + τt (ℓ)) − τt (ℓ) =
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (δp(ℓ + 1) − (1 − δ )(E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)] − E[π˜ (ℓ)]))
− τt (ℓ) =
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (E[π˜ (ℓ)] − E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)])+
δrF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (p(ℓ + 1) + E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)])+
δ
(
1 − rF (p(ℓ + 1)) )E[π˜ (ℓ)] − δE[π˜ (ℓ)] − τt (ℓ) =
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (E[π˜ (ℓ)] − E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)])+
E[π˜ (ℓ)](1 − δ ) − τt (ℓ) ≤
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (E[π˜ (ℓ)] − E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)]) − 1 − δ
δ
BD(t − 1) <
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (E[π˜ (ℓ)] − E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)]) .
Here, the last inequality follows directly from Lemma 5. Now, we
can rewrite
E[BD(t)] < E[BD(t − 1)]+
max
ℓ
{
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (E[π˜ (ℓ)] − E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)])} ≤
E[BD(t − 1)] +max
ℓ
{
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1))p(ℓ + 1)}.
Which implies that the expected budget deficit grows slower than
linearly. Thus,
lim
N→∞
E[BD(t)]
N
= 0.
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 2 1. The process τ1(X1),τ2(X2), ... is a martingale.
Proof. Let Xt = s . We want to show that E[τt+1(ℓ)|s] = τt (s).
Precisely,
E[τt+1(ℓ)|s] = rF
(
p(s + 1))τt+1(s + 1)+(
1 − rF (p(s + 1)) )τt+1(s) =
(1 − δ )
[
rF
(
p(s + 1)) (E[π˜ (s + 1)] + p˜(t)
δ
+ p(s + 1) − τ˜ (t)
)
+
(
1 − rF (p(s + 1)) ) (E[π˜ (s)] + p˜(t)
δ
− τ˜ (t)
)]
=
(1 − δ )
[
rF
(
p(s + 1)) (E[π˜ (s + 1)] + p(s + 1))+(
1 − rF (p(s + 1)) )E[π˜ (s)] + p˜(t)
δ
− τ˜ (t)
]
=
(1 − δ )
[E[π˜ (s)]
δ
+
p˜(t)
δ
− τ˜ (t)
]
=
1 − δ
δ
[
E[π˜ (s)] + p˜(t) − δτ˜ (t − 1) − τt (s)
]
=
1 − δ
δ
[ τt (s)
1 − δ − τt (s)
]
= τt (s).
Q.E.D. 
B VALUE MODEL
We assume that buyers acquire the data to make certain predictions
about the state of the world. If the prediction is good, they get a
high reward, RH ∈ R+. Otherwise, they get a low reward RL ∈ R+,
RL < RH (this is similar to the model of [Bergemann et al. 2018]).
Due to the inherent uncertainty about the world, a buyer without
any additional information faces a lotteryA in which he can get the
high reward with Pr(RH ) = P˜A or the low reward with Pr(RL) =
1 − P˜A. Thus, the expected reward of the risk-neutral buyer who
does not acquire any data is
RA = P˜ARH + (1 − P˜A)RL .
We assume that better predictions of the state of the world lead
to higher chances of getting the high reward RH for the buyer,
i.e., to a different lottery with a higher expected reward. Thus, in
order to improve his prediction, the buyer can purchase the data.
As typically the number of different databases N is much larger
than the number of databases relevant for answering each buyer’s
query, we assume that every buyer is willing to join at most two
databases.
Inwhat follows, we show that as the number of available databases
N increases, the aggregate value of buyers for a yet another data-
base also increases. Generally speaking, allocating an additional
complementary database may result in either concave or convex
aggregate value function V (.). However, we demonstrate that for
larger numbers of N , the aggregate value function V (.) is more
likely to be concave even for strongly complementary databases.
This follows from the fact, that as N grows, the buyers are still
joining only a very small number of databases comparing to N
(two in our example). Therefore, there is no exponential blow up in
the values of buyers for answers for their queries on average. We
show this more formally by demonstrating a number of examples
for N ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Development of a more general formal value
model is the future extension of this work.
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Single database. Assume that accessing a single database results
in a perfect prediction of the state of the world with probability P˜1.
Conversely, the database is useless with probability (1 − P˜1).9 This
induces a new lottery B, such that the expected reward of this new
lottery is
RB = (1 − P˜1)RA + P˜1RH = RA + P˜1(1 − PA)(RH − RL).
Consequently, the expected willingness to pay for the single data-
base is
RB − RA = P˜1(RH − RA) = P˜1(1 − P˜A)(RH − RL). (11)
Two databases. Now, assume that there are two databases avail-
able for the buyers. As before, let P˜1 be the probability to make
a perfect prediction regarding the state of the world by address-
ing either of the two databases. Implicit here is the homogeneity
assumption, i.e., the assumption that this probability is the same
for both databases. This obviously excludes the case of the “junk"
data, i.e., the data that is not valuable by neither buyer.
Furthermore, let P˜2 be the probability to make a perfect predic-
tion by joining the two databases.10 Let C be the respective lottery
faced by buyers who can access both databases. The expected re-
ward of this new lottery is
RC = RH
(
2P˜1 − P˜21 + P˜2
)
+ RA
(
1 − (2P˜1 − P˜21 + P˜2)
)
.
Here, the total probability of getting the high reward by accessing
any single database is 2P˜1 − P˜21 while the probability of getting the
high reward by joining the two databases is P˜2. In this case, the
expected willingness to pay for the second database is
RC − RB =
(
P˜1(1 − P˜1) + P˜2
)
(1 − P˜A)(RH − RL). (12)
Comparing this with Equation (11) we see that as long as P˜2 ≤ P˜21 ,
we have RC − RB ≤ RB − RA. This means that as long as the two
databases complement each other (i.e., P˜2 > 0) but are not “strongly"
complementary, the expected willingness of the buyers to pay for
the second database is smaller than the one for the first database.
This implies concavity of the value function V (.) of the buyer.
Contrary, if P˜2 > P˜21 , the expected willingness of the buyers to
pay for the second database is larger than their expected willing-
ness to pay for the first one. This means that if the two databases
are strongly complementary, the resulting value function V (.) can
become convex. However, as we show below, this effect decreases
as we increase N .
Three databases. Consider the casewhen there are three databases
available. Remember, that buyers are willing to join at most two
of them. In this case, the probability to get the high reward is
(3P˜1 − 3P˜21 + P˜31 ) + (3P˜2 − 3P˜22 + P˜32 ). Here, the first term reflects
the probability of getting the high reward by accessing a single
database. The second term reflects the probability of receiving the
high reward when joining two different databases.11 In this case,
9Another way of thinking about this is that the fraction of the population of buyers
P˜1 can get an answer for their questions using this single database.
10If the two databases are complementary, it must be that P˜2 > 0.
11Here we consider only the symmetric case, when different ways of joining the data
may lead to obtaining the perfect prediction regarding the state of the world.
the willingness to pay for the third database is
RD − RC =
(
P˜1(1 − P˜1)2 + 2P˜2 − 3P˜22 + P˜32
)
(1 − P˜A)(RH − RL).
Comparing this equation with Equation (12) we see that in this
case, to achieve concavity of V (.) we only need to show that
P˜1(1 − P˜1)2 + 2P˜2 − 3P˜22 + P˜32 ≤ P˜1(1 − P˜1) + P˜2.
This latter constraint is trivially less strict than the constraint P˜2 ≤
P˜21 obtained for the case of two databases. Thus, as the number
of available databases N grows and the buyers are willing to join
only a small subset of these databases, the expected willingness
of the buyers to pay for a yet another database decreases even for
databases with stronger complementarity properties. Thus, given
the assumption of homogeneity of databases and the restricting the
number of databases that can be joined by buyers, the aggregate
value function V (.) can be assumed to be concave for large N .
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